UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 6/3/2019

 

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on April 25, 2019.

 

In a previous Office action dated November 14, 2018, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.  In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement: Reclassify the goods identified in the application to International Class 5.

 

In its response, applicant submitted arguments against the Section 2(d) refusal and reclassified the goods to International Class 5.

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement has been satisfied: Reclassify the goods identified in the application to International Class 5.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 5047064 (BARN BARRIER).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Applicant has applied to register the mark BARN DEFENSE for “INSECTICIDES FOR DOMESTIC USE FOR KILLING AND REPELLING INSECTS ON SMALL AND LARGE COMPANION ANIMALS” in International Class 5.

 

The registered mark, owned by Eqyss Grooming Products, Inc., is BARN BARRIER for “Insect repellents” in International Class 5.

 

Similarity of Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Here, applicant’s BARN DEFNESE mark is confusingly similar to the registered BARN BARRIER mark because the two marks share identical leading wording and are similar in meaning and commercial impression. 

 

Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).  In this case, BARN is the first word in both the applied-for and registered marks and therefore constitutes the term that consumers will likely recognize or recollect when making purchasing decisions.

 

In its response, applicant argues that the marks are different in appearance, sound, meaning, and commercial impression because of the differences between the term DEFENSE and BARRIER.  The examining attorney is not persuaded by this argument.  As discussed in the previous Office action, consumer confusion has been held likely for marks that do not physically sound or look alike but that convey the same idea, stimulate the same mental reaction, or may have the same overall meaning.  Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Conway, 419 F.2d 1332, 1336, 164 USPQ 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding MISTER STAIN likely to be confused with MR. CLEAN on competing cleaning products); see In re M. Serman & Co., 223 USPQ 52, 53 (TTAB 1984) (holding CITY WOMAN for ladies’ blouses likely to be confused with CITY GIRL for a variety of female clothing); H. Sichel Sohne, GmbH v. John Gross & Co., 204 USPQ 257, 260-61 (TTAB 1979) (holding BLUE NUN for wines likely to be confused with BLUE CHAPEL for the same goods); Ralston Purina Co. v. Old Ranchers Canning Co., 199 USPQ 125, 128 (TTAB 1978) (holding TUNA O’ THE FARM for canned chicken likely to be confused with CHICKEN OF THE SEA for canned tuna); Downtowner Corp. v. Uptowner Inns, Inc., 178 USPQ 105, 109 (TTAB 1973) (holding UPTOWNER for motor inn and restaurant services likely to be confused with DOWNTOWNER for the same services); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The evidence attached to the previous Office action showed that DEFENSE is defined as a “means or method of defending or protecting oneself” or “a defensive structure.”  See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/defense.  BARRIER is defined as “something material that blocks or is intended to block passage” or “a natural formation or structure that prevents or hinders movement or action.”  See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/barrier.  The meanings of these two terms are similar in that they both describe something that protects someone by blocking an outsider’s passage.  Therefore, the commercial impression created by both marks is that of an insecticide or insect repellent that protects against insects by creating a structure that blocks passage.   

 

Please also note that when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).   Again, here, the general impression of both trademarks are that the goods protect against insects by blocking or hindering the insects’ passage or movement.  Therefore, applicant’s arguments regarding the differences in appearance, sound, meaning, and commercial impression are not persuasive. 

 

Applicant also argues that the applied-for mark is part of a family of marks containing the term “DEFENSE” and that the purchasing public’s familiarity with these marks obviates any likelihood of confusion.  However, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has found that a family of marks argument is “not available to an applicant seeking to overcome a [likelihood of confusion] refusal.”  In re Cynosure, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1644, 1645-46 (TTAB 2009).  Specifically, an applicant’s ownership of other similar marks has little relevance in this context because the focus of a likelihood of confusion analysis in an ex parte case is on the mark applicant seeks to register, rather than other marks applicant has used or registered.  In re Cynosure, Inc., 90 USPQ2d at 1645-46; In re Ald, Inc., 148 USPQ 520, 521 (TTAB 1965); TMEP §1207.01(d)(xi). 

