To: | CY FASHION CORP. (barkin@cyfashion.us) |
Subject: | U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 88050719 - LEGEND - N/A |
Sent: | 11/10/2018 9:46:06 PM |
Sent As: | ECOM120@USPTO.GOV |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 Attachment - 39 Attachment - 40 Attachment - 41 Attachment - 42 Attachment - 43 |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88050719
MARK: LEGEND
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: CY FASHION CORP.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 11/10/2018
INTRODUCTION
- Prior-Filed Applications – Advisory
- Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
- Sections 1, 2, 3, and 45 Refusal – Commonplace Expression
PRIOR-FILED APPLICATION(S) – ADVISORY
The filing dates of the following pending U.S. applications precede applicant’s filing date:
- 87511152 (LEG3ND)
- 88031534 (LEGENDWEAR)
See attached referenced applications. If one or more of the marks in the referenced applications register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
Please see the following additional refusals.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
- 4789239 (LEGEND, with design) for Class 25 goods;
- 3494353 (LEGEND, with design) for Class 25 goods;
- 4913910 (LEGEND, in standard character) for Class 14 goods; and
- 4951524 (L E G E N D, with design) for Class 14 goods.
Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant seeks registration of the mark LEGEND, in standard character.
The registrant’s marks are as follows:
- 4789239 (LEGEND, with design)
- 3494353 (LEGEND, with design)
- 4913910 (LEGEND, in standard character)
- 4951524 (L E G E N D, with design)
Here, the marks are confusingly similar because the wording in the marks are identical. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression. The wording in the marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. Id.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
It is noted that the registrants’ marks include a design element, while applicant’s mark is in standard character. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Finally, applicant may argue that its proposed mark is pronounced differently from the other marks – e.g., “leg” + “end” (not “lejend”). However, this does not overcome a likelihood of confusion. There is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark. See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 1353, 162 USPQ 227, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
Due to the identical wording in the marks, and the fact applicant’s mark has no other distinguishing part, the marks are confusingly similar such that consumers are likely to mistake the source of the goods.
Comparison of the Goods
Applicant’s goods are: Leggings; Sports bras; Tank tops; Graphic T-shirts, in class 25.
Registrant’s goods are as follows:
- 4789239 (LEGEND, with design): wearing apparel, namely, t-shirts, hats, caps, and sweatshirts, in class 25
- 3494353 (LEGEND, with design): headwear, in class 25
- 4913910 (LEGEND, in standard character): Jewelry; Watches, in class 14
- 4951524 (L E G E N D, with design): Watches, in class 14
With respect to U.S. Reg. Nos. 4789239 and 3494353, the goods are highly related as they concern clothing and apparel, in general. Neither the application nor the registration(s) contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores. Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks. See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).
With respect to U.S. Reg. Nos. 4913910 and 4951524, the goods of applicant and registrant are highly related because entities commonly manufacture and sell both clothing/apparel and jewelry and watches under the same mark.
To illustrate the relatedness of applicant’s and registrants’ goods, there is ample evidence from the Internet to show that entities commonly produce goods similar to both applicant and registrants clothing (RN 4789239 and 3494353), as well as watches and jewelry (RN 4913910 and 4951524). The attached Internet evidence, consisting of third party websites, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark and the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. See attached pages from Michael Kors, Gucci, Armani Exchange, and Burberry, all selling a wide variety of clothing, jewelry, and watches.
Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Conclusion
Due to the identical wording in the marks – LEGEND – and applicant’s lack of other distinctive matter, the marks are confusingly similar in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression. Further, when coupled with the highly related goods of clothing, apparel, jewelry, hats, and watches, consumers are likely to confuse the marks and mistake the source of the goods.
Based on the foregoing, the applicant’s proposed mark, LEGEND, is refused for likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 45 REFUSAL – COMMONPLACE EXPRESSION
Terms and expressions that merely convey an informational message are not registrable. In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 (TTAB 2010). Determining whether the term or expression functions as a trademark or service mark depends on how it would be perceived by the relevant public. In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d at 1229; In re Aerospace Optics, Inc., 78 USPQ2d 1861, 1862 (TTAB 2006); TMEP §1202.04. “The more commonly a [term or expression] is used, the less likely that the public will use it to identify only one source and the less likely that it will be recognized by purchasers as a trademark [or service mark].” In re Hulting, 107 USPQ2d 1175, 1177 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d at 1229); TMEP §1202.04(b).
The attached evidence from third party websites shows that this term or expression is commonly used to express pride or playfully brag that the individual wearing the shirt is famous or notorious. Because consumers are accustomed to seeing this term or expression commonly used in everyday speech by many different sources, they would not perceive it as a mark identifying the source of applicant’s goods and/or services but rather as only conveying an informational message. See attached pages.
An applicant may not overcome this refusal by amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register or asserting a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f). TMEP §1202.04(d); see In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d at 1229. Nor will submitting a substitute specimen overcome this refusal. See TMEP §1202.04(d).
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
/Jeane Yoo/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 120
(571) 272-5021
Jeane.Yoo@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.