United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 79290723
Mark: BIOASSOCIA
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: NIKON CORPORATION
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
International Registration No. 1543521
Notice of Provisional Full Refusal
Deadline for responding. The USPTO must receive applicant’s response within six months of the “date on which the notification was sent to WIPO (mailing date)” located on the WIPO cover letter, or the U.S. application will be abandoned. To confirm the mailing date, go to the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database, select “US Serial, Registration, or Reference No.,” enter the U.S. application serial number in the blank text box, and click on “Documents.” The mailing date used to calculate the response deadline is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.”
Respond to this Office action using the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Discussion of provisional full refusal. This is a provisional full refusal of the request for extension of protection to the United States of the international registration, known in the United States as a U.S. application based on Trademark Act Section 66(a). See 15 U.S.C. §§1141f(a), 1141h(c).
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 2931177 “ASSOCIA” and 2931183 “ASSOCIA”. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant has applied for the mark “BIOASSOCIA” for “Providing computer programs on data networks by application service provider; providing computer programs on data networks for laboratory apparatus and instruments; providing computer programs on data networks for cell observation devices; providing computer programs on data networks for cell culture observation systems; rental of computers; providing computer programs on data networks” in International Class 42.
Registrant owns the “ASSOCIA” marks for “Application service provider featuring computer programs to enable access to management, accounting and bookkeeping services provided over a global computer network”
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, applicant’s mark “BIOASSOCIA” is similar in sound, appearance, and meaning to registrant’s “ASSOCIA” marks.
The term “ASSOCIA” in the marks is identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner,” and are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Applicant’s addition of the term “BIO” to the identical term “ASSOCIA” does not obviate the identical nature of the term “ASSOCIA” in all three marks. Instead, it appears that “BIO” indicates a specific branch of goods/services provided under the same “ASSOCIA” house mark. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods/services, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01. MacMillan dictionary defines the prefix “BIO-” as “biology; relating to living things or someone’s life.” See attached. Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part. A consumer familiar with registrant’s computer-related services provided under its “ASSOCIA” marks may presume the applied-for “BIOASSOCIA” mark identifies a similar computer services for a specific biology-related function or purpose.
The stylization and design elements in Reg. No. 2931183 “ASSOCIA” are not overly distinctive and do not obviate the overall similarity between the wording in the marks. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Goods/Services
Here, applicant has applied for computer-related services including application service provider services and computer program services, which are related to registrant’s application service provider services.
In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe “Providing computer programs on data networks by application service provider” and “providing computer programs on data networks,” which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow “application service provider featuring computer programs to enable access to management, accounting and bookkeeping services provided over a global computer network.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)). Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Therefore, the applicant’s services are related to the registrant’s services.
Applicant’s mark “BIOASSOCIA” is similar to registrant’s “ASSOCIA” marks in sound, appearance, and meaning. The services of the parties are also closely related, rendering the marks confusingly similar for purposes of a likelihood of confusion.
IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICES IN INTERNATIONAL CLASS 42
The wording in the identification of services in International Class 42 is unacceptable as written because it fails to indicate the nature of the applied-for services with sufficient specificity. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.
- The wording “Providing computer programs on data networks by application service provider” is indefinite and overbroad, because downloadable software programs belong in Class 9 as goods, while computer programming services and application service provider services belong in Class 42. The wording should be amended to clarify the nature of the services and the function of the software. If applicant is providing computer programming services applicant must amend the wording to fit within the constructs of Class 42 services. If applicant is providing application service provider (ASP) services featuring computer program software, the entry should be reworded and amended to specify the function of the programs.
- The wording “providing computer programs on data networks for laboratory apparatus and instruments” is indefinite and overbroad, because downloadable software programs belong in Class 9 as goods, while computer programming services belong in Class 42. To ensure the wording is accurately classified in Class 42, the wording must be amended to clarify that applicant provides computer programming services.
- The wording “providing computer programs on data networks for cell observation devices” is indefinite and overbroad, because downloadable software programs belong in Class 9 as goods, while computer programming services belong in Class 42. To ensure the wording is accurately classified in Class 42, the wording must be amended to clarify that applicant provides computer programming services.
- The wording “providing computer programs on data networks for cell culture observation systems” is indefinite and overbroad, because downloadable software programs belong in Class 9 as goods, while computer programming services belong in Class 42. To ensure the wording is accurately classified in Class 42, the wording must be amended to clarify that applicant provides computer programming services.
- The wording “providing computer programs on data networks” is indefinite and overbroad, because downloadable software programs belong in Class 9 as goods, while computer programming services belong in Class 42. To ensure the wording is accurately classified in Class 42, the wording must be amended to clarify that applicant provides computer programming services.
Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate (changes highlighted in bold italic):
International Class 42:
Application service provider (ASP) featuring computer program software on data networks, for [specify function of programs, e.g., use in database management, use in electronic storage of data, etc.]; providing computer programming services on data networks for laboratory apparatus and instruments; providing computer programming services on data networks for cell observation devices; providing computer programming services on data networks for cell culture observation systems; rental of computers; providing computer programming services on data networks
SCOPE ADVISORY
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.
Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and/or services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06. Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted. See TMEP §1402.07(e). Additionally, for applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), the scope of the identification for purposes of permissible amendments is limited by the international class assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (International Bureau); and the classification of goods and/or services may not be changed from that assigned by the International Bureau. 37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1904.02(b). Further, in a multiple-class Section 66(a) application, classes may not be added or goods and/or services transferred from one existing class to another. 37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §1401.03(d).
U.S. COUNSEL REQUIRED
Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney at the USPTO to respond to or appeal the provisional refusal. An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory. 37 C.F.R. §§2.11(a), 11.14; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019). An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home. 37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business; i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities. 37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. Because applicant is foreign-domiciled, applicant must appoint such a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice under 37 C.F.R. §11.14 as its representative before the application may proceed to registration. 37 C.F.R. §2.11(a). See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
Only a U.S.-licensed attorney can take action on an application on behalf of a foreign-domiciled applicant. 37 C.F.R. §2.11(a). Accordingly, the USPTO will not communicate further with applicant about the application beyond this Office action or permit applicant to make future submissions in this application. And applicant is not authorized to make amendments to the application.
To appoint or designate a U.S.-licensed attorney. To appoint an attorney, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Change Address or Representation form. The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action, if any. Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney. See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
Alexandra Foster
/Alexandra Foster/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 117
(571) 272-5111
alexandra.foster1@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE