UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 12/23/2017

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal—Likelihood of Confusion
• Section 2(e)(1) Refusal—
• Advisory—Prior-Filed Applications
• Advisory—Improper Use Of Registration Symbol

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 2017198 (SELECT ADVANTAGE), 3704421 (SELECTLEADERS), 3520183 (SELECTSTAFF) and 2898596 (SELECTSTAFF).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Applicant’s mark is “SELECT” in standard characters.

 

In U.S. Registration No. 2017198, registrant’s mark is “SELECT ADVANTAGE” in typed form.

 

In U.S. Registration No. 3704421, registrant’s mark is “SELECTLEADERS” in standard characters.

 

In U.S. Registration No. 3520183, registrant’s mark is “SELECTSTAFF” in standard characters. The same registrant also owns U.S. Registration No. 2898596 for “SELECTSTAFF” in stylized text with a design element.

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Where the services of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, as applicant’s and registrants’ services are in this case, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse services.  See In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (citing Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); United Global Media Grp., Inc. v. Tseng, 112 USPQ2d 1039, 1049 (TTAB 2014) (quoting Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); TMEP §1207.01(b). However, in this case, not only are the services nearly identical, the marks are highly similar.

 

In the present case, the applied-for mark, “SELECT”, is comprised solely of the first word of each of the registered marks.  Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (“[T]he dominance of BARR in [a]pplicant’s mark BARR GROUP is reinforced by its location as the first word in the mark.”); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).

 

Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered marks, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered marks because it contains some of the wording in the registered marks, specifically, the first word of each of the registered marks, and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from those marks.

 

Further, in the case of U.S. Registration No. 2898596, the fact that the registration is stylized form with a design element does not obviate the similarity of the marks, because applicant’s mark is in standard characters. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).  Moreover, the stylization and design element of the registered mark is minimal, and does not affect the overall commercial impression created by the wording.   

 

For the above reasons, the applied-for mark is confusingly similar to the registered marks.

 

Relatedness of the Services

 

Applicant’s services are “Employment agency services, namely, filling the temporary and permanent staffing needs of businesses.” 

 

In U.S. Registration No. 2017198, registrant’s services are “temporary and permanent employment agency services.”

 

In U.S. Registration No. 3704421, registrant’s services are “Employment hiring, recruiting, placement, staffing and career networking services.” 

 

In U.S. Registration Nos. 3520183 and 2898596, registrant’s services are “employment staffing services.”

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registrations at issue, not on evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

The registrations use broad wording to describe the registrants’ employment agency services, which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including applicant’s slightly more narrow identification of employment agency services.  See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000).  Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

In summary, applicant’s and registrants’ marks are confusingly similar in appearance and create a similar overall commercial impression, and their respective services are nearly identical. Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the goods originate from a common source. Accordingly, registration must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.  

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  Applicant also should note the existence of two prior-filed applications and the following additional ground for refusal.

 

ADVISORY—PRIOR-FILED APPLICATIONS

 

The filing dates of pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 87436552 (SELECTED) and 87436540 (SELECTED) precede applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced applications.  If one or more of the marks in the referenced applications register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a quality and purpose of applicant’s services.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s services.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is made in relation to an applicant’s services, not in the abstract.  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061, 1062-63 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software rather than the term “doctor” shown in a dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242, 1243-44 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS and CONCURRENT DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where the relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system). 

 

“Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).

 

In the present case, the attached evidence from www.ahdictionary.com shows that the word “select” means “[t]o take as a choice from among several,” “[s]ingled out in preference,” and “[o]f special quality or value.”  This word merely describes the purpose of applicant’s services, to choose the best job candidates for employers, and a quality of the services, namely, that the employment agency services are of high quality and value. 

 

Moreover, applicant owns active U.S. Registration No. 4671904 for “SELECT STAFFING” for “Employment agency services, namely, filling the temporary and permanent staffing needs of businesses.” In this case, applicant has applied for a portion of that mark for the identical services.

