UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 3/8/2019

 

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on February 28, 2019.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES IN THE PRIOR ACTION:

·       Refusal Under Section 2(d) – Classes 25 and 41 Only

·       Requirement for Acceptable Identification of Goods – Class 25 Goods

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL:

·       Refusal Under Section 2(d) – Classes 25 and 41 Only

 

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN SATISFIED:

·       Requirement for Acceptable Identification of Goods – Class 25 Goods

 

FINAL REFUSAL UNDER SECTION 2(d)

 

Registration of the applied-for mark was refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4472467 and 5466242.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Applicant seeks registration of the mark FORTIFY (standard character mark) for, in relevant part, “clothing, namely, t-shirts, polo shirts, dress shirts, hats, coats, jackets, sweatshirts, sweatpants and shorts” (class 25) and “entertainment in the nature of music festivals” (class 41).. 

 

The already-registered marks are as follows:

 

·       FORTIFY (standard character mark) for “live performances by a musical group” (class 41)

 

·       4TIFY (standard character mark) for “Waterproof jackets and pants; Apparel for dancers, namely, tee shirts, sweatshirts, pants, leggings, shorts and jackets; Athletic footwear; Baseball caps; Beanies; Belts; Belts made out of cloth; Boat shoes; Boots for sport; Boxing shorts; Cargo pants; Coats; Crew necks; Culottes; Denims; Fedoras; Footwear, namely, pumps; Gloves; Golf shirts; Graphic T-shirts; Greatcoats; Gym suits; Hats for infants, babies, toddlers and children; Headbands for clothing; Headwear; Hooded pullovers; Hoods; Jerkins; Jogging pants; Jumpsuits; Kaftans; Lace boots; Loafers; Long johns; Maillots; Men's and women's jackets, coats, trousers, vests; Men's socks; Men's suits; Mocknecks; Morning coats; Mules; Nightshirts; Over shirts; Rain boots; Rain trousers; Raincoats; Rainproof jackets; Redingotes; Running suits; Shell jackets; Shirts for suits; Shoe uppers; Shoes; Singlets; Skull caps; Sleep pants; Slipper socks; Sneakers; Socks and stockings; Sport coats; Sports caps and hats; Sports shirts with short sleeves; Sports vests; Suit coats; Sweat pants; Sweat shirts; Sweat suits; Swim wear for gentlemen and ladies; Swimming trunks; T-shirts; Tank-tops; Tankinis; Tee shirts; Tennis shoes; Thermal socks; Thermal underwear; Training shoes; Training suits; Trench coats; Undershirts; Walking shorts; Waterproof footwear; Wind vests; Wind-jackets; Women's clothing, namely, shirts, dresses, skirts, blouses; Women's hats and hoods; Wrist bands as clothing; Zoot suits” (class 25).

 

COMPARISON OF MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

First, with regard to Reg. No. 4472467, there can simply be no issue that the mark are identical, i.e., both are FORTIFY, and therefore have the potential to be used in exactly the same manner.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective services.  Id.

 

Applicant does not appear to dispute that these marks are identical and therefore confusingly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression. 

 

With regard to Reg. No. 5466242, while not identical in appearance, applicant’s mark is indeed identical in sound, meaning and commercial impression to the registered mark.  That is, registrant’s mark is 4TIFY, with the number “4” pronounced as the actual number, i.e., “four,” and then combined with the remaining letters “TIFY,” creating a mark which is the phonetic equivalent of the term “FORTIFY” which is the same as the mark for which applicant seeks registration.  Purchasers encountering these marks will understand them to have the same sound as well as having the same connotation and commercial impression, and will be likely to remember them as being the same and mistakenly believe that they identify the same source for the goods.  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). 

 

Applicant submits that the fact that its mark begins with the letter “F” and the registrant’s mark begins with the number “4,” is a sufficient difference on its own in the appearance of the marks to “negate a likelihood of confusion when the marks are viewed by the public.”  Moreover, applicant submits that the marks differ in appearance because they contain a different number of characters, and its mark is 40% longer than the registered mark.  Applicant also contends that it is not clear now registrant’s mark will be pronounced so a comparison of the sounds is “merely speculative,” also submitting that the meaning of the mark is speculative, and therefore, the similarities are outweighed by the differences.  Additionally applicant states that the emphasis in this determination should be on the way in which the marks appear as they are used clothing, i.e., on labels, online images, and on the clothing itself, and as such, the sound of the mark “is very limited as a factor to weigh in the ‘likelihood of confusion’ determination as compared to appearance.”

