To: | HTP, Inc. (cclarkin@apslaw.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88141189 - ELITE - 405483 7026 |
Sent: | August 06, 2019 07:39:02 AM |
Sent As: | ecom120@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88141189
Mark: ELITE
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: HTP, Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. 405483 7026
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: August 06, 2019
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on July 15, 2019.
In a previous Office action dated January 15, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.
The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Comparing the Marks
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is “ELITE” and registrant’s mark is “ELITE”. These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods. Id. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Comparing the Goods
In this case, applicant’s goods are “heating boilers; water heaters” in International Class 11.
Registrant’s goods are “central air conditioners, furnaces, heat pumps and components thereof, all for residential space conditioning use” in International Class 11.
The previously attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a representative sample 26 of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely, furnaces, water heaters, and/or heating boilers are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.
Applicant’s Arguments
Applicant argues that its “mark ELITE HEATING BOILER with a disclaimer to the terms ‘HEATING BOILER’ leaving the dominant term ELITE has coexisted with the cited ELITE registration for ten (10) years without any likelihood of confusion.” Applicant also argues that its “other registrations and allowed application for the marks ELITE XL (disclaiming ‘XL’), ELITE FT and ELITE ULTRA also contain the dominant term elite and there has been no likelihood of confusion with these additional coexisting marks.”
Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive because applicant’s other registered marks are not identical to the mark in this case. As such, the claim that applicant’s other registered marks have coexisted without any likelihood of confusion with the cited registration is irrelevant.
Applicant argues that because other marks on the register coexist with the registered mark, that its mark can coexist as well. Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive for the same reason given above. Additionally, prior decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in registering other marks have little evidentiary value and are not binding upon the USPTO or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vi); see In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d 1790, 1793 n.10 (TTAB 2017). Each case is decided on its own facts, and each mark stands on its own merits. In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d at 1793 n.10 (quoting In re Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336, 1343, 67 USPQ2d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
Applicant argues that “the term ELITE is weak and only entitled to a narrow scope of protection” because of on other registered marks containing the word “ELITE.” Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive. Unlike the marks in this case, the registered marks that applicant references have additional words, besides the word “ELITE”, that distinguish the marks from each other and the cited mark.
Applicant argues that its “and Registrant’s goods are not marketed or sold through general retail stores but rather they are each sold through independent dealers as shown on the respective websites.” Applicant also argues that “[b]oth Applicant and Registrant also market their respective goods through detailed brochures.”
Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive because determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The identification of goods in the application and registration does not limit the trade channel to independent dealers nor does it limit the classes of purchasers. In the absence of limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers in the goods in the registration, the presumption is that the goods move in all trade channels normal for such goods and are available to all potential classes of ordinary consumers of such goods. See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii). As such, applicant’s attempt to limit registrant’s trade channels to independent dealers is unpersuasive and the attached evidence shows that the type of goods offered by applicant and registrant travel in the same channels of trade and to the same classes of purchasers.
Applicant argues that the relevant consumers are sophisticated purchasers. Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive. The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011). Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser. In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163).
Conclusion
Applicant’s and registrant’s marks are confusingly similar and their goods are related. Accordingly, the applied-for mark, “ELITE”, is refused for likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d). This refusal is hereby made final.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES FOR FINAL OFFICE ACTION
Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:
(1) a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or
(2) an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). There is a fee required for filing a petition. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
How to respond. Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).
Additional Response Guidance
QUESTIONS
If applicant has questions regarding this final Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal in this final Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
/Marco Wright/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 120
(571) 272-4918
marco.wright@uspto.gov