UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 1/6/2019

 

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

 

1.     Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

2.     Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive

3.     Additional Information Required

4.     Advisory – Overcoming a Section 2(e)(1) Refusal by Amending to the Supplemental Register

5.     Advisory – Applicant May Wish to Seek Trademark Counsel

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 0850906, 3877185, 3870782, 4425780, 3870783, 2293011, 3746840, and 3669402.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Applicant’s mark is AIPHONE (standard character) for “Handheld mobile digital electronic devices for the sending and receiving of telephone calls, electronic mail, and other digital data, for use as a digital format audio player, and for use as a handheld computer, personal digital assistant, electronic organizer, electronic notepad, and camera,” in International Class 009.

 

The cited registrations are:­­

 

AIPHONE (stylized), Registration No. 0850906, for “Intercommunication system; telephones” in International Class 009, in relevant part;

 

IPHONE (standard character), Registration No. 3877185, for “Computer gaming machines, videophones, prerecorded computer programs for personal information management, database management software, electronic mail and messaging software, database synchronization software, computer programs for accessing, browsing and searching online databases, computer software and firmware, namely, operating system programs, data synchronization programs, and application development computer software programs for personal and handheld computers; software for the redirection of messages, Internet e-mail, and/or other data to one or more electronic handheld services from a data store on or associated with personal computer or a server; software for the synchronization of data between a remote station or device and a fixed or remote station or device,” in International Class 009;

 

IPHONE (standard character), Registration No. 3870782, for “Full line of parts for mobile telephones; mobile phone accessories, namely, mobile telephone covers, mobile telephone cases, batteries, rechargeable batteries, battery chargers, chargers for electric batteries, headphones, stereo headphones, in-ear headphones, stereo speakers, audio speakers for home, personal stereo speaker apparatus, microphones, car audio adapters, headsets, remote controls, connection cables, power adapters, docking stations, and adapter plugs,” in International Class 009;

 

IPHONE (plus design), Registration No. 4425780, for “Computer gaming machines, videophones, and computer peripherals,” in International Class 009;

 

IPHONE (standard character), Registration No. 3870783, for “Retail store services and retail store services provided via communications networks all featuring handheld mobile digital electronic devices and other consumer electronics, computer software, accessories, and carrying cases for such devices; product demonstrations provided via communications networks,” in International Class 035;

 

IPHONE (standard character), Registration No. 2293011, for “Computer hardware and software for providing integrated telephone communication with computerized global information networks,” in International Class 009;

 

IPHONE (plus design), Registration No. 3746840, for “Handheld mobile digital electronic devices for the sending and receiving of telephone calls, electronic mail, and other digital data, for use as a digital format audio player, and for use as a handheld computer, personal digital assistant, electronic organizer, electronic notepad, and camera,” in International Class 009; and,

 

IPHONE (standard character), Registration No. 3669402) for “handheld mobile digital electronic devices for the sending and receiving of telephone calls, electronic mail, and other digital data, for use as a digital format audio player, and for use as a handheld computer, personal digital assistant, electronic organizer, electronic notepad, and camera,” in International Class 009.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Applicant’s mark, AIPHONE (standard character), is highly similar to the cited registrations in sound, appearance, and commercial impression.

 

With respect to Registration No. 0850906, applicant’s mark is AIPHONE (standard character) and registrant’s mark is AIPHONE (stylized).  Thus, the literal elements of these marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because the literal portions are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.  Id. The additional stylization in Registration No. 0850906 does not distinguish the marks where the applied-for mark is in standard character and may be displayed in any font or style. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).

