Offc Action Outgoing

SOOTHE

oeksound Oy

Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

U.S. Application Serial No. 79305042

 

Mark:  SOOTHE

 

 

 

 

Correspondence Address: 

IPRIQ LTD

Eteläesplanadi 2

FI-00130 Helsinki

FINLAND

 

 

 

Applicant:  oeksound Oy

 

 

 

Reference/Docket No. N/A

 

Correspondence Email Address: 

 

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

 

International Registration No. 1577386

 

Notice of Provisional Full Refusal

 

Deadline for responding.  The USPTO must receive applicant’s response within six months of the “date on which the notification was sent to WIPO (mailing date)” located on the WIPO cover letter, or the U.S. application will be abandoned (see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks-application-process/abandoned-applications for information on abandonment).  To confirm the mailing date, go to the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, select “US Serial, Registration, or Reference No.,” enter the U.S. application serial number in the blank text box, and click on “Documents.”  The mailing date used to calculate the response deadline is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.” 

 

Respond to this Office action using the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.

 

Discussion of provisional full refusal.  This is a provisional full refusal of the request for extension of protection to the United States of the international registration, known in the United States as a U.S. application based on Trademark Act Section 66(a).  See 15 U.S.C. §§1141f(a), 1141h(c). 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

 

  • Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
  • Identification of Goods and Services Requirement
  • Email Address Required
  • U.S.-Licensed Counsel Required

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5204143.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Applicant’s proposed mark is “SOOTHE” (standard character form) for “Software” in International Class 9 and “” in International Class 42.

 

The mark in U.S. Registration No. 5204143 is “SOOTHE” (standard character form) for “Computer software for booking massage services to be provided at the customer's location” in International Class 9, and “Providing temporary use of online non-downloadable software for booking massage services to be provided at the customer's location” in International Class 42.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is “SOOTHE” and registrant’s mark is also “SOOTHE”.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.  Id.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

Relatedness of the Goods and Services

 

Next, the goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Where the marks of the respective parties are identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods and services needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines.  See In re Country Oven, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 443903, at *5 (TTAB 2019) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); TMEP §1207.01(a); see also In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe “software” and “software as a service [Saass]”, which presumably encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow “Computer software for booking massage services to be provided at the customer's location” and “Providing temporary use of online non-downloadable software for booking massage services to be provided at the customer's location”.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.

 

Further, consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods and with services featuring or related to those goods.  TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii); see In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel related to various clothing items, including athletic uniforms); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding retail grocery and general merchandise store services related to furniture); In re United Serv. Distribs., Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (finding distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids related to skin cream); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (finding various items of men’s, boys’, girls’ and women’s clothing related to restaurant services and towels); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc., 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (finding refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery related to office furniture and accessories); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Huskie Freightways, Inc., 177 USPQ 32 (TTAB 1972) (finding trucking services related to motor trucks and buses). Here, both parties’ goods and services include software goods and software services, and applicant’s additional services include the development and implementation of software. Thus, the goods and services of both parties are complementary in nature or purpose.

 

Conclusion

 

Because the marks are highly similar and the goods and/or services are closely related, a likelihood of confusion exists and registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS AND/OR SERVICES REQUIREMENT

 

The following requirement is limited to the specified goods and services therein.

 

The identification requires clarification as indicated below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03.

 

The identification for software in International Class 9 is indefinite and too broad and must be clarified to specify (1) the purpose or function of the software and its content or field of use, if content- or field- specific; and (2) whether its format is downloadable, recorded, or online non-downloadable.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.03(d), 1402.11(a).  Downloadable and recorded goods are in International Class 9, whereas providing their temporary, online non-downloadable use is a service in International Class 42.  See TMEP §1402.03(d).

 

The USPTO requires such specificity in order for a trademark examining attorney to examine the application properly and make appropriate decisions concerning possible conflicts between the applicant’s mark and other marks.  See In re N.A.D. Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000); TMEP §1402.03(d).

 

The international classification of goods in applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a) cannot be changed from the classification the International Bureau assigned to the goods in the corresponding international registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §1401.03(d).  Therefore, although software may be classified in international classes other than International Class 9, any modification to the identification must identify goods in International Class 9 only, the class specified in the application for such goods.  See TMEP §1904.02(c)(ii).

