Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

 

 

International Registration No. 1543885

 

Notice of Provisional Full Refusal

 

Deadline for responding.  The USPTO must receive applicant’s response within six months of the “date on which the notification was sent to WIPO (mailing date)” located on the WIPO cover letter, or the U.S. application will be abandoned.  To confirm the mailing date, go to the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database, select “US Serial, Registration, or Reference No.,” enter the U.S. application serial number in the blank text box, and click on “Documents.”  The mailing date used to calculate the response deadline is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.” 

 

Respond to this Office action using the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.

 

Discussion of provisional full refusal.  This is a provisional full refusal of the request for extension of protection to the United States of the international registration, known in the United States as a U.S. application based on Trademark Act Section 66(a).  See 15 U.S.C. §§1141f(a), 1141h(c). 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive
• Identification of Goods
• Mark Description
• U.S.-Licensed Counsel Required

 

Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5748040 and 4976688.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Applicant has applied to register a mark consisting of the wording TCS and minor design elements for use with “Optical transceivers (components) for telecommunication products for the telecom and datacom industry” in Class 9.

 

The mark in Reg. No. 4976688 consists of the wording TCS TELECOM, INC. and minor design elements for use with “Telecommunication services in the nature of providing telephone services with various telephone features, namely, a dedicated toll-free number, voicemail, multiple mailbox extensions, telephone message notification, fax capabilities, detailed call reports, call waiting, call identification, call forwarding, and message waiting; Telecommunication services, namely, local and long distance transmission of voice, data, graphics and video by means of broadband, copper and optical or wireless networks; Telecommunication services, namely, transmission of voice, data, graphics, sound and video by means of broadband power line or wireless networks; Telecommunications reseller services for businesses, namely, providing long distance telecommunication services, voice telecommunication services, local telephone service, and Internet access services; Telecommunications reseller services, namely, providing long distance telecommunication services” in Class 38.

 

The mark in Reg. No. 5748040 consists of the wording TCS ION and minor design elements for use with, inter alia, “Computers and computer hardware; computer operating programs and computer operating systems; computer hardware and peripherals; computer terminals; computer hardware for communicating audio, video and data between computers via a global computer network, wide-area computer networks, and peer-to-peer computer networks; Computer software and hardware for use in network management; Computer software for use in database management; integrated information and communication technology solution software for small and medium businesses in manufacturing, wellness, education, retail, restaurant, textile and professional services industries; Computer software that provides real-time, integrated business management intelligence by combining information from various databases and presenting it in an easy-to-understand user interface; recorded computer programs for use in creating, viewing, manipulating, printing, storing, transferring and retrieving computer-aided graphics, text documents, fonts, multi-media applications and video images; blank computer discs; optical disc drives; printers; modems; blank hard computer discs; operating and user instructions stored in digital form for computers and computer software, in particular on floppy disks or CD-ROM; interfaces for computers; circuit boards; blank electronic chip cards; encoded electronic chip cards for identifying particular users of computers” in Class 9.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  In this case, this means that the most prominent element of each mark is the mark’s literal element.

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

Because the first, and dominant, literal element of each mark is TCS, the marks are similar in sound, meaning, appearance, and commercial impression.

 

Accordingly, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Relatedness of the Goods and Services

 

The goods and services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, Reg. No. 5748040 uses broad wording to describe “Computers and computer hardware; computer hardware and peripherals; computer hardware for communicating audio, video and data between computers via a global computer network, wide-area computer networks, and peer-to-peer computer networks”, which presumably encompasses all of the goods of that type, including applicant’s more narrow “optical transceivers”.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

Further, and as to the other registration, the attached Internet evidence, consisting of third party webpages, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides the relevant goods and services and markets the goods and services under the same mark or that the relevant goods and services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use or that the goods and services are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Because the marks are confusingly similar and the goods and services are legally identical or related, there is a likelihood of confusion.  Therefore, the applied-for mark must be refused registration under Section 2(d).

