Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  May 26, 2021

 

International Registration No. 1543885

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is supplemental to and supersedes the previous Office action issued on September 28, 2020 in connection with this application.  Based on information and/or documentation in applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney now issues the following new requirement:  information required.  See TMEP §§706, 711.02. 

 

In a previous Office action, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark, Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) for being merely descriptive.  In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirements:  amend the identification of goods, clarify the mark description, and appoint U.S.-licensed Counsel.

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement(s) have been satisfied:  amended identification and clarified mark description provided and U.S.-licensed counsel appointed.  See TMEP §713.02. 

 

The following is a SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:

 

            • NEW ISSUE:  Information Required

            • Maintained: Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

            • Maintained: Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive

 

Applicant must respond to all issues raised in this Office action and the previous Office action, within six (6) months of the date of issuance of this Office action.  37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); see TMEP §711.02.  If applicant does not respond within this time limit, the application will be abandoned.  37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).

 

NEW ISSUE:  Information Required

 

Due to the descriptive nature of the applied-for mark, applicant must provide the following information and documentation regarding the goods and wording appearing in the mark: 

 

(1)        Fact sheets, instruction manuals, brochures, advertisements and pertinent screenshots of applicant’s website as it relates to the goods in the application, including any materials using the terms in the applied-for mark.  Merely stating that information about the goods is available on applicant’s website is insufficient to make the information of record.; 

 

(2)        If these materials are unavailable, applicant should submit similar documentation for goods of the same type, explaining how its own product or services will differ.  If the goods feature new technology and information regarding competing goods is not available, applicant must provide a detailed factual description of the goods.  Factual information about the goods must make clear how they operate, salient features, and prospective customers and channels of trade.  Conclusory statements will not satisfy this requirement.; and

 

(3)        Applicant must respond to the following questions:  are applicant’s goods used in connection with telecommunications services; do applicant’s goods enable telecommunications services; does applicant market its goods for use in the telecommunications industry (provide examples); explain how applicant’s goods function and their role in the telecommunications industry?

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§814, 1402.01(e). 

 

Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814. 

 

Maintained: Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion     

 

Registration of the applied-for mark remains refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5748040 and 4976688.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registrations.

 

Applicant has applied to register a mark consisting of the wording TCS and minor design elements for use with, as amended, “Optical transceivers being electronic and optical communications instruments and components for telecommunication products for the telecommunications industry” in Class 9.

 

The mark in Reg. No. 4976688 consists of the wording TCS TELECOM, INC. and minor design elements for use with “Telecommunication services in the nature of providing telephone services with various telephone features, namely, a dedicated toll-free number, voicemail, multiple mailbox extensions, telephone message notification, fax capabilities, detailed call reports, call waiting, call identification, call forwarding, and message waiting; Telecommunication services, namely, local and long distance transmission of voice, data, graphics and video by means of broadband, copper and optical or wireless networks; Telecommunication services, namely, transmission of voice, data, graphics, sound and video by means of broadband power line or wireless networks; Telecommunications reseller services for businesses, namely, providing long distance telecommunication services, voice telecommunication services, local telephone service, and Internet access services; Telecommunications reseller services, namely, providing long distance telecommunication services” in Class 38.

 

The mark in Reg. No. 5748040 consists of the wording TCS ION and minor design elements for use with, inter alia, “Computers and computer hardware; computer operating programs and computer operating systems; computer hardware and peripherals; computer terminals; computer hardware for communicating audio, video and data between computers via a global computer network, wide-area computer networks, and peer-to-peer computer networks; Computer software and hardware for use in network management; Computer software for use in database management; integrated information and communication technology solution software for small and medium businesses in manufacturing, wellness, education, retail, restaurant, textile and professional services industries; Computer software that provides real-time, integrated business management intelligence by combining information from various databases and presenting it in an easy-to-understand user interface; recorded computer programs for use in creating, viewing, manipulating, printing, storing, transferring and retrieving computer-aided graphics, text documents, fonts, multi-media applications and video images; blank computer discs; optical disc drives; printers; modems; blank hard computer discs; operating and user instructions stored in digital form for computers and computer software, in particular on floppy disks or CD-ROM; interfaces for computers; circuit boards; blank electronic chip cards; encoded electronic chip cards for identifying particular users of computers” in Class 9.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  In this case, this means that the most prominent element of each mark is the mark’s literal element.