 

In applicant’s prior registration, applicant claimed acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f) unconditionally and not in the alternative for “SELECT STAFFING”, with a disclaimer of “STAFFING”, in the initial application or a subsequent amendment.  Thus, applicant conceded that this wording was not inherently distinctive but was rather merely descriptive. See Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1464, 1479 (TTAB 2016) (citing Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 1358, 92 USPQ2d 1626, 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); TMEP §1212.02(b)-(c).  Accordingly, applicant’s prior registration is probative to show that applicant’s applied-for mark is not inherently distinctive in this case.  See In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d 1712, 1713 (TTAB 2011); TMEP §1212.02(c).

 

Accordingly, the applied-for mark is refused as merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act. 

 

SECTION 2(f) ACQUIRED DISTINCTIVENESS

 

In the application, applicant asserted a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f) based on applicant’s use of the mark in commerce with applicant’s services for five years prior to the date on which the claim is made.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(f).  However, as the attached evidence demonstrates, the allegation of five years’ use is insufficient to show acquired distinctiveness because the applied-for mark is highly descriptive of applicant’s services.  See In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd., 797 F.3d 1332, 1336-37, 116 USPQ2d 1262, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Alacatraz Media Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1765 (TTAB 2013); TMEP §1212.05(a).  Applicant may respond by providing additional evidence of acquired distinctiveness. 

 

An applicant bears the burden of proving that a mark has acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f).  In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd., 797 F.3d 1332, 1335, 116 USPQ2d 1262, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1212.01.  “To show that a mark has acquired distinctiveness, an applicant must demonstrate that the relevant public understands the primary significance of the mark as identifying the source of a product or service rather than the product or service itself.”  In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1297, 75 USPQ2d at 1422. 

 

In the present case, applicant’s claim of acquired distinctiveness based on five years’ use in commerce is insufficient to show acquired distinctiveness of the applied-for mark because, as the attached evidence from www.er-select.com, www.selectgroup.com, www.selectemp.jobs, www.selectleaders.com, www.selectonellc.com, and www.selectstaffconsulting.com shows, the word “SELECT” is frequently used in the employment agency industry and therefore, applicant’s use of the term “SELECT” in connection with employment agency services has not been substantially exclusive.

 

To support the claim of acquired distinctiveness, applicant may respond by submitting other evidence.  See TMEP §1212.02(g).  Such evidence may include “advertising expenditures, sales success, length and exclusivity of use, unsolicited media coverage, and consumer studies (linking the name to a source).”  In re Change Wind Corp., 123 USPQ2d 1453, 1467 (TTAB 2017) (quoting In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).  A showing of acquired distinctiveness need not consider all of these types of evidence; no single factor is determinative.  In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424; see TMEP §§1212.06 et seq.  Rather, the determination involves assessing all of the circumstances involving the use of the mark.  See In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424 (citing Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217, 225 USPQ2d 124, 131-32 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

 

If applicant cannot submit additional evidence to support the claim of acquired distinctiveness, applicant may respond to the refusal by arguing in support of registration and/or amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1091(a); 37 C.F.R. §§2.47, 2.75(a); TMEP §§801.02(b), 816.  If applicant amends the application to the Supplemental Register, applicant is not precluded from submitting evidence and arguments against this refusal.  TMEP §816.04.

 

ADVISORY—IMPROPER USE OF REGISTRATION SYMBOL

 

The specimen shows use of the federal registration symbol ® with the applied-for mark.  However, the USPTO records do not show that the mark is registered.  Applicant may not use the federal registration symbol until its mark is registered in the USPTO.  TMEP §§906, 906.03.  After registration, applicant may use this symbol in connection with the specific services listed in the registration.  Id.

 

This information is advisory only.  Applicant need not respond to this issue.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusals in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

/Melissa S. Winter/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

571-272-7913

Melissa.Winter@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 12/23/2017 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87601379

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 12/23/2017 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  A response transmitted through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the TEAS response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.