UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
SERIAL NO: 78/635477
APPLICANT: MATTEL, INC.
|
|
CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
RETURN ADDRESS: Commissioner for Trademarks P.O. Box 1451 Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
|
MARK: POWER PACK
|
|
CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: N/A
CORRESPONDENT EMAIL ADDRESS: |
Please provide in all correspondence:
1. Filing date, serial number, mark and applicant's name. 2. Date of this Office Action. 3. Examining Attorney's name and Law Office number. 4. Your telephone number and e-mail address.
|
MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION: If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.
Serial Number 78/635477
This letter responds to applicant’s communication submitted on June 5, 2006. The applicant argued against the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d) and the disclaimer requirement. For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 2066491. In addition, the disclaimer requirement is now made FINAL. 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).
Registration of the proposed mark was refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2066491. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
Taking into account the relevant Du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis. First, the marks are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Second, the goods or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or related or whether the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely. In re National Novice Hockey League, Inc., 222 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1984); In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Prods. Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Applicant proposes POWER PACK for use in connection with “toys, games and playthings, namely, toy vehicles and accessories therefor.” Registrant provides a “kit for making educational models of bridges, vehicles, rockets, rocket launchers and gliders” in connection with the mark POWER PAK.
The marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and are thus similar sounding. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. RE/MAX of America, Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469 (TTAB 1975); In re Cresco Mfg. Co., 138 USPQ 401 (TTAB 1963); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
The marks are also very similar in appearance, as they are both two-word marks starting with the word POWER and ending with a version of the word PACK. Looking at the marks in their entireties, the marks only differ by a couple of letters. When applicant’s mark is compared to a registered mark, “the points of similarity are of greater importance than the points of difference.” Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 40, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (internal citation omitted).
The similarities in the sound, appearance and meaning of each mark create a nearly identical commercial impression. Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source. In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972). For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison. The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression. Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant amended its identification to the goods “toys, games and playthings, namely, toy vehicles and accessories therefor.” Consequently, applicant argues that because it has narrowed its goods, it “has properly distinguished them from the goods associated with the cited registration.”
However, the goods of applicant include a “kit for making education models of…vehicles.” As shown on the attached Internet evidence, model vehicles and toy vehicles are often sold through the same channels of trade, namely, toy stores. Although the registrant’s goods are “educational” in nature, as shown by the attached Internet evidence, toy stores sell both educational items and those intended purely for entertainment. So the fact that registrant’s goods are labeled as “educational” while applicant’s are not does not preclude both types of goods from being sold through the same channels of trade to the same consumers.
Also, attached are copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods as those of applicant and registrant in this case. These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods listed therein, namely toy cars, model kits and model cars, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source. See In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-1218 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).
Any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion is resolved in favor of the prior registrant. In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).
Accordingly, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d) based on a likelihood of confusion. This refusal is made FINAL.
Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
If applicant chooses to respond to the final refusal to register, then applicant must also respond to the following final requirement.
The applicant was required to disclaim the descriptive wording “PACK” apart from the mark as shown. Trademark Act Section 6, 15 U.S.C. §1056; TMEP §§1213 and 1213.03(a). The applicant argued against the disclaimer, stating that the mark creates a unitary impression on the consumer and that the registration cited against the applicant’s mark did not disclaim the word “PAK.”
The examining attorney has considered the applicant’s arguments, but has found them unpersuasive. As shown by the photograph submitted by applicant with its response, the goods do, in fact, comprise a “collection of items tied up or wrapped” together or a PACK, and therefore, the word PACK is merely descriptive of a feature of the goods. Please see the attached dictionary definition.
The mark does not create a unitary impression on the consumer, but rather tells the consumer that the goods are a collection of powerful items. As such, the words POWER and PACK are separable elements of the mark.
As for the cited registration not including a disclaimer of PAK, prior decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in registering different marks are without evidentiary value and are not binding upon the Office. Each case is decided on its own facts, and each mark stands on its own merits. AMF Inc. v. American Leisure Products, Inc., 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re International Taste, Inc., 53 USPQ2d 1604 (TTAB 2000); In re Sunmarks Inc., 32 USPQ2d 1470 (TTAB 1994); In re National Novice Hockey League, Inc., 222 USPQ 638, 641 (TTAB 1984); In re Consolidated Foods Corp., 200 USPQ 477 (TTAB 1978).
The computerized printing format for the Trademark Official Gazette requires a standard form for a disclaimer. TMEP §1213.08(a)(i). A properly worded disclaimer should read as follows:
No claim is made to the exclusive right to use PACK apart from the mark as shown.
See In re Owatonna Tool Co., 231 USPQ 493 (Comm’r Pats. 1983).
The Office can require an applicant to disclaim exclusive rights to an unregistrable part of a mark, rather than refuse registration of the entire mark. Trademark Act Section 6(a), 15 U.S.C. §1056(a). Under Trademark Act Section 2(e), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e), the Office can refuse registration of the entire mark where it is determined that the entire mark is merely descriptive, deceptively misdescriptive, or primarily geographically descriptive of the goods. Thus, the Office may require the disclaimer of a portion of a mark which, when used in connection with the goods or services, is merely descriptive, deceptively misdescriptive, primarily geographically descriptive, or otherwise unregistrable (e.g., generic). TMEP §1213.03(a). If an applicant does not comply with a disclaimer requirement, the Office may refuse registration of the entire mark. TMEP §1213.01(b).
A “disclaimer” is thus a written statement that an applicant adds to the application record that states that applicant does not have exclusive rights, separate and apart from the entire mark, to particular wording and/or to a design aspect. The appearance of the applied-for mark does not change.
This requirement is made FINAL.
If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond to this final action by:
(1) submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or
(2) filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).
In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2). 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a). See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matters. The petition fee is $100. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
Sara N. Thomas
/Sara Thomas/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 110
571.272.8847
fax (formal response only) 571.273.9110
HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:
STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.
VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm
FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.