UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
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U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 79231829
MARK: GALLANT
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: A. DE FUSSIGNY
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION NO. 1401183
STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS NOTIFICATION: TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF THE REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE A COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL NOTIFICATION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE “DATE ON WHICH THE NOTIFICATION WAS SENT TO WIPO (MAILING DATE)” LOCATED ON THE WIPO COVER LETTER ACCOMPANYING THIS NOTIFICATION.
In addition to the Mailing Date appearing on the WIPO cover letter, a holder (hereafter “applicant”) may confirm this Mailing Date using the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. To do so, enter the U.S. application serial number for this application and then select “Documents.” The Mailing Date used to calculate the response deadline for this provisional full refusal is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.”
This is a PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL of the request for extension of protection of the mark in the above-referenced U.S. application. See 15 U.S.C. §1141h(c). See below in this notification (hereafter “Office action”) for details regarding the provisional full refusal.
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
Likelihood of Confusion
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)). The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.
COMPARISON OF THE MARKS
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant’s mark is GALLANT.
The mark in reg. no. 2932427 is T'GALLANT. This mark incorporates the whole of applicant’s mark and has a highly similar connotation and commercial impression.
The mark in reg. no. 2099244 is GALANTE VINEYARDS and design. The dominant feature of this mark is GALANTE, which is highly similar in appearance and sound to applicant’s mark. GALANTE could also be pronounced as GALLANT. Moreover, GALANTE translates to GALLANT, which is applicant’s mark. See the registration translation statement and the Google® Translate Spanish translation attached hereto.
The word GALANTE in registrant’s mark is in Spanish, which is a common, modern language in the United States. See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122 (Spanish). The doctrine is applied when “the ordinary American purchaser” would “stop and translate” the foreign term into its English equivalent. Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1377, 73 USPQ2d at 1696 (quoting In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp., 190 USPQ 109, 110 (TTAB 1976)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(vi)(A). The ordinary American purchaser includes those proficient in the foreign language. In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1352, 90 USPQ2d 1489, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1024.
In this case, the ordinary American purchaser would likely stop and translate the mark because the Spanish language is a common, modern language spoken by an appreciable number of consumers in the United States.
Thus, GALANTE and GALLANT are foreign equivalents.
The deletion of the highly descriptive word VINEYARDS from the cited registered mark is insufficient to obviate the likelihood of confusion, as discussed above.
As to the design element in the cited registered mark, when evaluating a composite mark containing both words and designs, the word portion is more likely to indicate the origin of the goods and/or services because it is that portion of the mark that consumers use when referring to or requesting the goods and/or services. Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Thus, the design element is insufficient to obviate the likelihood of confusion.
Accordingly, the marks are confusingly similar.
COMPARISON OF THE GOODS
Applicant’s goods are “Alcoholic beverages (excluding beers), spirits, vodka, alcoholic cocktails.”
Both cited registrations are used in connection with “wines.”
Applicant’s “Alcoholic beverages (excluding beers)” encompasses “wines,” therefore, these goods must be considered identical. Alcoholic cocktails encompass those with a wine base, thus they must be considered highly similar to “wines.”
The remainder of applicant’s goods would be sold in the same alcoholic beverage stores as wines, thus, they would be found in the same channels of trade. Moreover, many companies now operate as both wineries and distilleries, providing both wine and various types of distilled spirits.
See the attached Internet evidence consisting of representative websites showing companies which are both wineries and distilleries. This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and/or services and markets the goods and/or services under the same mark. Therefore, applicant’s and registrants’ goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Evidence obtained from the Internet may be used to support a determination under Section 2(d) that goods and/or services are related. See, e.g., In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1371 (TTAB 2009); In re Paper Doll Promotions, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1660, 1668 (TTAB 2007). The Internet has become integral to daily life in the United States, with Census Bureau data showing approximately three-quarters of American households used the Internet in 2013 to engage in personal communications, to obtain news, information, and entertainment, and to do banking and shopping. See In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, 113 USPQ2d 1639, 1642 (TTAB 2015) (taking judicial notice of the following two official government publications: (1) Thom File & Camille Ryan, U.S. Census Bureau, Am. Cmty. Survey Reports ACS-28, Computer & Internet Use in the United States: 2013 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf, and (2) The Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. & Econ. & Statistics Admin., Exploring the Digital Nation: America’s Emerging Online Experience (2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/exploring_the_digital_nation_-_americas_emerging_online_experience.pdf). Thus, the widespread use of the Internet in the United States suggests that Internet evidence may be probative of public perception in trademark examination.
Accordingly, the goods would be provided to the same class of purchasers and encountered under circumstances leading one to mistakenly believe the goods originate from the same source.
In an application filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), an applicant may not change the classification of goods and/or services from that assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization in the corresponding international registration. 37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1904.02(b). Therefore, any modification to this wording must identify goods and/or services in International Class(es) 33 only, the class(es) specified in the application for these goods and/or services. See TMEP §1904.02(c), (c)(ii).
Applicant may adopt the following wording in International Class(es) 33, if accurate:
[for the “Alcoholic beverages (excluding beers)” amend to avoid usage of parentheses eg. alcoholic beverages excluding beers], spirits, vodka, [clarify the nature of the cocktails eg. prepared alcoholic cocktails, alcoholic cocktail mixes], in class 33
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
WHO IS PERMITTED TO RESPOND TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL: Any response to this provisional refusal must be personally signed by an individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner). 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §712.01. If applicant hires a qualified U.S. attorney to respond on his or her behalf, then the attorney must sign the response. 37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(2)(i), 11.18(a); TMEP §§611.03(b), 712.01. Qualified U.S. attorneys include those in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. commonwealths or U.S. territories. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), 2.62(b), 11.1, 11.14(a); TMEP §§602, 712.01. Additionally, for all responses, the proper signatory must personally sign the document or personally enter his or her electronic signature on the electronic filing. See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(a); TMEP §§611.01(b), 611.02. The name of the signatory must also be printed or typed immediately below or adjacent to the signature, or identified elsewhere in the filing. 37 C.F.R. §2.193(d); TMEP §611.01(b).
In general, foreign attorneys are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO (e.g., file written communications, authorize an amendment to an application, or submit legal arguments in response to a requirement or refusal). See 37 C.F.R. §11.14(c), (e); TMEP §§602.03-.03(b), 608.01.
DESIGNATION OF DOMESTIC REPRESENTATIVE: The USPTO encourages applicants who do not reside in the United States to designate a domestic representative upon whom any notice or process may be served. TMEP §610; see 15 U.S.C. §§1051(e), 1141h(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.24(a)(1)-(2). Such designations may be filed online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.
/Rebecca Gilbert/
Rebecca Gilbert
Examining Attorney
Law Office 103
571-272-9431
rebecca.gilbert@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.