UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 11/23/2016

 

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on October 3, 2016.

 

In the first Office Action dated April 1, 2016, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark as to International Class 028 based on Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Reg. Nos. 3438988.  Registratioon of the mark was also refused under Section 2(e)(4) because the applied for mark is primarily merely a surname.

 

Based on the evidence and arguments provided in applicant’s response, the refusal to register under Section 2(e)(4) regarding the surname significance of the mark is hereby withdrawn.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal to register the applied-for mark as to International Class 028 under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is maintained and now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 3438988.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION- PARTIAL FINAL REFUSAL

The stated refusal refers to International Class 028 only and does not bar registration in the other class.

 

The refusal to register the applied-for mark as to the applied-for goods in International Class 028 is hereby made final because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3438988.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  A copy of the cited registration was attached to the First Office Action and is incorporated herein by reference.

 

I.                 Legal Standards for Trademark Act Section 2(d)

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are: (1) the similarities between the marks, and (2) the similarities between the goods. In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 (TTAB 2015) (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); see TMEP §1207.01.  That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Additionally, the goods are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).

 

Applicant has applied to register, as amended:

 

• CABALLERO (Standard Character) for, in relevant part, “Skateboards, Skateboard decks, Skateboard trucks, Skateboard wheels,” in International Class 028.

 

The registered mark is:

 

• MIGUEL CABALLERO (Design Plus Word) for, in relevant part "Protective Helmets," in International Class 009.

 

II.               SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this case, the applied-for mark consists entirely of the surname CABALLERO in standard character form and the registered mark is comprised of the name MIGUEL CABALLERO and a design feature.  The mere deletion of a first name from a registered mark comprised of an entire name does not obviate the similarity between the marks, but, as in this case, would likely cause a consumer to believe that the applied-for mark and the registered mark refer to the same person.   See, e.g., In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (C.H. HANSON confusingly similar to HANSON) (citing In re Chatham Int’l, Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1343, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (JOSE GASPAR GOLD confusingly similar to GASPAR’S ALE); Harry Winston, Inc. v. Bruce Winston Gem Corp., 111 USPQ2d 1419, 1446-47 (TTAB 2014) (BRUCE WINSTON confusingly similar to WINSTON); In re SL&E Training Stable Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1216, 1219 (TTAB 2008) (SAM EDELMAN confusingly similar to EDELMAN); Somerset Distilling Inc. v. Speymalt Whisky Distribs. Ltd., 14 USPQ2d 1539, 1542 (TTAB 1989) (JAS. GORDON confusingly similar to GORDON’S)).

 

Applicant asserts that the design element would mitigate any confusion between the marks.  However, for a composite mark containing both words and a design, the word portion may be more likely to indicate the origin of the goods because it is that portion of the mark that consumers use when referring to or requesting the goods.  Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although such marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

Further, in this case the applied-for mark is in standard character.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). 

 

The presence of the design in the registered mark fails to change the overall commercial impression of the mark.  Therefore, the presence of this additional element in conjunction with highly similar wording would fail to distinguish the source of the goods, particularly where applicant has claimed no particular lettering or display style.

 

In addition, while applicant asserts that the “connotation” of the literal potions of the marks in the context of the parties’ goods distinguish the mark, applicant does not indicate or provide any differing meaning or commercial impression which would be provided by the identical wording as used in the mark.  Because the wording CABALLERO is identical, and the applied-for mark contains no additional wording or matter by which consumers could distinguish the CABELLERO from which the highly related goods original, confusion is highly likely. 

 

Applicant’s arguments with regard to the dissimilarity of the marks are found unpersuasive.  The marks are therefore found to be confusingly similar.

 

III.             RELATEDNESS OF THE GOODS

 

The goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Applicant asserts that because applicant’s other registered goods indicate more specific restrictions and limitations, applicant’s goods, identified as “protective helmets” are bullet proof and would not be designed to be sold to skateboarders. 

 

The question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).   Unrestricted and broad identifications presumed to encompass all goods of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the goods cited in the application are “protective helmets.”  The cited goods are not modified or limited by any restrictions as to the nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers, but as identified in the registration indicate a separate category of goods for which the cited mark is registered. While applicant asserts that the goods are only used by police, military, correctional facilities, and the like, this limitation specifically modifies the goods identified as “hand-held protective shields for use by police, military, correctional facilities, and the like,” and does not refer to all of the goods in the registration.  Therefore, based on the broad description of the goods stated in the application at issue, the goods are presumed to encompass all protective helmets, not merely bullet-proof helmets or those used in any specialized field of use. 

