UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
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U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87396901
MARK: PREMIER
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Sauna Works Inc.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 2/19/2018
This letter responds to applicant’s communication filed on December 27, 2017 in response the outgoing Office Action dated June 27, 2017.
The Section 2(d) and Section 2(e)(1) arguments in support of registration along with the substitute specimens have all been carefully considered. The arguments do not overcome the Section 2(d) and Section 2(e)(1) refusals for the reasons set forth below.
Additionally, applicant’s substitute specimen is NOT ACCEPTED as it does not show use of the mark in connection with services.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the Section 2(d) refusal, for U.S. Registration No(s). 4145783, 4110489, and 4820705, and the Section 2(e)(1) refusal are made FINAL along with the requirement to produce an acceptable specimen showing use of the mark in commerce for services. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).
Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion FINAL
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No(s). 4145783, 4110489, and 4820705. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously enclosed registration(s).
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See TMEP §1207.01. However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
Taking into account the relevant du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis. First, the marks are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Second, the goods or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or related or whether the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely. In re National Novice Hockey League, Inc., 222 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1984); In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Prods. Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Applicant has applied to register the mark “PREMIER” for “saunas and heaters associated with saunas” in International Class 11 and the retail stores services featuring the same in Class 35.
Registrant owns the mark “PREMIERE HOT TUBS” across three registrations cited herein for in relevant part hot tubs in International Class 11.
Similarities of the marks
With respect to the similarities of the marks, the examining attorney maintains that the marks in this case are identical in commercial impression.
Applicant has argued that the marks are (1) distinct as the spelling and (2) that the different spelling implemented by the marks in the context of hot tubs suggests that these marks are not the same. The examining attorney does not follows applicant’s logic and disagrees with these assertions.
Specifically, the marks share the same wording “PREMIER” and “PREMIERE” which are phonetically the same. Moreover, this dominant element is emphasized because the wording “HOT TUBS” in registrants mark is generic for hot tubs and thus has not source identifying significance. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
Relatedness of the Goods and/or Services
Applicant has amended the identification to more specifically relate the descriptions to use of heaters, and further describe saunas that use heaters, such as infrared heaters. These amendments to do little to overcome relatedness hot tubs and saunas which are still part of applicant’s goods and that of the cited registration. Thus, regarding the relatedness of the goods and/or services, applicant and registrant still have related goods.
A determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion is made solely on the basis of the goods and/or services identified in the application and registration, without limitations or restrictions that are not reflected therein. In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595 (TTAB 1999).
The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Rather, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source. In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Here, hot tubs and saunas are related goods.
Attached previously were 7 copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of applicant and registrant in this case. These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely, hot tubs and saunas, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source. In re Infinity Broad. Corp.,60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
Additionally please find the previously attached Internet evidence showing that customers can shop for and find hot tubs and saunas from a single source.
http://www.kachemakcooperage.com/
Please also find the following new evidence showing the same.
http://www.kachemakcooperage.com/
This evidence establishes that the relevant goods and/or services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use and the goods and/or services are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function. Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Evidence obtained from the Internet may be used to support a determination under Trademark Act Section 2(d) that goods and/or services are related. See, e.g., In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1371 (TTAB 2009); In re Paper Doll Promotions, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1660, 1668 (TTAB 2007).
Any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion is resolved in favor of the prior registrant. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).
In sum, based on the foregoing, registration is denied, and made FINAL, on the Principal Register under Section 2(d).
Section 2(e)(1) – Descriptiveness Refusal FINAL
Registration is refused because the proposed mark merely describes a feature of applicant’s goods and/or services. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); TMEP §§1209 et seq.
A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the specified goods and/or services. TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217-18, 3 USPQ2d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Moreover, a mark that identifies a group of users to whom an applicant directs its goods and/or services is also merely descriptive. TMEP §1209.03(i); see In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1454 (TTAB 2004).
The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is considered in relation to the identified goods and/or services, not in the abstract. In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (C.C.P.A. 1978); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would be understood to refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software, not “doctor” as shown in dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system). “Whether consumers could guess what the product is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.” In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).
“A mark may be merely descriptive even if it does not describe the ‘full scope and extent’ of the applicant’s goods or services.” In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); TMEP §1209.01(b). It is enough if the term describes only one significant function, attribute or property. In re Oppedahl, 373 F.3d at 1173, 71 USPQ2d at 1371; TMEP §1209.01(b).
A term is merely descriptive if it conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities, or characteristics of the identified goods and/or services. See In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
In this case, applicant has applied to register the mark “PREMIER” for its goods and services.
