UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 1/12/2018

 

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This final Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on December 18, 2017.

 

In a previous Office action dated June 16, 2017, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with registered marks based on U.S. Registration Nos. 2481193, 4762333, and 4808805.  In addition, applicant was advised that a prior pending application posed a potential bar to registration under Trademark Action Section 2(d). 

 

Based on applicant’s response deleting International Class 025, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following refusal has been withdrawn: the Section 2(d) refusal regarding U.S. Registration Nos. 2481193 and 4762333.  In addition, the potential refusal under Trademark Action Section 2(d) regarding a prior pending application is obviated by applicant’s deletion of Class 025.   See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Likelihood of Confusion Refusal—Trademark Act Section 2(d)

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 4808805.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4808805.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. 

 

Standard of Analysis for Section 2(d) Refusal

 

Applicant’s mark is “SHIELD” for “Textile piece goods, namely, fabric for use in the manufacture of articles of clothing and sleeping bags” in International Class 024.

 

Registrant’s mark is “SHIELD CLASSIC” for “Textiles and textile goods, namely, fabrics, cotton fabrics, felt fabrics, faux suede fabrics, satin fabrics, silk fabrics, printed fabrics, woven fabrics; upholstery materials, namely, fabrics, cotton fabrics, felt fabrics, suede fabrics, satin fabrics, silk fabrics, printed fabrics, woven fabrics; materials for covering walls, namely, textile and fabric wall hangings; materials for soft furnishings, namely, textiles and fabrics for the further manufacture of soft furnishings; curtain materials of fabric and textile; fabrics for the manufacture of upholstered goods; flame retardant fabrics for the further manufacture of upholstered goods; waterproof fabrics for the further manufacture of upholstered goods; water resistant fabrics for the further manufacture of upholstered goods; laminated fabrics for the further manufacture of upholstered goods; vinyl cloth for use in the manufacture of upholstered goods; plastic substitutes for fabrics in the nature of vinyl fabric for use in the manufacture of upholstered items; upholstery fabrics; fabrics for the further manufacture of wall coverings; fabrics for furnishings; fabrics for soft furnishings; fabrics for seating areas, namely, for the further manufacture of furniture; curtain fabrics; soft furnishings, namely, curtains, cushion covers, bed sheets, duvet covers, pillow covers, bed blankets, blanket throws, lap blankets, travelling blankets, throws, coverlets; curtains; curtains of textile material; curtains made of plastics; shower curtains; door curtains in the nature of fabric curtains for separating rooms; fabric curtains for cubicles; fabric curtains for hospital cubicles; replacement parts for the aforesaid goods” in International Class 024.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Comparison of the Marks:

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is SHIELD and registrant’s mark is SHIELD CLASSIC.  Here, both marks share the wording SHIELD.  The sole distinction between the marks, both visually and aurally, is the addition of the disclaimed term “CLASSIC” to registrant’s mark.  Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Moreover, although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  In the present case, registrant’s mark contains the disclaimed wording “CLASSIC” and this term is descriptive for the registrant’s goods; thus, it is the less dominant portion of the mark, leaving the term “SHIELD” as the dominant portion of the mark. The attached evidence from online dictionaries shows that the term “classic” may refer to “Formal, refined, and restrained in style”; “simple and harmonious; elegant”; “traditional, enduring”; or “characterized by simple tailored lines in fashion year after year”.  See attached definitions.  When used in connection with registrant’s identified goods, the term “classic” merely describes the style of the textile and textile goods as being refined, traditional, etc.  As such, the term is merely descriptive of registrant’s goods and is therefore the less significant portion of registrant’s mark.  Here, the dominant portion of registrant’s mark, “SHIELD,” is identical to applicant’s mark, “SHIELD”, and thus the two marks are confusingly similar.

 

Applicant argues that the addition of the term “CLASSIC” to registrant’s mark creates a different commercial impression when compared to applicant’s mark.  However, as explained above, although the marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Here, the term “SHIELD” is the dominant term in registrant’s mark and is identical to applicant’s applied-for mark and creates a similar commercial impression.  Further, as explained above, applicant’s mark simply deletes the merely descriptive term “CLASSIC” to create its own mark.  Thus, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as the registered mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from the registered mark.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

 