 

As shown by the third party registrations attached to the first Office action, helmets registered for use under the same marks as skateboards and related skateboard goods are identified as “protective helmets.”  Similarly, the plain meaning of this wording would encompass all protective helmets.  Therefore, the cited registered goods clearly encompass skateboard helmets.

 

As shown by the evidence attached to the first Office Action, skateboards and skateboard protective/safety helmets, are goods of a kind that are commonly registered for use together under a single mark.  The Internet evidence previously attached also establishes that these goods are also commonly sold together in commerce at specialty skate shops under the same mark.

 

In addition to the evidence attached to the first Office Action, the additional website screenshots attached hereto show not only that relevant goods are sold together in the same streams of commerce to the same users for the same uses, but that these goods are commonly marketed together under the same marks, illustrated by the evidence of Airwalk helmets and skateboards, Krown helmets and skateboards, and Titan Flower Princess helmets and skateboards.   Thus, based on the evidence, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

The remainder of applicant’s argument is premised upon it’s reading of the artificial restriction into the registration, namely, applicant’s assertion that since the evidence it provided indicates registrant is only using the mark in conjunction with bullet proof or police, military and correctional facility helmets, the goods would therefore not be related and the purchasers would be different.  However, the identification in the registration contains no such limitation on the field of use, and applicant provides no evidence that “protective helmets” would not encompass skateboard helmets.  In contrast, the examining attorney has provided evidence that, (1) “protective helmets” encompass protective helmets used in skateboarding, and (2) protective helmets used in skateboarding are commonly sold in the same streams of commerce, to the same purchasers, and commonly under the same marks, as the skateboarding goods identified in the application.  

 

Applicant’s argument would therefore constitute a collateral attack on the registration.  Evidence and arguments that constitute a collateral attack on a cited registration are not relevant during ex parte prosecution.  See In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Peebles Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n.5 (TTAB 1992); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).  Such evidence and arguments may, however, be pertinent to a formal proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel the cited registration.  Therefore, applicant’s arguments asserting the goods are limited to “bullet proof” helmets or for use only by police, military and correctional facilities are found unpersuasive.  Similarly, applicant’s arguments asserting that the streams of commerce and purchasers are different based on this artificial limitation are similarly found unpersuasive.

 

Applicant argues that skateboard manufacturers do not manufacture helmets because of helmet regulations, and because of the special requirements for skateboard helmets.  In support of its argument, applicant attached a screenshot from a website listing helmets certified by their respective manufacturers to meet both CPSC bicycle and ASTM F1492 Skateboard helmet standards.  However, applicant has failed to provide the source of this evidence, namely, a URL, or the date on which this evidence was printed.  See TMEP §710.01(b) (citingSafer Inc. v. OMS Invs. Inc., 94 USPQ2d at 1039).  Therefore, applicant has failed to make this evidence of record, and the screenshots provided by applicant will not be considered.

 

To make Internet evidence of record, applicant must provide both an image file or printout of the actual downloaded webpage, and complete information as to the date the evidence was published or accessed from the Internet, and its source (e.g., the complete URL address of the website).  See TMEP §710.01(b) (citingSafer Inc. v. OMS Invs. Inc., 94 USPQ2d at 1039).  

 

The registered goods, as identified in the registration, clearly encompass protective helmets for use in skateboarding.  The evidence attached to the Office action clearly establishes the specified goods are commonly marketed together under the same marks, travel in the same channels of trade and are sold the same purchasers, namely, to purchasers and users of skateboards.  Therefore, the goods are considered related.

 

IV.            CONCLUSION

 

In this case, applicant's and registrant's marks are identical in part, with the applied-for mark containing no wording or elements by which consumers could distinguish the source of the goods.  Neither the design appearing in registrant’s mark, nor presence of a first name appearing with the identical surname shown in each of the marks, would obviate confusion when used in conjunction with highly related goods.  The confusingly similar marks, when used on highly related skateboarding goods, combines to create a high likelihood that the relevant consumers will be confused as to the source of the goods.  The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. In re Power Distrib., Inc., ___ USPQ2d ___, Ser. No. 77825939, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 402, at *12 (Sept. 29, 2012); TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  

 

For these reasons, as detailed supra, the refusal to register the mark as to the applied-for goods in International Class 028 pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is made FINAL.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES FOR FINAL OFFICE ACTIONS

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the following class to which the final refusal applies will be deleted from the application by Examiner’s Amendment: 

 

            International Class 028

 

37 C.F.R. §2.65(a); see 15 U.S.C. §1062(b).

 

The application will then proceed for the following class:  International Class 025. 

 

Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)       A response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals.

 

(2)       An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with the appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $50 per international class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/Christina M. Riepel/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

(571) 272-6358

christina.riepel@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 11/23/2016 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86851702

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 11/23/2016 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.