UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 10/4/2018

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Unacceptable Consent Agreement
• Prior-Filed Application
• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Section 44(e) Refusal – Applicant Was Not the Owner of the Foreign Registration on the Filing Date of U.S. Application
• Drawing is Unacceptable

 

 

UNACCEPTABLE CONSENT AGREEMENT

The submitted consent agreement is a “naked consent” and is insufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion refusal because it neither (1) sets forth reasons why the parties believe there is no likelihood of confusion, nor (2) describes the arrangements undertaken by the parties to avoid confusing the public.  See In re Mastic, 829 F.2d 1114, 1117-18, 4 USPQ2d 1292, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Permagrain Prods., Inc., 223 USPQ 147, 149 (TTAB 1984); TMEP §1207.01(d)(viii).  These consents are generally accorded little weight in a likelihood of confusion determination without additional factors to support confusion is unlikely.  See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1362, 177 USPQ 563, 568 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Here, the consent agreement does not set forth any arrangements which the parties will take to avoid confusing the public, and what actions the parties might take to avoid any confusion that may arise in the future.

 

If applicant submits a consent agreement that (1) indicates the registrant’s consent to the use and registration of the mark, and (2) addresses one or both of the factors listed above, this refusal will be reconsidered.  However, consent agreements are but one factor to be taken into account with all of the other relevant circumstances bearing on a likelihood of confusion determination.  In re N.A.D. Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999, 224 USPQ 969, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 177 USPQ at 567; TMEP §1207.01(d)(viii); see also In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1963 (TTAB 2016).

 

Factors to be considered in weighing a consent agreement include the following:

 

(1)       Whether the consent shows an agreement between both parties;

 

(2)       Whether the agreement includes a clear indication that the goods and/or services travel in separate trade channels;

 

(3)       Whether the parties agree to restrict their fields of use;

 

(4)       Whether the parties will make efforts to prevent confusion, and cooperate and take steps to avoid any confusion that may arise in the future; and

 

(5)       Whether the marks have been used for a period of time without evidence of actual confusion.

 

See In re Four Seasons Hotels Ltd., 987 F.2d 1565, 1569, 26 USPQ2d 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Mastic, 829 F.2d at 1117-18, 4 USPQ2d at 1295-96; cf. Bongrain Int’l (Am.) Corp. v. Delice de Fr., Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1485, 1 USPQ2d 1775, 1779 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

 

 

PRIOR-FILED APPLICATION

The filing date of pending U.S. Application Serial No. 87911083 precedes applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced application.  If the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the two marks.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application.

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5299177 and 5299178.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

 

Applicant’s mark is BAYER (standard characters) for “Doll accessories; Doll cases; Doll clothing; Doll costumes; Doll furniture; Doll house furnishings; Doll houses; Dolls' beds; Dolls' clothes; Dolls' feeding bottles; Dolls' houses; Dolls' rooms; Dolls; Dolls and doll accessories, namely, clothing for dolls, doll rooms, doll beds, doll houses, toy fabrics and linens for dolls and strollers for dolls; Dolls and dolls' clothing; Dolls and accessories therefor; Dolls and playsets therefor; Dolls for playing; Puzzles; Stuffed toy animals; Furniture for doll's houses; Furniture for dolls' houses; Jigsaw puzzles; Playsets for dolls; Rag dolls; Shoes for dolls; Talking dolls; Toy strollers; Traditionally dressed dolls; Vinyl dolls” in International Class 28.

 

Registrant’s mark is BAYER 04 (standard characters) for goods including “Gaming modules, namely, arcade games; toy hats; games in the nature of soccer games, board games, dart games, card games and playthings in the nature of beanbags in the form of playthings and play balls; puzzles; jigsaw puzzles; dressing-up masks for play purposes; hobby and model kits with activity materials for play purposes comprised of plastic, metal, wood and cotton for making toy model kit cars, toy model train sets, model toy vehicles; toy figurines of plastic; toy cars and lorries; inflatable swimming pools, swimming toys in the nature of, swimming rings, swimming floats, swimming kick boards, water slides, toy sandpits, soft and stuffed dolls and animals; dolls and clothing for dolls; play balloons” in International Class 28.

 

The mark in U.S. Registration No. 5299178 is 1904 BAYER BAYER LEVERKUSEN (with design) for goods including Gaming modules, namely, arcade games; toy hats; games in the nature of soccer games, board games, dart games, card games and playthings in the nature of beanbags in the form of playthings and play balls; puzzles; jigsaw puzzles; dressing-up masks for play purposes; hobby and model kits with activity materials for play purposes comprised of plastic, metal, wood and cotton for making toy model kit cars, toy model train sets, model toy vehicles; toy figurines of plastic; toy cars and lorries; inflatable swimming pools, swimming toys in the nature of, swimming rings, swimming floats, swimming kick boards, water slides, toy sandpits, soft and stuffed dolls and animals; dolls and clothing for dolls; play balloons” in International Class 28.

 

Both of the above-cited marks are owned by the same entity.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01. 

 

 

Comparison of the Marks

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  Here, the registered marks contains the term, “BAYER”, and the entirety of the applied-for mark is the term, “BAYER”.  Accordingly, the marks are similar in sound and appearance.

 

Additionally, incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the applied-for mark is entirely incorporated within the registered mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 5299177, making the marks identical in part.

 

Finally, consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (“[T]he dominance of BARR in [a]pplicant’s mark BARR GROUP is reinforced by its location as the first word in the mark.”); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).  Here, the applied-for mark appears as the first term in the registered mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 5299177.  Accordingly, these marks are also similar in commercial impression.

