UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 8/5/2016

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Amended Color Claim and Mark Description Required
• Clarification of Entity Type Required

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4173092 (“FEARCE”), 4238034 (“FIERCE”), and 4841321 (“FIERCEWEAR”).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Applicant has applied to register the mark “FIERCE” in stylized font with design.

 

The mark in Registration No. 4173092 is “FEARCE” in standard characters.

 

The mark in Registration No. 4238034 is “FIERCE” in standard characters.

 

The mark in Registration No. 4841321 is “FIERCEWEAR” in standard characters.

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).   

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is nearly identical to the “FIERCE” mark in Registration No. 4238034.  The literal element of both marks is “FIERCE”—applicant merely presents it in stylized font, while registrant presents the mark in standard characters.  These marks are identical in sound and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, Llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015).  Additionally, because they are nearly identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and services.  In re i.am.symbolic, Llc, 116 USPQ2d at 1411.  Therefore, applicant’s mark and the “FIERCE” mark are confusingly similar. 

 

Applicant’s mark is identical in sound to the “FEARCE” mark in Registration No. 4173092.  The marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar.  Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

Applicant’s mark is also similar to the “FIERCEWEAR” mark in Registration No. 4841321.  Both marks include the identical wording “FIERCE”.  Registrant merely appends the generic wording “WEAR” to its mark.  Despite this addition, the marks remain confusingly similar because the identical wording “FIERCE” is the dominant element of registrant’s mark.  Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Matter that is generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark.  See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).  In the present case, the attached evidence shows that the wording “WEAR” in the registered mark is generic for registrant’s clothing goods.  Specifically, “WEAR” means “[c]lothing, especially of a particular kind or for a particular use.”  See attached dictionary definition.  Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording “FIERCE” the more dominant element of the mark.

 

Although applicant’s mark includes stylization and design, this does not obviate the marks’ similarities, because each of the registered marks is in standard characters.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Based on the above analysis, applicant’s and registrants’ marks are sufficiently similar to find a likelihood of confusion.

 

Similarity of the Goods and Services

 

Applicant has applied to register its mark in connection with “Aprons; Baseball caps; Baseball caps and hats; Bathing suits; Bathrobes; Bikinis; Bottoms; Boxer shorts; Bras; Button down shirts; Cardigans; Collared shirts; Dress shirts; Fitted swimming costumes with bra cups; Fleece shorts; Footwear; Gloves for apparel; Golf pants, shirts and skirts; Golf shirts; Gowns; Headbands; Headbands against sweating; Headbands for clothing; Headwear; Hooded sweatshirts; Jeans; Jogging pants; Jogging suits; Jumpers; Knit shirts; Leotards; Lingerie; Neckties; Night gowns; Nightcaps; Nightgowns; Nightshirts; Pajamas; Polo knit tops; Polo shirts; Ponchos; Robes; Running suits; Sandals and beach shoes; Shirts; Short-sleeved or long-sleeved t-shirts; Shorts; Shoulder scarves; Sleeping garments; Snap crotch shirts for infants and toddlers; Socks; Sports caps and hats; Sports shirts; Strapless brassieres; Sweat shirts; Sweat suits; Sweaters; Sweatpants; Sweatshirts; Sweatsuits; Swim suits; Swimming caps; Swimsuits; T-shirts; Tank tops; Tank-tops; Tights; Tops; Undergarments; Underwear; Warm-up suits.”

 

The goods in Registration No. 4173092 are “Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic uniforms.”

 

The services in Registration No. 4238034 are “Retail store services featuring apparel and personal care products.”

 

The goods in Registration No. 4841321 are “Boots; Gloves; Hats; Jackets; Pants; T-shirts.”

 

I.                Comparison with the Clothing Goods in Registration Nos. 4173092 and 4841321

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d at 1268, 62 USPQ2d at 1005.  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identifications set forth in the application and registrations have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  See Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  The identifications have several legally identical goods and goods that are encompassed by the application or registrations.  Applicant’s shirts and footwear are legally identical to those same items in Registration No. 4173092.   Applicant’s gloves and t-shirts are legally identical to those same goods in Registration No. 4841321.  Further, the application and registrations use broad wording to describe the goods and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described, including those in the narrower corresponding identifications.  For example, the “shirts,” “footwear” and “hats and caps” in Registration No. 4173092 are presumed to encompass “Baseball caps; Baseball caps and hats; Button down shirts; Collared shirts; Dress shirts; Golf shirts; Headwear; Hooded sweatshirts; Knit shirts; Nightcaps; Nightshirts; Polo knit tops; Polo shirts; Sandals and beach shoes; Short-sleeved or long-sleeved t-shirts; Snap crotch shirts for infants and toddlers; Sports caps and hats; Sports shirts; Sweat shirts; Sweatshirts; Swimming caps; Tank tops; Tank-tops; Tops.”  The “pants” in both registered marks are presumed to encompass “Golf pants; Jeans; Jogging pants; Sweatpants.”  Similarly, applicant’s “Bottoms” and “Footwear” are presumed to encompass both registrants’ “pants” and the “boots” in Registration No. 4841321. 