 

International Class 9

 

In addition to the above-referenced issues, if applicable, the following wording in the identification of goods in International Class 9 is indefinite and overly broad.  This wording must be clarified because it is not clear what the goods are and could identify goods in more than one international class:

 

  • software

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03, 1904.02(c), (c)(ii).  Suggested amendments to each of the above entries within Class 9 are included below.

 

In an application filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), an applicant may not change the classification of goods from that assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization in the corresponding international registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1904.02(b).  Therefore, although the goods above may be classified in several international classes, any modification to this wording must identify goods in International Class 9 only, the class specified in the application for these goods.  See TMEP §1904.02(c), (c)(ii).  Further, although applicant has identified additional classes, in a multiple-class Section 66(a) application, goods may not be transferred from one existing class to another.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §1401.03(d).

 

International Class 42

 

In addition to the above-referenced issues, if applicable, the following wording in the identification of services for International Class 42 is indefinite because the field, nature or purpose of the services must be further specified:

 

  • software as a service [SaaS]

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. Suggested amendments to each of the above entries are included below.

 

As noted above, although the services may be classified in several international classes, any modification to this wording must identify services in International Class 42 only, the class specified in the application for these services.  See TMEP §1904.02(c), (c)(ii).

 

Suggested Amendment to Identification of Goods and Services

 

The Trademark Act requires that a trademark or service mark application must include a “specification of … the goods [or services]” in connection with which the mark is being used or will be used.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(2) (emphasis added), (b)(2) (emphasis added); see 15 U.S.C. §1053.  Specifically, a complete application must include a “list of the particular goods or services on or in connection with which the applicant uses or intends to use the mark.”  37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6) (emphasis added).  This requirement for a specification of the particular goods and/or services applies to applications filed under all statutory bases.  See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a)(2), 1051(b)(2), 1053, 1126(d)-(e), 1141f; 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.01(b)-(c).

 

Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate:

 

Class 9:           Downloadable software for {specify the function of the software, e.g., use as a spreadsheet, word processing, and, if software is content- or field-specific, the content or field of use}

 

Class 42:         Software development, programming and implementation; software as a service (SAAS) [SaaS] services featuring software for {specify the function of the programs, e.g., for use in database management, for use as a spreadsheet, for word processing, and, if software is content - or field-specific, the field of use}

 

Wording in bold text indicates additions.  Wording in bold text, in italics, and {in brackets} indicates that applicant must provide additional information.  Deleted text is in bold, in italics, and struck through.

 

Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted goods and services may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).  Additionally, for applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), the scope of the identification for purposes of permissible amendments is limited by the international class assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (International Bureau); and the classification of goods and services may not be changed from that assigned by the International Bureau.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1904.02(b).  Further, in a multiple-class Section 66(a) application, classes may not be added or goods and services transferred from one existing class to another.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §1401.03(d).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

EMAIL ADDRESS REQUIRED

 

Applicant must provide applicant’s email address, which is a requirement for a complete application.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(2); Mandatory Electronic Filing & Specimen Requirements, Examination Guide 1-20, at III.A. (Rev. Feb. 2020).  Applicant’s email address cannot be identical to the listed primary correspondence email address of any attorney retained to represent applicant in this application.  See Examination Guide 1-20, at III.A. 

 

U.S.-LICENSED COUNSEL REQUIRED

 

Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney to respond to or appeal the provisional refusal.  An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented by an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory.  37 C.F.R. §§2.11(a), 11.14; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019).  An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business; i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  Because applicant is foreign-domiciled, applicant must appoint such a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice under 37 C.F.R. §11.14 as its representative before the application may proceed to registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).  See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks-getting-started/why-hire-private-trademark-attorney for more information. 

 

Only a U.S.-licensed attorney can take action on an application on behalf of a foreign-domiciled applicant.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).  Accordingly, the USPTO will not communicate further with applicant about the application beyond this Office action or permit applicant to make future submissions in this application. 

 

To appoint or designate a U.S.-licensed attorney.  To appoint an attorney, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Change Address or Representation form at http://teas.gov.uspto.report/wna/ccr/car.  The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form at http://teas.gov.uspto.report/office/roa/ indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action, if any.  Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Ray Harmon/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 103

United States Patent & Trademark Office

(571) 272-0386

raymond.harmon@uspto.gov

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RESPONSE GUIDANCE

  • Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

 

 

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