 

As to the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5299178, when evaluating a composite mark containing both words and designs, the word portion is more likely to indicate the origin of the goods and/or services because it is that portion of the mark that consumers use when referring to or requesting the goods and/or services.  Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  Here, it is the word portion of the mark, “1904 BAYER BAYER LEVERKUSEN” which is the more dominant portion of the mark.  Additionally, the shared wording between this mark and the applied-for mark appears prominently in the center of the registered mark.  Accordingly, the applied-for mark and the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5299178 are similar in sound, appearance, and commercial impression. 

 

Because the marks are similar in sound, appearance, and commercial impression, a consumer who is familiar with registrant’s mark used on registrant’s goods is likely to mistakenly believe that applicant’s mark, used on applicant’s goods, indicates the same source. Therefore the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and/or services are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000). 

 

In this case, both the applicant’s and registrant’s identified goods contain “puzzles” and “jigsaw puzzles” and have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers with regard to these goods.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods and/or services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  See Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  Accordingly, these goods of registrant and applicant are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis. 

 

Additionally, the registrant’s goods include “dolls and clothing for dolls”, and the applicant’s goods include a variety of dolls and doll accessories, as well as toy strollers and stuffed animals.  The attached Internet evidence consists of webpages from entities which manufacture, under the same mark, both the applicant’s and registrant’s goods identified above.  See attached evidence.  This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, and that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use.  Thus, these goods of applicant and registrant are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

In sum, the marks are highly similar and the goods of the parties are closely related.  As such, consumers encountering the marks of the parties in connection with the identified goods are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods/services.  Accordingly, registration of the mark is refused pursuant to Trademark Act Section 2(d). 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. 

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

 

 

SECTION 44(e) REFUSAL – APPLICANT WAS NOT THE OWNER OF THE FOREIGN REGISTRATION ON THE FILING DATE OF U.S. APPLICATION

Registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 44(e) because applicant was not the owner of the foreign registration on the filing date of the U.S. application.  See 15 U.S.C. §1126(e); TMEP §1005. 

 

In an application filed solely under Section 44(e), the applicant must be the owner of the foreign registration on the filing date of the U.S. application.  TMEP §1005; see 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3); In re De Luxe, N.V., 990 F.2d 607, 609, 26 USPQ2d 1475, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Tong Yang Cement Corp., 19 USPQ2d 1689, 1690-91 (TTAB 1991).  However, in this case, the foreign registration specifies an owner other than the U.S. applicant.  Specifically, the U.S. application sets forth the owner as “Bayer Design Fritz Bayer GmbH & Co. KG”, while the foreign registration sets forth the owner as “Fritz Bayer Puppenwagenfabrik, Michelau”.

 

If applicant can prove the foreign registration was assigned to applicant on or before the filing date of the U.S. application, the Section 44(e) basis can remain in the application.  See TMEP §1005.  Applicant may establish ownership of the foreign registration by submitting (1) a copy of an assignment document, (2) certification from the foreign trademark office that reflects applicant’s ownership of the foreign registration and the date of the assignment, or (3) a printout from the intellectual property’s office website that shows the foreign registration was assigned to applicant on or before the filing date of the U.S. application.  See TMEP§§1005, 1006.

 

If applicant did not own the foreign registration on or before the filing date of the U.S. application, applicant will have to amend to an acceptable basis, such as Section 1(a) or 1(b).  See TMEP §§806.03, 1005.  A foreign registration certificate is not required for a Section 1(a) or 1(b) basis.  See 15 U.S.C. §1051(a)-(b); TMEP §806.01(a)-(b).

 

If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

 

 

 

DRAWING IS UNACCEPTABLE

The USPTO cannot accept the drawing of the mark because it is not a “substantially exact representation” of the mark as it appears in the foreign application or registration.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.51(c); In re Hacot-Colombier, 105 F.3d 616, 618-19, 41 USPQ2d 1523, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1997); TMEP §§807.12(b), 1011.01.  Specifically, the marks do not correspond because the U.S. application contains a standard character claim and the foreign application or registration does not.

 

Applicant may respond by satisfying one of the following:

 

(1)       Submit the following statement in the U.S. application:  “Under the law of the country of origin, the foreign application or registration includes a claim that the mark is in standard characters (or the equivalent).”; or

 

(2)       Delete the standard character claim from the U.S. application and proceed with a special form drawing by submitting an accurate and concise description of the literal and design elements in the mark.  The following mark description is suggested, if accurate:  The mark consists of the word “BAYER” in stylized lettering with a heart to the upper-right of the word.

 

See 37 C.F.R. §§2.37, 2.52(b), 2.61(b); TMEP §§807.03(f), 808.02, 1011.01.  

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

For this application to proceed further, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  Applicant may also have other options specified in this Office action for responding to a refusal, and should consider those options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.

 

In addition, because applicant filed a TEAS Plus application, applicant must respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) to avoid incurring an additional fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.22(b)(1), (c).  For more information and general tips on responding to USPTO Office actions, response options, and how to file a response online, see “Responding to Office Actions” on the USPTO’s website.

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02.  Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.

 

When an application has been abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via TEAS with a $100 fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(a)(1), (b)(1). 

 

 

ASSISTANCE

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/Kyle Ingram/

Kyle Ingram

Attorney Advisor

Law Office 125

(571)272-5276

Kyle.ingram@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 10/4/2018 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88001773

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed.  The trademark examining attorney assigned by the USPTO to your application has written an official letter to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

(1)  Read the LETTER by clicking on this link or going to http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, entering your U.S. application serial number, and clicking on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

(2)  Respond within 6 months (or sooner if specified in the Office action), calculated from 10/4/2018, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  A response transmitted through TEAS must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions. 

 

(3)  Questions about the contents of the Office action itself should be directed to the trademark examining attorney who reviewed your application, identified below. 

 

Kyle Ingram

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp. 

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.