Comparison of Goods

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In the present case, applicant’s goods are “Textile piece goods, namely, fabric for use in the manufacture of articles of clothing and sleeping bags” and registrant’s goods are “Textiles and textile goods, namely, fabrics, cotton fabrics, felt fabrics, faux suede fabrics, satin fabrics, silk fabrics, printed fabrics, woven fabrics; upholstery materials, namely, fabrics, cotton fabrics, felt fabrics, suede fabrics, satin fabrics, silk fabrics, printed fabrics, woven fabrics; materials for covering walls, namely, textile and fabric wall hangings; materials for soft furnishings, namely, textiles and fabrics for the further manufacture of soft furnishings; curtain materials of fabric and textile; fabrics for the manufacture of upholstered goods; flame retardant fabrics for the further manufacture of upholstered goods; waterproof fabrics for the further manufacture of upholstered goods; water resistant fabrics for the further manufacture of upholstered goods; laminated fabrics for the further manufacture of upholstered goods; vinyl cloth for use in the manufacture of upholstered goods; plastic substitutes for fabrics in the nature of vinyl fabric for use in the manufacture of upholstered items; upholstery fabrics; fabrics for the further manufacture of wall coverings; fabrics for furnishings; fabrics for soft furnishings; fabrics for seating areas, namely, for the further manufacture of furniture; curtain fabrics; soft furnishings, namely, curtains, cushion covers, bed sheets, duvet covers, pillow covers, bed blankets, blanket throws, lap blankets, travelling blankets, throws, coverlets; curtains; curtains of textile material; curtains made of plastics; shower curtains; door curtains in the nature of fabric curtains for separating rooms; fabric curtains for cubicles; fabric curtains for hospital cubicles; replacement parts for the aforesaid goods”.  These goods are related in that they both deal with the production of fabric.  Furthermore, registrant’s broad identification of “Textiles and textile goods, namely, fabrics, cotton fabrics, felt fabrics, faux suede fabrics, satin fabrics, silk fabrics, printed fabrics, woven fabrics” encompass applicant’s goods.  Registrant’s textile goods include fabrics that could be used in the manufacture of articles of clothing and sleeping bags.  

 

Applicant argues that its goods are different than registrant’s because applicant’s goods will be used as a raw material, whereas, the registrant’s goods include fabric for industrial application such as fabrics to covering walls, seats, and furnishing.  This argument is unconvincing.  Although registrant’s goods include fabrics that are used for wall covering, furnishing, seats, etc., registrant’s goods also include the broad items “Textiles and textile goods, namely, fabrics, cotton fabrics, felt fabrics, faux suede fabrics, satin fabrics, silk fabrics, printed fabrics, woven fabrics”.  These fabrics may overlap with applicant’s fabrics for use in the manufacture of articles of clothing and sleeping bags. In fact, cotton fabric, satin fabric, faux suede fabric, etc. are all types of fabrics that are used in the manufacture of articles of clothing.  The attached evidence includes a series of third-party websites that demonstrate that cotton fabrics, satin fabrics, silk fabrics, etc. are used in the manufacture of clothing and sleeping bags.      

 

The registration uses the broad wording “textiles and textile goods, namely, fabrics”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “fabric for use in the manufacture of articles of clothing and sleeping bags.”  See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000).  Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to, channels of trade or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the descriptions of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Accordingly, the goods of applicant and the registrant are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.

Applicant also contends that likelihood of confusion between the two marks is unlikely because of the sophistication of registrant’s and applicant’s purchasers.  However, applicant has not provided any evidence to show that purchasers of the parties’ goods in International Class 024 are sophisticated. 

Moreover, the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011). 

Finally, applicant notes that there are registered SHIELD marks in connection with identical or closely related goods.  Prior decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in registering other marks have little evidentiary value and are not binding upon the USPTO or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vi); see In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d 1790, 1793 n.10 (TTAB 2017).  Each case is decided on its own facts, and each mark stands on its own merits.  In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d at 1793 n.10 (quoting In re Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336, 1343, 67 USPQ2d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).  Moreover, many of the registrations that applicant identifies pertain to finished products for end consumers, like diaper changing clothes, bed linens, sofa covers, etc.  These items are not particularly related to applicant’s applied-for goods and registrant’s goods, which are used in further manufacture.  In addition, the majority of the marks identified by the applicant combine the term SHIELD with other nondescriptive wording to create marks with different commercial impressions, such as LIFESHIELD, BATTLESHIELD X, ECOSHIELD, etc.  Thus, these third party registrations do not demonstrate that the cited mark, SHIELD CLASSIC, is weak or diluted in connection with fabrics.

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

Because applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are highly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression, and because applicant’s goods are, in essence, identical to goods in the cited registration and are presumed to move in the same trade channels, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods.  Therefore, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 4808805.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)       a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or

 

(2)       an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  There is a fee required for filing a petition.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/Bridget A. McCarthy/

Bridget A. Sarpu

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 125

(571)272-3223

bridget.sarpu@uspto.gov

 

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 1/12/2018 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87376087

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 1/12/2018 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  A response transmitted through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the TEAS response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.