PTO Form 1957 (Rev 9/2005) |
OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp. 07/31/2017) |
Input Field |
Entered |
---|---|
SERIAL NUMBER | 86376028 |
LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED | LAW OFFICE 108 |
MARK SECTION | |
MARK | http://uspto.report/TM/86376028/mark.png |
LITERAL ELEMENT | CREST |
STANDARD CHARACTERS | YES |
USPTO-GENERATED IMAGE | YES |
MARK STATEMENT | The mark consists of standard characters, without claim to any particular font style, size or color. |
ARGUMENT(S) | |
Applicant's application is for the mark "CREST," and applicant's amended goods are described above, in Class 6. Applicant submits that there is no likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) after taking into account the factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont
de Nemours and Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). Applicant analyzes relevant du Pont factors below: Similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties The du Pont case identified this factor to be considered as the "similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression." Id., 476 F.2d at 1361, 177 USPQ at 567. "That marks must be considered in their entireties in determining whether there is likelihood of confusion or mistake is a basic rule in comparison of marks." Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion Institute of Technology, 492 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 272, 273-74 (CCPA 1974) (reversing Board and holding that F.I.T. (stylized) not confusingly similar to FIA and design). In this case, applicant's and registrant's marks are not identical. In the office action, the Trademark Examining Attorney appears to have focused only on the common formative "CREST." Notwithstanding that applicant's mark and the cited marks all include these same five letters, they are perceived quite differently. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its predecessor have held that marks must be considered in the way they are perceived by the relevant public, in determining likelihood of confusion. Opryland USA Inc. v. The Great American Music Show Inc. 23 USPQ2d 1471, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Although it is often helpful to analyze marks by separating them into their component words in order to ascertain which aspects are more or less dominant, such analysis must not contravene law and reason. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). While there are often discrete terms in marks that are more dominant and, thus, more significant to the assessment of similarity, see, e.g., Opryland USA Inc. v. The Great American Music Show Inc. 23 USPQ2d 1471, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the law forbids the type of dissection proposed by the Trademark Examining Attorney as in the instant application. See, Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 1358, 56 USPQ2d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The ultimate conclusion of similarity or dissimilarity of the marks must rest on consideration of the marks in their entirety.") The online Merriam-Webster Dictionary at www.merriam-webster.com defines applicant's mark "crest" as follows:
On the other hand, the term "CRESTVIEW" in the cited applications is not listed in the dictionary, and appears to be a made-up word that does not
evoke the same meanings as applicant's mark "CREST." Moreover, "CRESTVIEW" is substantially longer, and does not employ the "CREST-" portion as a separate word, but
instead makes it into a single blended word, so that the "CREST-" portion does not stand on its own as in applicant's mark. When it is the entirety of the marks that is perceived by the public, it is the entirety of the marks that must be compared.
Packard Press, 56 USPQ2d at
1354. Applicant's mark is very different in sound, appearance, connotation and commercial impression as compared to the registrant's mark. The term "CREST" in applicant's mark may bring to mind any of the definitions recited above, while the considerably longer, made-up term "CRESTVIEW" will not bring any of those
definitions to mind. Even when the entirety of one mark (applicant's) is in another's mark (the cited applications), there may be no likelihood of confusion. In re Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d 493, 494 (Fed.Cir.1992) (no likelihood of confusion between the marks VARGA GIRL and VARGAS both for calendars. The Court stated that
appearance, sound, sight, and commercial impression of VARGA GIRL derive significant contribution from the component "girl," and by stressing the portion "varga" and diminishing the portion "girl",
the Board inappropriately changed the mark.) See also, Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Miss Quality, Inc., 507 F.2d 1404, 1407 (CCPA 1975) (No likelihood of confusion
between COUNTRY VOGUES for women's dresses and VOGUE for a magazine since the marks COUNTRY VOGUES and VOGUE do not look or sound alike. The only similarity between marks is word VOGUE, and the