 

Applicant’s remaining goods, which are generally undergarments, swimwear, sleepwear, and accessories, are also related to registrants’ goods.  The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a representative sample of third-party marks registered for use in connection with applicant’s remaining clothing goods and registrants’ goods.  This evidence shows that the goods listed therein are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).  Accordingly, the applicant’s goods and the goods in Registration Nos. 4173092 and 4841321 are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

II.             Comparison with the Retail Services in Registration No. 4238034

 

Applicant’s clothing goods are related to registrant’s retail services, because registrant’s services feature the types of goods applicant produces.  The use of similar marks on or in connection with both products and retail-store services has been held likely to cause confusion where the evidence showed that the retail-store services featured the same type of products.  See In re Peebles, Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1796 (TTAB 1992) (holding the use of nearly identical marks for coats and for retail outlets featuring camping and mountain climbing equipment, including coats, likely to cause confusion, noting that “there is no question that store services and the goods which may be sold in that store are related goods and services for the purpose of determining likelihood of confusion”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii).

 

Attached hereto are screen captures from J. Crew, Banana Republic, and Forever 21.  These entities provide retail services under the same mark used in connection with their apparel goods. This shows that the same entities commonly produce clothing goods and provide retail services featuring such clothing, while marketing both under the same mark.  Therefore, applicant’s clothing and registrant’s retail services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Accordingly, because applicant’s and registrants’ marks are similar and the goods and services are related, consumers are likely to be confused and registration must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

 

AMENDED COLOR CLAIM AND MARK DESCRIPTION REQUIRED

 

As detailed below, applicant must amend the color claim and mark description to: (1) remove the registered mark from the mark description, (2) incorporate all colors that appear in the drawing in the color claim, and (3) clarify the mark description such that it does not reference changeable elements. 

 

With respect to issue (1), the wording “SWAROVSKI” in the description of the mark is a registered mark that does not appear to be owned by applicant.  See, for example, attached copy of U.S. Registration No. 1739479.  Applications for marks not in standard characters must include an accurate and concise description of the entire mark using common non-proprietary language.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.37; TMEP §808.02; cf. Camloc Fastener Corp. v. Grant, 119 USPQ 264, 265 n.1 (TTAB 1958) (the use of registered marks in identifications is inappropriate because it indicates origin in another party); TMEP §1402.09.  Therefore, applicant must amend the description to delete reference to the registered mark and replace it with generic wording.  TMEP §808.02. 

 

With respect to issue (2), the color claim does not identify the silver color of the diamond in the mark.  A complete color claim must list all the colors appearing in the drawing of the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(1); TMEP §§807.07(a) et seq.  If black, white, and/or gray are not being claimed as a color feature of the mark, applicant must exclude these from the color claim and include in the mark description a statement that the colors black, white, and/or gray represent background, outlining, shading and/or transparent areas and are not part of the mark.  TMEP §807.07(d). 

 

With respect to issue (3), the drawing shows the mark in particular colors and with a diamond design, but the mark description indicates that the colors and diamond design can vary or change such that the mark may be used in combinations different from those shown on the drawing.  Specifically, the mark description states that “the mark will be writing in black or white,” and that it contains a “clear . . . diamond over the i,” but that the mark also “will be written without the clear . . . diamond.”  Accordingly, applicant must clarify what the mark comprises because it is unclear what colors and design elements applicant is claiming as part of the mark.  TMEP §807.07(a)(i).

 

A mark description must state clearly and accurately what the mark comprises, and must agree with the mark as it appears on the drawing.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.37, 2.52; TMEP §808.02.  In addition, an applicant may seek registration of only one mark in a single application.  37 C.F.R. §2.52; TMEP §807.01; see 15 U.S.C. §1051; In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1366, 51 USPQ2d 1513, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Hayes, 62 USPQ2d 1443, 1445-46 (TTAB 2002).  A mark with a changeable or “phantom” element is considered to be more than one mark.  See In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d at 1368, 51 USPQ2d at 1518; In re Primo Water Corp., 87 USPQ2d 1376, 1378 (TTAB 2008); TMEP §1214.01.  Thus, a mark with varying or changing colors and designs is considered to be more than one mark.  See In re Hayes, 62 USPQ2d at 1445.

