To: | Discovery Communications, LLC (tmdocket@arentfox.com) |
Subject: | U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 87116448 - DISCOVERY - 026146.00000 |
Sent: | 4/18/2017 6:07:07 PM |
Sent As: | ECOM114@USPTO.GOV |
Attachments: |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87116448
MARK: DISCOVERY
|
|
CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/index.jsp
|
APPLICANT: Discovery Communications, LLC
|
|
CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
|
SUSPENSION NOTICE: NO RESPONSE NEEDED
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/18/2017
The trademark examining attorney is suspending action on the application for the reasons stated below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.67; TMEP §§716 et seq.
The effective filing date of the pending application identified below precedes the filing date of applicant’s application. If the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with that registered mark. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. Therefore, action on this application is suspended until the earlier-filed referenced application is either registered or abandoned. 37 C.F.R. §2.83(c). A copy of information relevant to this referenced application was sent previously.
- Application Serial No. 79177962
The examining attorney notes that the consent agreement submitted by applicant is a “naked consent” and is insufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion refusal because it neither (1) sets forth reasons why the parties believe there is no likelihood of confusion, nor (2) describes the arrangements undertaken by the parties to avoid confusing the public. See In re Mastic, 829 F.2d 1114, 1117-18, 4 USPQ2d 1292, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Permagrain Prods., Inc., 223 USPQ 147, 149 (TTAB 1984); TMEP §1207.01(d)(viii). Without additional factors to support the conclusion that confusion is unlikely, naked consents are generally accorded little weight in a likelihood of confusion determination. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1362, 177 USPQ 563, 568 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
If applicant submits a more “clothed” consent agreement indicating the registrant’s consent to the use and registration of the mark, and addressing one or both of the factors listed above, this refusal will be reconsidered. However, consent agreements are but one factor to be taken into account with all of the other relevant circumstances bearing on a likelihood of confusion determination. In re N.A.D. Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999, 224 USPQ 969, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 177 USPQ at 567; TMEP §1207.01(d)(viii); see also In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1963 (TTAB 2016) (“[T]here is no per se rule that a consent, whatever its terms, will always tip the balance to finding no likelihood of confusion, and it therefore follows that the content of each agreement must be examined.”).
Factors to be considered in weighing a consent agreement include the following:
(1) Whether the consent shows an agreement between both parties;
(2) Whether the agreement includes a clear indication that the goods and/or services travel in separate trade channels;
(3) Whether the parties agree to restrict their fields of use;
(4) Whether the parties will make efforts to prevent confusion, and cooperate and take steps to avoid any confusion that may arise in the future; and
(5) Whether the marks have been used for a period of time without evidence of actual confusion.
See In re Four Seasons Hotels Ltd., 987 F.2d 1565, 1569, 26 USPQ2d 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Mastic, 829 F.2d at 1117-18, 4 USPQ2d at 1295-96; cf. Bongrain Int’l (Am.) Corp. v. Delice de Fr., Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1485, 1 USPQ2d 1775, 1779 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Further, it is unclear whether the consent agreement is signed by a person authorized to bind the registrant, Jaguar Land Rover Limited a United Kingdom Limited Company. See TMEP §611.06(g), §1207.01(d)(viii).
The examining attorney also notes that the requirement for a signed declaration has been SATISFIED.
The USPTO will periodically conduct a status check of the application to determine whether suspension remains appropriate, and the trademark examining attorney will issue as needed an inquiry letter to applicant regarding the status of the matter on which suspension is based. TMEP §§716.04, 716.05. Applicant will be notified when suspension is no longer appropriate. See TMEP §716.04.
No response to this notice is necessary; however, if applicant wants to respond, applicant should use the “Response to Suspension Inquiry or Letter of Suspension” form online at http://teasroa.gov.uspto.report/rsi/rsi.
/Breanna Freeman/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 114
(571) 272-7099
breanna.freeman@uspto.gov
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.