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature, ingredient, characteristic, purpose, or function of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

An abbreviation, initialism, or acronym is merely descriptive when it is generally understood as “substantially synonymous” with the descriptive words it represents.  See In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d 1712, 1715 (TTAB 2011) (citing Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504, 506, 110 USPQ 293, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1956)) (holding NKJV substantially synonymous with merely descriptive term “New King James Version” and thus merely descriptive of bibles); In re BetaBatt Inc., 89 USPQ2d 1152, 1155 (TTAB 2008) (holding DEC substantially synonymous with merely descriptive term “direct energy conversion” and thus merely descriptive of a type of batteries and battery related services); TMEP §1209.03(h).

 

A mark consisting of an abbreviation, initialism, or acronym will be considered substantially synonymous with descriptive wording if:

 

(1)    the applied-for mark is an abbreviation, initialism, or acronym for specific wording;

 

(2)    the specific wording is merely descriptive of applicant’s goods and/or services; and

 

(3) a relevant consumer viewing the abbreviation, initialism, or acronym in connection with applicant’s goods and/or services will recognize it as the equivalent of the merely descriptive wording it represents.

 

TMEP §1209.03(h); see In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d at 1715-16 (citing In re Harco Corp., 220 USPQ 1075, 1076 (TTAB 1984)).

 

In the present case, the attached evidence shows that applicant’s mark “TCS” is an acronym for the wording “telecommunications service.”  Further, the attached evidence shows that this wording is merely descriptive of a feature or purpose of applicant’s goods because applicant’s goods are for use with “telecommunications products for the telecom…industry”. 

 

Lastly, a relevant consumer viewing applicant’s mark in connection with the identified goods would recognize it as the equivalent of the descriptive wording it represents because the acronym identifies the broad field in which the goods are used. 

 

Because the applied-for mark at best merely describes a feature or purpose of the goods in the application, it must be refused registration under Section 2(e)(1).

 

Applicant Options

 

In response to the refusal, applicant may assert a claim that the applied-for mark has acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f).  Applicant may respond by submitting (1) actual evidence (such as verified statements of long term use, advertising and sales expenditures, examples of advertising, affidavits and declarations of consumers, customer surveys) and/or (2) a verified statement of applicant’s five years’ use in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(f); 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(2)-(3); TMEP §1212.08. 

 

To establish acquired distinctiveness based on use in commerce, an applicant may rely only on use in commerce that may be regulated by the U.S. Congress.  See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(f), 1127.  Use solely in a foreign country or between two foreign countries is not evidence of acquired distinctiveness in the United States.  TMEP §§1010, 1212.08; see In re Rogers, 53 USPQ2d 1741, 1746-47 (TTAB 1999).

 

Extrinsic evidence of acquired distinctiveness.  This evidence must demonstrate that the relevant public understands the primary significance of the mark as identifying the source of applicant’s product or service rather than identifying the product or service itself.  In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

 

When determining whether the evidence shows the mark has acquired distinctiveness, the trademark examining attorney will consider the following six factors:  (1) association of the mark with a particular source by actual purchasers (typically measured by customer surveys linking the name to the source); (2) length, degree, and exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of advertising; (4) amount of sales and number of customers; (5) intentional copying; and (6) unsolicited media coverage.  See Converse, Inc. v. ITC, 909 F.3d 1120, 1120, 128 USPQ2d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“the Converse factors”).  “[N]o single factor is determinative.”  In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424; see TMEP §§1212.06 et seq.  Rather, all factors are weighed together in light of all the circumstances to determine whether the mark has acquired distinctiveness.  In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424. 

 

Verified statement of five years’ use in commerce.  To amend the application to assert Section 2(f) based on five years’ use, applicant should provide (1) information regarding the length of use of the mark in commerce and/or dates of use, and (2) the following written statement claiming acquired distinctiveness, if accurate:

 

The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services through the applicant’s substantially exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce that the U.S. Congress may lawfully regulate for at least the five years immediately before the date of this statement.