 

With respect to Registration Nos. 3877185, 3870782, 4425780, 3870783, 2293011, 3746840, and 3669402, for IPHONE (standard character) and IPHONE (plus design), the entire literal portion of the cited registrations is encompassed by the applied-for mark. Specifically, the only difference between the literal portions of the marks is the addition of the letter “A” to the beginning of the applied-for mark. Otherwise, the literal portions are identical. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Finally, with respect to Registration Nos. 4425780 and 3746840, the additional design elements in the marks do not distinguish the marks where the literal portion remains dominant. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

As such, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods and/or Services

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In the present case, applicant lists “Handheld mobile digital electronic devices for the sending and receiving of telephone calls, electronic mail, and other digital data, for use as a digital format audio player, and for use as a handheld computer, personal digital assistant, electronic organizer, electronic notepad, and camera,” in International Class 009. These goods directly overlap with and are highly similar to the goods and services listed in each of the cited registrations as discussed below.

 

With respect to Registration Nos. 3746840 and 3669402, the goods are identical. Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.  

 

 With respect to Registration Nos. 0850906, 3877185, 4425780, and 2293011, the applicant’s identification uses broad wording that fully encompasses the goods listed by the registrants. Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe its handheld mobile digital electronic devices for the sending and receiving of telephone calls”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrants’s more narrow telephones, videophones, and computer hardware for  telephone communication.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.

 

Lastly, with respect to Registration Nos. 3870783, registrant’s retail store services feature applicant’s handheld mobile digital electronic devices. The use of similar marks on or in connection with both products and retail-store services has been held likely to cause confusion where the evidence showed that the retail-store services featured the same type of products.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the use of similar marks for various clothing items, including athletic uniforms, and for retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel likely to cause confusion); In re House Beer, LLC, 114 USPQ2d 1073, 1078 (TTAB 2015) (holding the use of identical marks for beer and for retail store services featuring beer likely to cause confusion); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1023 (TTAB 2006) (holding the use of similar marks for jewelry and for retail-jewelry and mineral-store services likely to cause confusion); TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii). The attached evidence from Apple, Samsung, and Blackberry all offering mobile electronic devices and retail store services featuring those devices under the same marks.

 

Because the marks are similar and goods/services are related, it is likely that consumers would believe the goods/services emanate from a common source.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature,  characteristic, purpose, or funtionfunction of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods and/or services.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is AIPHONE for “Handheld mobile digital electronic devices for the sending and receiving of telephone calls, electronic mail, and other digital data, for use as a digital format audio player, and for use as a handheld computer, personal digital assistant, electronic organizer, electronic notepad, and camera,” in International Class 009. The mark is a combination of the terms AI and PHONE.

 

An abbreviation, initialism, or acronym is merely descriptive when it is generally understood as “substantially synonymous” with the descriptive words it represents.  See In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d 1712, 1715 (TTAB 2011) (citing Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504, 506, 110 USPQ 293, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1956)) (holding NKJV substantially synonymous with merely descriptive term “New King James Version” and thus merely descriptive of bibles); In re BetaBatt Inc., 89 USPQ2d 1152, 1155 (TTAB 2008) (holding DEC substantially synonymous with merely descriptive term “direct energy conversion” and thus merely descriptive of a type of batteries and battery related services); TMEP §1209.03(h).

 

A mark consisting of an abbreviation, initialism, or acronym will be considered substantially synonymous with descriptive wording if:

 

(1)    the applied-for mark is an abbreviation, initialism, or acronym for specific wording;

 

(2)    the specific wording is merely descriptive of applicant’s goods and/or services; and

 

(3) a relevant consumer viewing the abbreviation, initialism, or acronym in connection with applicant’s goods and/or services will recognize it as the equivalent of the merely descriptive wording it represents.

 

TMEP §1209.03(h); see In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d at 1715-16 (citing In re Harco Corp., 220 USPQ 1075, 1076 (TTAB 1984)).

 

In the present case, the attached evidence from abbreviations.com and acronymfinder.com shows that the wording AI in applicant’s mark is an acronym for the wording “artificial intelligence.”  Further, the attached evidence from Merriam-Webster shows that this wording is merely descriptive of a feature or characteristic of applicant’s goods because the goods feature or include the capability of a machine or technology to imitate intelligent human behavior. 