Applicant has argued that the mark is suggestive and not descriptive as the “mark does not immediately convey specific knowledge or information about particular features or characteristics of saunas as it is not immediately apparent what characteristics ‘Premier” would be describing”.
The examining attorney respectfully disagrees. The mark is laudatorily descriptive. The Office has found the term to be laudatorily descriptive as evidenced by the same registrations that were cited in the Section 2(d) refusal. Please note that PREMIER and PREMIERE are both acceptable spellings of a term having the same meaning. See attached evidence from the dictionary for applicant’s reference.
As previously provided by the examining attorney, the term “PREMIER” is defined as first in position, rank, or importance. Please see attached definition.
Here, applicant’s “PREMIER” mark is merely descriptive because it immediately conveys a laudatory feature of the goods and services being ranking as the first in its category.“ Marks that are merely laudatory and descriptive of the alleged merit of a product [or service] are . . . regarded as being descriptive” because “[s]elf-laudatory or puffing marks are regarded as a condensed form of describing the character or quality of the goods [or services].” DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1256, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1759 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re The Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373, 53 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding THE ULTIMATE BIKE RACK merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s bicycle racks being of superior quality); In re The Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d at 1373-74, 53 USPQ2d at 1058-59 (holding THE BEST BEER IN AMERICA merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s beer and ale being of superior quality); TMEP §1209.03(k). In fact, “puffing, if anything, is more likely to render a mark merely descriptive, not less so.” DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d at 1256, 103 USPQ2d at 1759. In re Duvernoy & Sons, Inc., 212 F.2d 202, 204, 101 USPQ 288, 289 (C.C.P.A. 1954) (holding CONSISTENTLY SUPERIOR merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s bakery products always being of superior quality); In re The Place, Inc., 76 USPQ2d 1467, 1468 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE GREATEST BAR merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s restaurant being markedly superior in character or quality to other restaurants and bars); In re Dos Padres, Inc., 49 USPQ2d 1860, 1862 (TTAB 1998) (holding QUESO QUESADILLA SUPREME merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s cheese being of superior quality); In re Inter-State Oil Co., 219 USPQ 1229, 1230 (TTAB 1983) (holding PREFERRED merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s bird and squirrel repellant being liked better than other similar products).
In sum, based on the foregoing registration is denied, and made FINAL< on the Principal Register under Section 2(e)(1).
Specimen – Does Not Show Use With Services in Class 35 FINAL
Registration is refused because the specimen does not show the applied-for mark in use in commerce in connection with any of the goods and/or services specified in International Class(es) 35 in the application or amendment to allege use. Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); In re Graystone Consulting Assocs., Inc., 115 USPQ2d 2035, 2037-38 (TTAB 2015); In re Chengdu AOBI Info. Tech. Co., 111 USPQ2d 2080, 2081-82 (TTAB 2011); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(d), (g)(i). Specifically, the specimen does not show use of the mark in connection with the applied for retail store services. The specimens continue to show only use with goods but not with services that bear the mark. Specifically, applicant has indicated that the substitute specimens show the mark as follows:
The evidence submitted includes two specimens that show the mark PREMIER appearing on a sauna on display as a floor model. The first specimen shows the mark PREMIER as it appears on a control panel of the sauna. The second specimen shows a more zoomed out version of the sauna to provide additional context.
An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods and/or services identified in the application or amendment to allege use. 15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a).
Examples of specimens for goods include tags, labels, instruction manuals, containers, photographs that show the mark on the actual goods or packaging, and displays associated with the actual goods at their point of sale. See TMEP §§904.03 et seq. Webpages may also be specimens for goods when they include a picture or textual description of the goods associated with the mark and the means to order the goods. TMEP §904.03(i). Examples of specimens for services include advertising and marketing materials, brochures, photographs of business signage and billboards, and webpages that show the mark used in the actual sale, rendering, or advertising of the services. See TMEP §1301.04(a), (h)(iv)(C). Specimens comprising advertising and promotional materials must show a direct association between the mark and the services. TMEP §1301.04(f)(ii).
Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:
1) Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods and/or services identified in the application or amendment to allege use. A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.” The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.
(2) Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required. This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.
For an overview of both response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy either option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/specimen.jsp.
(1) a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or
(2) an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). There is a fee required for filing a petition. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
/Jaclyn Kidwell Walker/
Jaclyn Kidwell Walker
Law Office 112
Tel: 571-272-8196
Fax: 571-273-8196
jaclyn.kidwellwalker@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.
