To: | Sintetica S.A. (jbseyler@lawabel.com) |
Subject: | U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 79221555 - BIORPHEN - N/A |
Sent: | 4/1/2019 12:02:53 PM |
Sent As: | ECOM125@USPTO.GOV |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 Attachment - 39 Attachment - 40 Attachment - 41 Attachment - 42 Attachment - 43 Attachment - 44 Attachment - 45 Attachment - 46 Attachment - 47 |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 79221555
MARK: BIORPHEN
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Sintetica S.A.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/1/2019
THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.
INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION NO. 1376655
For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 5126687. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on March 12, 2019.
In a previous Office action dated September 15, 2018, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.
The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
SUMMARY OF THE ISSUE MADE FINAL that applicant must address:
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION-FINAL
Applicant’s applied-for mark is BIORPHEN in standard characters for “Food supplements for veterinary use; dietetic foods for medical use; dietetic foodstuffs for veterinary use; food supplements for human consumption; food for babies; bactericides; chemical contraceptives; disinfectants; enzymes for medical use; enzymes for veterinary use; fungicides; medicines for anesthetic, analgesic, antibradycardia, antihypotensive, antiemetic, anti-nausea and antiseptic use; vitamin and mineral food supplements; vitamin preparations; pharmaceutical preparations for anesthetic, analgesic, antibradycardia, antihypotensive, antiemetic, anti-nausea and antiseptic use; food supplements; medicines for anesthetic, analgesic, antibradycardia, antihypotensive, antiemetic, anti-nausea and antiseptic use; dietetic food supplements; pharmaceutical substances for anesthetic, analgesic, antibradycardia, antihypotensive, antiemetic, anti-nausea and antiseptic use; prescription synthetic narcotics, all the aforementioned goods excluding diagnostic reagents and diagnostic preparations” in Class 5.
Registrant’s mark is BIOPHEN in standard characters for “medical diagnostic agents for use with medical test apparatuses; diagnostic reagents or diagnostic preparations for medical or veterinary purposes; test drugs, namely, diagnostic preparations for medical or veterinary purposes; reagents for blood analysis for medical use; reagents for blood coagulation analysis for medical use; reagents for clinical medical chemistry testing; test drugs, namely, diagnostic preparations for clinical medical purposes; reagents for clinical medical test purposes; reagents for clinical medical diagnostic purposes; control reagents for medical accuracy management used in medical testing and diagnosis; blood plasma; standard blood plasma; control blood plasma for medical purposes; detergents for medical purposes; reagent paper for medical purposes” in Class 5.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Applicant’s applied-for mark is highly similar in appearance, sound and overall commercial impression to registrant’s mark.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, the marks differ by just a single letter. Specifically, both marks begin with the letters “BIO” and end in the suffix “PHEN”. The only difference between the marks is that applicant adds the letter “R” between the terms “BIO” and “PHEN”. Thus, the marks appear highly similar and also sound very similar. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
Further, because the marks are nearly identical in wording, they sound highly similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
In the Response to Office Action, applicant contends that the presence of the letter “R” in the applied-for mark creates a distinct commercial impression. In support of its contention, applicant cites Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc. v. Georgallis Holdings, LLC, 826 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016). However, in that case, the court found the marks dissimilar because “MAYA” is a familiar name whereas “MAYARA” would not be perceived by US Consumers as a female name or as a shortened form of “MAYA”. Unlike in that case, here, the marks convey a similar commercial impression. Specifically, applicant and registrant both provide pharmaceutical preparations in connection with highly similar fanciful marks.
Thus, the marks are confusingly similar.
Comparison of the Goods
Applicant’s goods are related to registrant’s goods because they are commonly provided by the same entity under the same mark and travel in the same channels of trade.
The attached website printouts from Sigma Pharmaceuticals, Asahi Kasei, Horizon Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Seki Sui Diagnostics, DC Fine Chemicals, Abcam demonstrate further demonstrate that the same
entity commonly provides pharmaceutical preparations for purposes other than diagnostic purposes including antiseptic or anesthetic preparations and/or enzymes for medical use other than diagnostic
purposes and/or fungicides as well as provides diagnostic preparations and/or reagents and markets the goods under the same mark, the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade
channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.
Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
In the Response to Office Action applicant contends that the goods are not related because they are different and purchased by a different class of purchasers including because applicant’s goods specifically exclude diagnostic preparations and diagnostic reagents. Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive. While applicant’s goods exclude diagnostic preparations and reagents its goods are still provided in the medical field, just as registrant’s goods are provided in the medical field. Registrant’s goods are also provided in the medical field. Further, registrant’s goods are not limited to just diagnostic preparations and reagents but rather include other goods such as reagents for blood analysis.
While the goods of applicant and registrant are not identical, the evidence attached to this Office Action as well as to the previous Office Action demonstrates that they are related. As mentioned above, the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Conclusion
Given that the applied-for mark is confusingly similar to the registrant's mark and that applicant's goods are related to registrant's goods, applicant remains rightly refused registration under Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion.
It is important to note that any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This is because the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
(1) a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or
(2) an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). There is a fee required for filing a petition. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
/Nicole Passman/
Nicole Passman
Examining Attorney
Law Office 125
(571) 272-3244
nicole.passman@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.