 

Therefore, applicant must clarify what the mark comprises by satisfying one of the following.  Each option incorporates the changes required to address issue (1) regarding the registered mark in the description and issue (2) regarding the missing color in the color claim:

 

(1)  Submit (a) a new drawing showing the mark only in black and white, (b) a statement authorizing deletion of any color claim, and (c) a modified mark description deleting any reference to color.  A registration for a mark that does not include a color claim covers depictions of the mark in all possible color combinations and is not limited to any particular color scheme.  See In re Data Packaging Corp., 453 F.2d 1300, 1302, 172 USPQ 396, 397 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §807.14(e)(i).  In the present case, amending the mark to delete color would not be considered a material alteration.  37 C.F.R. §2.72(a)-(b); see TMEP §§807.12(a), 807.14 et seq.  The following mark description is suggested, if accurate:

 

The mark consists of the stylized wording “FIERCE” with a diamond as the point of the letter “I”.

 

(2)  Submit an amended color claim and mark description that deletes reference to the color in the mark varying or being changeable and restricts the color claim and mark description to only those colors shown on the drawing.  Generic color names must be used to describe the colors in the mark, e.g., magenta, yellow, turquoise.  TMEP §807.07(a)(i)-(ii).  If black, white, and/or gray are not being claimed as a color feature of the mark, applicant must exclude them from the color claim and include in the mark description a statement that the colors black, white, and/or gray represent background, outlining, shading, and/or transparent areas and are not part of the mark.  See TMEP §807.07(d).  Applicant may submit the following color claim and mark description, if accurate:

 

Color claim:  The colors black and silver are claimed as a feature of the mark.

 

Mark description:  The mark consists of the stylized black wording “FIERCE” with a silver diamond as the point of the letter “I”.

 

See TMEP §807.07(a)(i)-(ii).

 

CLARIFICATION OF ENTITY TYPE REQUIRED

 

The name of an individual person appears in the section of the application intended for the trademark owner’s name, but the entity type is set forth as a limited liability company.  Applicant must clarify this inconsistency.  TMEP §803.03. 

 

If applicant is an individual, applicant should simply request that the entity be amended to “individual” and must indicate his/her country of citizenship for the record.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(2); 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(3)(i); TMEP §§803.02(a), 803.03(a), 803.04.  Alternatively, if applicant is a limited liability company, applicant must set forth its correct name and U.S. state or foreign country of incorporation or organization.  TMEP §§803.03(h), 803.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(2), (a)(3)(ii).

 

If, in response to the above request, applicant provides information indicating that it is not the owner of the mark, registration may be refused under Trademark Act Section 1, 15 U.S.C. §1051, because the application was void as filed.  Only the owner of a mark may apply to register the mark.  TMEP §§803.01, 803.06, 1201.02(b).

 

ABANDONMENT ADVISORY & RESPONSE GUIDELINES

  

For this application to proceed further, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.  For more information and general tips on responding to USPTO Office actions, response options, and how to file a response online, see “Responding to Office Actions” on the USPTO’s website.

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02.  Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.

 

Where the application has been abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, applicant’s only option would be to file a timely petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  There is a $100 fee for such petitions.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6, 2.66(b)(1).

 

Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines involved in the USPTO application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney specializing in trademark matters to represent applicant in this process and provide legal advice.  Although the undersigned trademark examining attorney is permitted to help an applicant understand the contents of an Office action as well as the application process in general, no USPTO attorney or staff is permitted to give an applicant legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights.  TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help, an attorney referral service of a state or local bar association, or a local telephone directory.  The USPTO may not assist an applicant in the selection of a private attorney.  37 C.F.R. §2.11.

 

ASSISTANCE

  

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

 

 

 

 

/Danielle E. Johnson/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 120

(571) 272-4362

danielle.johnson1@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 8/5/2016 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87000651

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed.  The trademark examining attorney assigned by the USPTO to your application has written an official letter to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

(1)  Read the LETTER by clicking on this link or going to http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, entering your U.S. application serial number, and clicking on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

(2)  Respond within 6 months (or sooner if specified in the Office action), calculated from 8/5/2016, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. 

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions. 

 

(3)  Questions about the contents of the Office action itself should be directed to the trademark examining attorney who reviewed your application, identified below. 

 

/Danielle E. Johnson/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 120

(571) 272-4362

danielle.johnson1@uspto.gov

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp. 

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.