United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88216416
Mark: VALOR
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Clark Associates, Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: October 01, 2019
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on September 9, 2019.
In a previous Office action dated March 12, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark, and Sections 1 and 45 failure to show the applied-for mark in use in commerce with any of the specified goods. In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement: clarify the mark description.
Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement has been satisfied: applicant clarified the mark description. See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
The following refusal has also been obviated: Sections 1 and 45 refusal. See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
Upon further review of the application and consideration of the applicant’s arguments, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
ISSUE MADE FINAL that applicant must address:
I. SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4988036. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously attached registration
VALOR and design for “Cookware, namely, pots and pans.”
U.S. Registration No. 4988036 is the mark VALOR FORGE CUSTOM KNIVES (standard character form) which has been registered for, in relevant part, “Blades for Chef knives, . . . Household knives . . . Kitchen knives, . . . Chef knives . . . [and] Knives.”
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
A. Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, the standard character mark owned by the registrant may be displayed in any lettering style including the style selected by the applicant since the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).
When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Here, the wording “VALOR” constitutes the dominant portion of the applicant’s mark since it is the only literal element of the applied-for mark.
Additionally, consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions). In this case, the wording “VALOR” constitutes the dominant portion of the registered mark since it is the first term and is followed by disclaimed descriptive wording. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
Accordingly, any differences between applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are substantially outweighed by the high degree of similarities in overall commercial impression, between the respective marks. As such, considered in their entireties, applicant and registrant’s marks are confusingly similar pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
B. Comparison of the Goods
In this case, the applicant and registrant’s goods are highly similar in terms of their nature, use, and marketing channels. For instance, the applicant listed in the identification of goods that it will provide “Cookware, namely, pots and pans.”
Registrant provides, in relevant part, “Blades for Chef knives, . . . Household knives . . . Kitchen knives, . . . Chef knives . . . [and] Knives.”
C. Applicant’s Arguments Are Unpersuasive
Applicant contends in the September 9, 2019 response that there is no likelihood of confusion since the marks are visually and phonetically different in that the applicant has used stylized lettering and applicant’s mark does not include the additional wording “FORGE CUSTOM KNIVES”. As an initial matter, the registrant’s mark is in standard character form; as noted above, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). Furthermore, the omission of the descriptive wording “FORGE CUSTOM KNIVES” fails to differentiate the marks since applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion. See Id at 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Here, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark. Additionally, contrary to applicant’s assertion the marks here have not been dissected in the Section 2(d) analysis; the marks have been considered in their entireties, as noted above, and differences referenced by the applicant are simply outweighed by the other factors in the analysis.
Moreover, when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b). Accordingly, the differences in sound and appearance referenced by the applicant are insufficient to obviate the likelihood of confusion since the marks’ commercial impression and dominant wording are highly similar if not virtually identical.
Applicant also argues that the goods of the parties are not identical and that it believes confusion to be de minimis; however, contrary to applicant’s position, there are several examples of industry websites which clearly show a common entity providing these goods and often in close proximity to the other. Furthermore, the fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01. Moreover, applicant’s contention that the registrant’s goods are limited to hunting and fishing is unpersuasive since the registration specifically lists goods like kitchen knives, chefs knives, and knives generally among the goods provided. A trademark or service mark registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration and the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the specified goods. See 15 U.S.C. §1057(b); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv). As such, reading limitations into the registrant’s use of the mark is improper. Thus, evidence and arguments that constitute a collateral attack on a cited registration, such as information or statements regarding a registrant’s nonuse of its mark, are not relevant during ex parte prosecution. See In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Peebles Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n.5 (TTAB 1992); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv). Such evidence and arguments may, however, be pertinent to a formal proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel the cited registration.
The evidence discussed above demonstrates that the goods in the application and registration are highly similar, particularly with respect to the nature of goods, use of the goods, and marketing channels involved. Since the marks are confusingly similar and the goods are related, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the respective goods. Therefore, applicant’s mark is not entitled to registration.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
/Amer Raja/
Amer Raja
Examining Attorney
Law Office 121
(571) 270 5936
amer.raja@uspto.gov
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