 

See 15 U.S.C. §1052(f); 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(2); TMEP §§1212.05(d), 1212.08.  This statement must be verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20.  37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(2); TMEP §1212.05(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

Identification of Goods

 

The identification of goods contains parentheses.  Generally, applicants should not use parentheses and brackets in identifications in their applications so as to avoid confusion with the USPTO’s practice of using parentheses and brackets in registrations to indicate goods and/or services that have been deleted from registrations or in an affidavit of incontestability to indicate goods and/or services not claimed.  See TMEP §1402.12.  The only exception is that parenthetical information is permitted in identifications in an application if it serves to explain or translate the matter immediately preceding the parenthetical phrase in such a way that it does not affect the clarity or scope of the identification, e.g., “fried tofu pieces (abura-age).”  Id.

 

Therefore, applicant must remove the parentheses from the identification and incorporate any parenthetical or bracketed information into the description of the goods.

 

The wording “DATACOM” in the identification of goods is a registered mark not owned by applicant; accordingly, applicant must amend the identification to delete this wording and, if not already included in the identification, provide the common commercial or generic name of the goods.  TMEP §1402.09; see 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); Camloc Fastener Corp. v. Grant, 119 USPQ 264, 264 n.1 (TTAB 1958).  See the attached U.S. Registration No(s). 5699819. 

 

Identifications of goods should generally be comprised of generic everyday wording for the goods, and exclude proprietary or potentially-proprietary wording.  See TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.09.  A registered mark indicates origin in one particular party and so may not be used to identify goods or services that originate in a party other than that registrant.  TMEP §1402.09 (citing Camloc Fastener Corp. v. Grant, 119 USPQ at 264 n.1). 

 

The wording “Optical transceivers” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because the nature of the transceivers must be further specified.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.  Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate: 

 

Class 9: Optical transceivers being electronic and optical communications instruments and components for telecommunication products for the telecommunications industry.

 

Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and/or services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).  Additionally, for applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), the scope of the identification for purposes of permissible amendments is limited by the international class assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (International Bureau); and the classification of goods and/or services may not be changed from that assigned by the International Bureau.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1904.02(b).  Further, in a multiple-class Section 66(a) application, classes may not be added or goods and/or services transferred from one existing class to another.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §1401.03(d).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

Mark Description

 

Applicant must submit an amended description of the mark because the current one uses broad, vague language that does not accurately describe the mark.  37 C.F.R. §2.37; see TMEP §§808.01, 808.02.  Descriptions must be accurate and identify all the literal and design elements in the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.37; TMEP §808.02.  In this case, the description is vague because it is not clear how each of the elements appears. 

 

The following description is suggested, if accurate:  The mark consists of the stylized letters “TCS” in white with each letter having two horizontal lines in blue partially across the center of each letter, all over a blue background.

 

U.S.-Licensed Counsel Required

 

Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney at the USPTO to respond to or appeal the provisional refusal.  An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory.  37 C.F.R. §§2.11(a), 11.14; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019).  An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business; i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  Because applicant is foreign-domiciled, applicant must appoint such a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice under 37 C.F.R. §11.14 as its representative before the application may proceed to registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).  See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.

 

Only a U.S.-licensed attorney can take action on an application on behalf of a foreign-domiciled applicant.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).  Accordingly, the USPTO will not communicate further with applicant about the application beyond this Office action or permit applicant to make future submissions in this application.  And applicant is not authorized to make amendments to the application. 

 

To appoint or designate a U.S.-licensed attorney.  To appoint an attorney, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Change Address or Representation form.  The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action, if any.  Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).

 

Response Options

 

Response guidelines.  For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

Carr, Patrick

/Patrick Carr/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 125

(571) 272-9634

patrick.carr@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.