 

Lastly, a relevant consumer viewing applicant’s mark in connection with the identified goods would recognize the term AI as the equivalent of the descriptive wording it represents because it is commonly used in the computer technology industry to refer to artificial intelligence as demonstrated by the evidence from abbreviations.com and acronymfinder.com (showing artificial intelligence as the first and most commonly recognized abbreviation or acronym associated with AI). 

 

Generally, if the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable.  In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1317-18 (TTAB (2002)); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g., Apollo Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc. v. Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc., 123 USPQ2d 1844, 1851 (TTAB 2017) (holding MEDICAL EXTRUSION TECHNOLOGIES merely descriptive of medical extrusion goods produced by employing medical extrusion technologies); In re Cannon Safe, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1348, 1351 (TTAB 2015) (holding SMART SERIES merely descriptive of metal gun safes); In re King Koil Licensing Co., 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows). 

 

Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services is the combined mark registrable.  See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013).

 

In this case, both the individual components and the composite result are descriptive of applicant’s goods and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services.  Specifically, as discussed above, the term AI refers to artificial intelligence. The term PHONE in the mark refers to a telephone or an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance. See attached evidence from Merriam-Webster.com.

 

When considered in connection with the identified goods, the term AI PHONE or AIPHONE refers to a telephone that uses or features artificial intelligence technology.

 

For the reasons discussed above, applicant’s mark is refused registration on the Principal Register under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1). Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED

 

To permit proper examination of the application, applicant must submit additional product information about applicant’s goods.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.  The requested product information should include fact sheets, instruction manuals, and/or advertisements.  If these materials are unavailable, applicant should submit similar documentation for goods of the same type, explaining how its own product will differ.  If the goods feature new technology and no competing goods are available, applicant must provide a detailed description of the goods.

 

Factual information about the goods must clearly indicate how they operate, their salient features, and their prospective customers and channels of trade.  Conclusory statements regarding the goods will not satisfy this requirement.

 

Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.  Merely stating that information about the goods is available on applicant’s website is an insufficient response and will not make the relevant information of record.  See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).

 

In addition, applicant must answer the following:

 

1.     Do applicant’s goods feature, use or incorporate artificial intelligence technology (as defined by the attached evidence from Merriam-Webster)?

 

ADVISORY – OVERCOMING A SECTION 2(E)(1) REFUSAL BY AMENDING TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER

 

Although an amendment to the Supplemental Register would normally be an appropriate response to the Section 2(e)(1) refusal, such a response is not appropriate in the present case.  The instant application was filed under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use meeting the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been timely filed.  37 C.F.R. §2.47(d); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.

 

If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for an amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).  In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date.  TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.

 

Please note that amending to the Supplemental Register will not obviate the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with registered mark(s).

 

ADVISORY – APPLICANT MAY WISH TO SEEK TRADEMARK COUNSEL

 

Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines involved in the USPTO application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney specializing in trademark matters to represent applicant in this process and provide legal advice.  Although the undersigned trademark examining attorney is permitted to help an applicant understand the contents of an Office action as well as the application process in general, no USPTO attorney or staff is permitted to give an applicant legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights.  TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help; an online directory of legal professionals, such as FindLaw®; or a local telephone directory.  The USPTO, however, may not assist an applicant in the selection of a private attorney.  37 C.F.R. §2.11.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/Breanna Freeman/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 114

(571) 272-7099

breanna.freeman@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 1/6/2019 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88105944

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed.  The trademark examining attorney assigned by the USPTO to your application has written an official letter to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

(1)  Read the LETTER by clicking on this link or going to http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, entering your U.S. application serial number, and clicking on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

(2)  Respond within 6 months (or sooner if specified in the Office action), calculated from 1/6/2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  A response transmitted through TEAS must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions. 

 

(3)  Questions about the contents of the Office action itself should be directed to the trademark examining attorney who reviewed your application, identified below. 

 

/Breanna Freeman/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 114

(571) 272-7099

breanna.freeman@uspto.gov

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp. 

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.