 

First, the fact that the marks are different in length, one including letters only while the other includes a number, is not dispositive.  There is no case law to support this argument as a reason for obviating the refusal under Section 2(d).  Furthermore, both the pronunciation and meaning of registrant’s mark seems somewhat obvious, i.e., that the term is intended as the equivalent of the word “FORTIFY”.  In other words, the marks are not only pronounced the same, but they indeed do have the same meaning, as they are indeed the same word.  Applicant’s contention that the emphasis should be on the appearance of the marks, rather than sound, since the marks are used on clothing, is unclear; that is, it is not clear how use of the mark on clothing affects the likelihood of confusion determination.  Applicant is advised that an analysis under Section 2(d) is based solely on the marks and goods or services as they appear in the application and registration – not on extrinsic evidence of use.  In other words, actual use of the marks has no bearing in the current determination.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 

 

Moreover, contrary to applicant’s belief that the sound of the mark is less consequential than the appearance, applicant is reminded that similarity in any one element – appearance, sound, connotation or overall commercial impression – may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Further, case law is clear that similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). 

 

And additionally, it is noted that when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  And in this instance, consumers are likely to remember applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark as being the same – having the identical sound, meaning and overall commercial impression.

 

Finally, the fact that each mark is in standard character format, means that each mark may be used in any manner – including in a stylization identical to that of the other.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). 

Accordingly, applicant’s mark is confusingly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression to each of the cited marks.

 

COMPARISON OF GOODS AND SERVICES

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

With regard to Reg. No. 4472467, the services of applicant and registrant are indeed sufficiently related such that their marketing would be likely to give rise to the mistaken belief that the services come from the same source.  That is, while applicant’s services feature music festivals, registrant’s services are live performances by a musical group; material attached to the prior action clearly shows that music festivals feature live musical performances.  In other words, applicant’s services feature the services of registrant – and, therefore, such services are likely to be marketed through the same channels to the same class of purchasers. 

 

Applicant contends that the registered mark is no longer in use.  However, applicant is advised that a trademark or service mark registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration and the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the specified goods and/or services.  See 15 U.S.C. §1057(b); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).  Thus, evidence and arguments that constitute a collateral attack on a cited registration, such as information or statements regarding a registrant’s nonuse of its mark, are not relevant during ex parte prosecution.  See In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Peebles Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n.5 (TTAB 1992); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).  Such evidence and arguments may, however, be pertinent to a formal proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel the cited registration.

 

Therefore, here, where there is a valid registration, and evidence supports a finding that the services are indeed related – and, the marks are identical – confusion as to the source of the services is likely. 

 

With regard to the goods in Reg. No. 5466242, there can be no doubt that the goods of applicant and registrant are highly related – if not the same in several instances.  That is, both have clothing items – including t-shirts, jackets, sweatshirts and shorts.  And, decisions regarding likelihood of confusion in the clothing field have found many different types of apparel to be related goods.  Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 286 F.2d 623, 624, 128 USPQ 549, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (women’s boots related to men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233, 1236 (TTAB 1992) (underwear related to neckties); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) (women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets related to women’s shoes); In re Pix of Am., Inc., 225 USPQ 691, 691-92 (TTAB 1985) (women’s shoes related to outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397, 398-99 (TTAB 1982) (hosiery related to trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444, 445 (TTAB 1975) (men’s suits, coats, and trousers related to ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400, 404 (TTAB 1964) (brassieres and girdles related to slacks for men and young men).  Thus, the goods in this instance are clearly related.

 

Moreover, because neither the application nor the registration contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods, it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).  Additionally, material attached downloaded from the internet shows that it is common for a single entity to provide a wide variety of clothing items – including both those of applicant and registrant. 

 

It is noted that applicant has failed to provide any arguments regarding the relatedness of the goods; thus, it is presumed that applicant does not dispute that its goods and those listed in Reg. No. 5466242 are indeed related (if not identical).  And, when such goods are encountered by purchasers – with confusingly similar marks – confusion as to the source of the goods is indeed likely,

 

Accordingly, the refusal under Section 2(d) with regard to the goods in class 25 and the services in class 41 is hereby made FINAL.

 

RESPONSE TO A PARTIAL FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the following classes to which the final refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) apply will be deleted from the application by Examiner’s Amendment:  classes 25 and 41.  37 C.F.R. §2.65(a); see 15 U.S.C. §1062(b).

 

The application will then proceed for the following classes:  classes 16, 21 and 32. 

 

Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)       a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or

 

(2)       an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  There is a fee required for filing a petition.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/Susan K. Lawrence/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 116, USPTO

(571) 272-9186

sue.lawrence@uspto.gov

(informal communication only)

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 3/8/2019 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87920465

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 3/8/2019 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  A response transmitted through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the TEAS response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.