 

In its response, applicant also argues that registrant uses its EQYSS mark on its goods to further identify source and that applicant uses its FARNAM and BRONCO marks on its goods to further identify its source.  However, there is no restriction on the application or the registration that the BARN BARRIER and BARN DEFENSE marks must be used in conjunction with these other marks.  Therefore, the argument that the “actual” commercial impression of the marks is different because of additional wording that may appear on the goods at issue is unpersuasive. 

 

As for applicant’s argument that there are two other registered BARN marks, one for insect repellents and one for animal supplements, and that therefore the marks must be considered as a whole, the examining attorney is unpersuaded.  Again, not only do the marks share the identical lead wording BARN, the overall commercial impressions created by the remaining words DEFENSE and BARRIER are highly similar because of the similarities in these terms’ meanings to connote that the goods are used for protection by blocking or hindering insects. 

 

Additionally, applicant notes the coexistence of NATURE BARRIER and NATURE’S DEFENSE for insect repellents to demonstrate that BARRIER and DEFENSE have been considered sufficiently distinct in the past.  However, the existence on the register of other seemingly similar marks does not provide a basis for registrability for the applied-for mark.  AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Total Quality Grp., Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1477 (TTAB 1999).  Moreover, each case is decided on its own facts, and each mark stands on its own merits.  In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d at 1793 n.10 (quoting In re Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336, 1343, 67 USPQ2d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).

 

Thus, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

Relatedness of Goods

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Here, applicant’s goods, “insecticides for domestic use for killing and repelling insects on small and large companion animals,” are closely related to registrant’s goods, “insect repellents.”

 

The Internet evidence attached to the previous Office action, consisting of webpage printouts, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark through the same trade channels.  The additional Internet evidence attached to the present Office action further shows that insect repellents commonly have the function of also killing insects:

 

• http://www.equiderma.com/products/buy-one-gallon-fly-spray-get-quart-free?variant=12397884801141&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI-bztg9ut4gIVQcDICh2liQykEAQYCyABEgLcHPD_BwE
• http://www.tractorsupply.com/tsc/product/dumor-equine-fly-spray-1-gal-1012882?cm_mmc=feed-_-GoogleShopping-_-Product-_-1012882&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI-bztg9ut4gIVQcDICh2liQykEAQYASABEgJKbfD_BwE
• http://www.valleyvet.com/ct_detail.html?pgguid=4F094FD9-3F83-4AFC-96E5-CB5C86831E8B
• http://www.valleyvet.com/ct_detail.html?pgguid=2906B339-ECF6-4D38-99A3-3942E5E2477D

 

Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Moreover, the trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  See attached Registration Nos. 5743338 (BUGG PRODUCTS LLC), 5617460 (MICROCOSMIC), 5379530 (CEDARCIDE), 5728535 (BUG IT), 5311360 (MESSINAS).  This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely insecticides and insect repellents, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

In its response, applicant argues that consumers will likely exercise greater care when purchasing registrant’s goods, which could include products for humans rather than applicant’s goods, which are only used on animals.  The examining attorney is not persuaded by this argument.  The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).  Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser.  In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163).  Moreover, this argument appears somewhat inconsistent with applicant’s later statement that “a horse is a substantial emotional and financial investment for most people,” and therefore, consumers will engage in careful, sophisticated purchasing.  The least sophisticated potential purchaser is likely to confuse the source of these goods because as discussed above, the goods are highly related and the commercial impressions and meanings of the marks are highly similar.

 

Again, with respect to applicant’s arguments regarding registrant’s BARN BARRIER products being accompanied by the EQYSS mark when searched online, the examining attorney is not persuaded because the cited registration is simply, BARN BARRIER, not EQYSS BARN BARRIER.  The registration contains no restrictions that this BARN BARRIER mark must be used in conjunction with the mark EQYSS.  Moreover, there is no evidence to support applicant’s contention that “consumers of goods for horses are likely to be aware of applicant’s incontestable trademarks for similar goods for companion animals using the word defense.” 

 

Please also note that the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Considering all of the above, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is hereby made FINAL. 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)       a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or

 

(2)       an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  There is a fee required for filing a petition.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

Young Wolfe

/Young Wolfe/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

Phone: (571) 272-5579

young.wolfe@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 6/3/2019 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88049132

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 6/3/2019 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  A response transmitted through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the TEAS response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.