dissimilarities between the marks, viewed in their entireties, outweigh this similarity sufficiently.) Likewise, in the instant case this minor similarity of inclusion of the term "crest" is sufficiently outweighed by the dissimilarities between the marks, as viewed in their entireties. The mere fact that two marks share words in common, such as the word "CREST" in the case at hand, is not determinative. See, The Murray Corp. of America v. Red Spot Paint and Varnish Co., Inc., 126 USPQ 390 (TTAB, 1960) (opposition of mark EASY against the mark EASY TINT for identical goods dismissed since Board found no likelihood of confusion), See also, Industrial Adhesive Co. v. Borden, Inc., 218 USPQ 945 (TTAB 1983), (opposition of mark BOND-PLUS against WONDER BOND PLUS for similar goods dismissed. Board determined that the addition of the term WONDER to the expression BOND PLUS served to impart a distinctive commercial impression that precluded likelihood of confusion.) Again, "[t]he ultimate conclusion of similarity or dissimilarity of the marks must rest on consideration of the marks in their entirety." In re Nat'l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1059 [224 USPQ 749] (Fed. Cir. 1985). Thus, the dissimilarities of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression heavily favor applicant in a
finding of no likelihood of confusion. Number and nature of similar marks for similar goods The number and nature of similar marks for similar goods and services goes to the strength of the common formative in applicant's and registrant's mark, here "crest." A review of registered marks indicates that there are existing registrations including the "CREST-" formative in Classes 6 and 19 for various windows and doors, including U.S. Registration No. 1,869,215 for "CRESTLINE," U.S. Registration No. 1,816,315 for "CRESTLINE" and Logo and U.S. Registration No. 2,902,043 for "CRESTLINE SELECT." Copies are attached as Exhibits A, B and C, along with the specimens showing how they are actually used. Applicant notes that these "CREST-" formative registrations were not cited against the instant application or in the cited applications for "CRESTVIEW." The evidence of these third-party registrations also including "crest" for similar goods illustrate that these respective goods cannot be understood by the purchasing public to emanate from a single source. Further, the fact that there are third-party applications and registrations using the term "crest" for similar goods owned by different entities is consistent with the conclusion that such trademark owners and their consumers do not and would not believe there is a likelihood of confusion between such marks. See, e.g., In re Hyundai Motor Am., Serial No. 78889340 (TTAB 2009) (non-precedential). Since the only commonality between applicant's mark and the cited applications is the presence of the formative "crest" used in other registrations
for similar goods, this factor points away from a likelihood of confusion between the marks, and heavily favors applicant. Fame of the prior mark There is no evidence that the cited marks are either well known or well recognized. This factor therefore favors
applicant. Extent to which applicant may exclude others from use of its mark As indicated by the other registrations using the words "crest," the cited applicant's right to exclude others from use marks inclusive of the word
"crest" is limited. Accordingly, this factor favors applicant. Condition of sales and buyers Purchasers of door products are used to seeing marks with the similar formatives "crest" in these goods, as sold by different entities, so this factor
favors applicant. Extent of potential confusion In view of the actual difference in the marks themselves, the potential for confusion is de minimus. As such, this
factor favors applicant. All of the foregoing weighs in favor of a finding of no likelihood of confusion. It is for these reasons that
applicant respectfully requests that the instant application be allowed and passed to publication pursuant to the Trade Marks Act of 1946. Respectfully submitted, Peter W. Peterson
Exhibits attached: Exhibit A, U.S. Registration No. 1,869,215 for "CRESTLINE," along with the specimen showing how the mark is actually used Exhibit B, U.S. Registration No. 1,816,315 for "CRESTLINE" and Logo, along with the specimen showing how the mark is actually used Exhibit C, U.S. Registration No. 2,902,043 for "CRESTLINE SELECT," along with the specimen showing how the mark is actually used
|
|
EVIDENCE SECTION | |
EVIDENCE FILE NAME(S) | |
ORIGINAL PDF FILE | evi_5019871169-20150415141255574821_._EXHIBIT_A.pdf |
CONVERTED PDF FILE(S) (4 pages) |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0002.JPG |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0003.JPG | |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0004.JPG | |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0005.JPG | |
ORIGINAL PDF FILE | evi_5019871169-20150415141255574821_._EXHIBIT_B.pdf |
CONVERTED PDF FILE(S) (3 pages) |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0006.JPG |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0007.JPG | |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0008.JPG | |
ORIGINAL PDF FILE | evi_5019871169-20150415141255574821_._EXHIBIT_C.pdf |
CONVERTED PDF FILE(S) (6 pages) |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0009.JPG |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0010.JPG | |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0011.JPG | |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0012.JPG | |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0013.JPG | |
\\TICRS\EXPORT16\IMAGEOUT16\863\760\86376028\xml4\ROA0014.JPG | |
DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE FILE | Exhibit A, U.S. Registration No. 1,869,215 for "CRESTLINE," along with the specimen showing how the mark is actually used Exhibit B, U.S. Registration No. 1,816,315 for "CRESTLINE" and Logo, along with the specimen showing how the mark is actually used Exhibit C, U.S. Registration No. 2,902,043 for "CRESTLINE SELECT," along with the specimen showing how the mark is actually used |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (current) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 006 |
DESCRIPTION | |
METAL DOORS AND WINDOW FURNITURE INCLUDING HANDLES, LOCKS AND HINGES; LOCKS OF METAL; SMALL ITEMS OF METAL HARDWARE; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES IN THIS CLASS FOR THE AFORESAID GOODS | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(b) |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (proposed) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 006 |
TRACKED TEXT DESCRIPTION | |
FINAL DESCRIPTION | |
METAL DOORS AND WINDOWS AND METAL PARTS THEREFORE, NAMELY HANDLES, DOOR HANDLES, WINDOW HANDLES, LEVER HANDLES, LEVERS, LOCK ESCUTCHEONS, HANDLE ESCUTCHEONS, LEVER ESCUTCHEONS, WINDOW STAYS, WINDOW CLOSERS, DOOR CLOSERS; LOCKS OF METALS; SMALL ITEMS OF METAL HARDWARE, PARTS AND ACCESSORIES FOR THE AFORESAID GOODS, NAMELY DOOR HANDLES, WINDOW HANDLES, LEVER HANDLES, LEVERS, SCREWS, SHIMS, METAL WINDOW CRANKS, TRIM, CASINGS, STAYS AND CLOSERS | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(b) |
SIGNATURE SECTION | |
RESPONSE SIGNATURE | /Peter W Peterson/ |
SIGNATORY'S NAME | Peter W Peterson |
SIGNATORY'S POSITION | Attorney of Record, Connecticut bar member |
SIGNATORY'S PHONE NUMBER | 203-787-0595 |
DATE SIGNED | 04/15/2015 |
AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY | YES |
FILING INFORMATION SECTION | |
SUBMIT DATE | Wed Apr 15 14:20:56 EDT 2015 |
TEAS STAMP | USPTO/ROA-XX.XXX.XX.XXX-2 0150415142056056137-86376 028-530575aafac37f1b531e1 741ff1daa59f3dac27dc6133d 095c3503aa07abc6380-N/A-N /A-20150415141255574821 |
PTO Form 1957 (Rev 9/2005) |
OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp. 07/31/2017) |
Applicant's application is for the mark "CREST," and applicant's amended goods are described above, in Class 6.
Applicant submits that there is no likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) after taking into account the factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont
de Nemours and Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). Applicant analyzes relevant du Pont factors below:
Similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties
The du Pont case identified this factor to be considered as the "similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression." Id., 476 F.2d at 1361, 177 USPQ at 567. "That marks must be considered in their entireties in determining whether there is likelihood of confusion or mistake is a basic rule in comparison of marks." Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion Institute of Technology, 492 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 272, 273-74 (CCPA 1974) (reversing Board and holding that F.I.T. (stylized) not confusingly similar to FIA and design). In this case, applicant's and registrant's marks are not identical.
In the office action, the Trademark Examining Attorney appears to have focused only on the common formative "CREST." Notwithstanding that applicant's mark and the cited marks all include these same five letters, they are perceived quite differently.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its predecessor have held that marks must be considered in the way they are perceived by the relevant public, in determining likelihood of confusion. Opryland USA Inc. v. The Great American Music Show Inc. 23 USPQ2d 1471, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Although it is often helpful to analyze marks by separating them into their component words in order to ascertain which aspects are more or less dominant, such analysis must not contravene law and reason. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). While there are often discrete terms in marks that are more dominant and, thus, more significant to the assessment of similarity, see, e.g., Opryland USA Inc. v. The Great American Music Show Inc. 23 USPQ2d 1471, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the law forbids the type of dissection proposed by the Trademark Examining Attorney as in the instant application. See, Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 1358, 56 USPQ2d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The ultimate conclusion of similarity or dissimilarity of the marks must rest on consideration of the marks in their entirety.")
The online Merriam-Webster Dictionary at www.merriam-webster.com defines applicant's mark "crest" as follows:
On the other hand, the term "CRESTVIEW" in the cited applications is not listed in the dictionary, and appears to be a made-up word that does not
evoke the same meanings as applicant's mark "CREST." Moreover, "CRESTVIEW" is substantially longer, and does not employ the "CREST-" portion as a separate word, but
instead makes it into a single blended word, so that the "CREST-" portion does not stand on its own as in applicant's mark.
When it is the entirety of the marks that is perceived by the public, it is the entirety of the marks that must be compared.
Packard Press, 56 USPQ2d at
1354. Applicant's mark is very different in sound, appearance, connotation and commercial impression as compared to the registrant's mark. The term "CREST" in applicant's mark may bring to mind any of the definitions recited above, while the considerably longer, made-up term "CRESTVIEW" will not bring any of those
definitions to mind.