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

Because the first, and dominant, literal element of each mark is TCS, the marks are similar in sound, meaning, appearance, and commercial impression.

 

Accordingly, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Relatedness of the Goods and Services

 

The goods and services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, Reg. No. 5748040 uses broad wording to describe “Computers and computer hardware; computer hardware and peripherals; computer hardware for communicating audio, video and data between computers via a global computer network, wide-area computer networks, and peer-to-peer computer networks”, which presumably encompasses all of the goods of that type, including applicant’s more narrow “optical transceivers”.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

Further, and as to the other registration, the previously attached Internet evidence, consisting of third party webpages, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides the relevant goods and services and markets the goods and services under the same mark or that the relevant goods and services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use or that the goods and services are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Because the marks are confusingly similar and the goods and services are legally identical or related, there is a likelihood of confusion.  Applicant’s mere conclusion to the contrary is thereby unpersuasive.  Therefore, the applied-for mark must be refused registration under Section 2(d).

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

Maintained: Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive

 

Registration remains refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature, ingredient, characteristic, purpose, or function of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

An abbreviation, initialism, or acronym is merely descriptive when it is generally understood as “substantially synonymous” with the descriptive words it represents.  See In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d 1712, 1715 (TTAB 2011) (citing Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504, 506, 110 USPQ 293, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1956)) (holding NKJV substantially synonymous with merely descriptive term “New King James Version” and thus merely descriptive of bibles); In re BetaBatt Inc., 89 USPQ2d 1152, 1155 (TTAB 2008) (holding DEC substantially synonymous with merely descriptive term “direct energy conversion” and thus merely descriptive of a type of batteries and battery related services); TMEP §1209.03(h).

 

A mark consisting of an abbreviation, initialism, or acronym will be considered substantially synonymous with descriptive wording if:

 

(1)    the applied-for mark is an abbreviation, initialism, or acronym for specific wording;

 

(2)    the specific wording is merely descriptive of applicant’s goods and/or services; and

 

(3) a relevant consumer viewing the abbreviation, initialism, or acronym in connection with applicant’s goods and/or services will recognize it as the equivalent of the merely descriptive wording it represents.

 

TMEP §1209.03(h); see In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d at 1715-16 (citing In re Harco Corp., 220 USPQ 1075, 1076 (TTAB 1984)).

 

In the present case, the previously attached evidence shows that applicant’s mark “TCS” is an acronym for the wording “telecommunications service.”  Further, the previously attached evidence shows that this wording is merely descriptive of a feature or purpose of applicant’s goods because applicant’s goods are for use with “telecommunications products for the telecom…industry”. 

 

Lastly, a relevant consumer viewing applicant’s mark in connection with the identified goods would recognize it as the equivalent of the descriptive wording it represents because the acronym identifies the broad field in which the goods are used. 

 

The applied-for mark shows the wording in stylized lettering.  Stylized descriptive or generic wording is registrable only if the stylization creates a commercial impression separate and apart from the impression made by the wording itself.  See In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 606, 118 USPQ2d 1632, 1639-40 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re Northland Aluminum Prods., Inc., 777 F.2d 1556, 1561, 227 USPQ 961, 964 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1209.03(w).  Common and ordinary lettering with minimal stylization, as in this case, is generally not sufficiently striking, unique, or distinctive as to make an impression on purchasers separate from the wording.  See In re Sadoru Grp., Ltd., 105 USPQ2d 1484, 1487 (TTAB 2012). 

 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is made in relation to an applicant’s goods and/or services, not in the abstract.  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b).  “Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).

 

“A mark may be merely descriptive even if it does not describe the ‘full scope and extent’ of the applicant’s goods or services.”  In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); TMEP §1209.01(b).  It is enough if a mark describes only one significant function, attribute, or property.  In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d at 1173, 71 USPQ2d at 1371.

 

The mark immediately conveys that applicant’s “optical transceivers” are for use in connection with telecommunications services.

 

Because the applied-for mark at best merely describes a feature or purpose of the goods in the application, it must be refused registration under Section 2(e)(1).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Response Guidelines

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

Carr, Patrick

/Patrick Carr/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 125

(571) 272-9634

patrick.carr@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on May 26, 2021 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 79290916

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Carr, Patrick

/Patrick Carr/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 125

(571) 272-9634

patrick.carr@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from May 26, 2021, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”