Even when the entirety of one mark (applicant's) is in another's mark (the cited applications), there may be no likelihood of confusion. In re Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d 493, 494 (Fed.Cir.1992) (no likelihood of confusion between the marks VARGA GIRL and VARGAS both for calendars. The Court stated that
appearance, sound, sight, and commercial impression of VARGA GIRL derive significant contribution from the component "girl," and by stressing the portion "varga" and diminishing the portion "girl",
the Board inappropriately changed the mark.) See also, Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Miss Quality, Inc., 507 F.2d 1404, 1407 (CCPA 1975) (No likelihood of confusion
between COUNTRY VOGUES for women's dresses and VOGUE for a magazine since the marks COUNTRY VOGUES and VOGUE do not look or sound alike. The only similarity between marks is word VOGUE, and the
dissimilarities between the marks, viewed in their entireties, outweigh this similarity sufficiently.)
Likewise, in the instant case this minor similarity of inclusion of the term "crest" is sufficiently outweighed by the dissimilarities between the marks, as viewed in their entireties. The mere fact that two marks share words in common, such as the word "CREST" in the case at hand, is not determinative. See, The Murray Corp. of America v. Red Spot Paint and Varnish Co., Inc., 126 USPQ 390 (TTAB, 1960) (opposition of mark EASY against the mark EASY TINT for identical goods dismissed since Board found no likelihood of confusion), See also, Industrial Adhesive Co. v. Borden, Inc., 218 USPQ 945 (TTAB 1983), (opposition of mark BOND-PLUS against WONDER BOND PLUS for similar goods dismissed. Board determined that the addition of the term WONDER to the expression BOND PLUS served to impart a distinctive commercial impression that precluded likelihood of confusion.) Again, "[t]he ultimate conclusion of similarity or dissimilarity of the marks must rest on consideration of the marks in their entirety." In re Nat'l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1059 [224 USPQ 749] (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Thus, the dissimilarities of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression heavily favor applicant in a
finding of no likelihood of confusion.
Number and nature of similar marks for similar goods
The number and nature of similar marks for similar goods and services goes to the strength of the common formative in applicant's and registrant's mark, here "crest."
A review of registered marks indicates that there are existing registrations including the "CREST-" formative in Classes 6 and 19 for various windows and doors, including U.S. Registration No. 1,869,215 for "CRESTLINE," U.S. Registration No. 1,816,315 for "CRESTLINE" and Logo and U.S. Registration No. 2,902,043 for "CRESTLINE SELECT." Copies are attached as Exhibits A, B and C, along with the specimens showing how they are actually used.
Applicant notes that these "CREST-" formative registrations were not cited against the instant application or in the cited applications for "CRESTVIEW."
The evidence of these third-party registrations also including "crest" for similar goods illustrate that these respective goods cannot be understood by the purchasing public to emanate from a single source. Further, the fact that there are third-party applications and registrations using the term "crest" for similar goods owned by different entities is consistent with the conclusion that such trademark owners and their consumers do not and would not believe there is a likelihood of confusion between such marks. See, e.g., In re Hyundai Motor Am., Serial No. 78889340 (TTAB 2009) (non-precedential).
Since the only commonality between applicant's mark and the cited applications is the presence of the formative "crest" used in other registrations
for similar goods, this factor points away from a likelihood of confusion between the marks, and heavily favors applicant.
Fame of the prior mark
There is no evidence that the cited marks are either well known or well recognized. This factor therefore favors
applicant.
Extent to which applicant may exclude others from use of its mark
As indicated by the other registrations using the words "crest," the cited applicant's right to exclude others from use marks inclusive of the word
"crest" is limited. Accordingly, this factor favors applicant.
Condition of sales and buyers
Purchasers of door products are used to seeing marks with the similar formatives "crest" in these goods, as sold by different entities, so this factor
favors applicant.
Extent of potential confusion
In view of the actual difference in the marks themselves, the potential for confusion is de minimus. As such, this
factor favors applicant.
All of the foregoing weighs in favor of a finding of no likelihood of confusion. It is for these reasons that
applicant respectfully requests that the instant application be allowed and passed to publication pursuant to the Trade Marks Act of 1946.
Respectfully submitted,
Peter W. Peterson
Exhibits attached:
Exhibit A, U.S. Registration No. 1,869,215 for "CRESTLINE," along with the specimen showing how the mark is actually used
Exhibit B, U.S. Registration No. 1,816,315 for "CRESTLINE" and Logo, along with the specimen showing how the mark is actually used
Exhibit C, U.S. Registration No. 2,902,043 for "CRESTLINE SELECT," along with the specimen showing how the mark is actually used