| To: | Hertel, Andrew, D (drew@gshop.com) |
| Subject: | TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77115632 - GPAY - N/A |
| Sent: | 6/14/2007 9:22:19 AM |
| Sent As: | ECOM108@USPTO.GOV |
| Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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SERIAL NO: 77/115632
MARK: GPAY
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm
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APPLICANT: Hertel, Andrew, D
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 6/14/2007
The assigned trademark examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and has determined the following:
Registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registrations Nos. 2854164 and 3170987. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed information regarding these registrations.
The Court in In re E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), created a two-part analysis for determining the likelihood of confusion between a proposed mark and a registered mark. First, the marks are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Second, the goods or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or related or whether the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely. In re National Novice Hockey League, Inc., 222 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1984); In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Prods. Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Comparing the Marks
First, the marks are compared for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation. In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source. In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972). For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison. The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression. Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, applicant’s proposed mark consists of the wording “GPAY.” Registrants’ marks consist of the wording “PAY.GOV” (2854164) and “GO PAY” (3170987). All three marks contain “PAY” as a dominant feature.
“GPAY” is similar to “PAY.GOV” in that “G” as a prefix can refer to “government,” as shown by the attached Internet dictionary evidence showing “gman” to refer to an FBI agent, or “government man.” The combination of the “G” and “PAY” creates a similar commercial impression to that of “PAY.GOV” in that both marks give the impression of having something to do with the government and payment.
Regarding “GO PAY” and “GPAY,” the marks are similar in sound and appearance. “GPAY” appears to be a shortened version of “GO PAY” with the removal of an “O” and a space between the two words. The mere deletion of matter from a registered mark is not sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See In re Optical Int’l, 196 USPQ 775 (TTAB 1977) (where applicant filed to register the mark OPTIQUE for optical wear, deletion of the term BOUTIQUE is insufficient to distinguish the mark, per se, from the registered mark OPTIQUE BOUTIQUE when used in connection with competing optical wear). In the present case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as registrant’s mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from registrant’s mark.
Thus, a comparison of the marks shows that they are highly similar.
Turning to the second prong of the Du Pont analysis, the parties’ services are compared for relatedness. The services need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. Instead, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing such that consumers would encounter the services under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the services come from a common source. On-line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). All circumstances surrounding the sale of the services are considered. Industrial Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (C.C.P.A. 1973). These circumstances include marketing channels and the identity of the prospective purchasers.
Any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion is resolved in favor of the prior registrant. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).
Here, applicant’s services are “bill payment services.” Registrant’s services include “federal electronic transaction funds transfer services; on-line authentication services, bill presentment; and the processing and reporting of financial information in an electronic environment, via the Internet; electronic processing of payment data,” (2854164) and “electronic debit transactions.”
Applicant has not limited its bill payment services to exclude payment via the Internet or electronically, so it must be assumed that the applicant’s services include payments made in this fashion. Likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the services identified in the application and registration. If the application describes the services broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, it is presumed that the application encompasses all services of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers. See In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) (“With reference to the channels of trade, applicant’s argument that its goods are sold only in its own retail stores is not persuasive …There is no restriction [in its identification of goods] as to the channels of trade in which the goods are sold”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).
As all three marks are for services that involve electronic bill payment, the services are all highly related.
In sum, based on the overall commercial impression of applicant’s proposed mark, taking into consideration the relevant factors discussed above, confusion as to the source of the services is likely, and accordingly, registration of applicant’s proposed mark is refused.
Although the trademark examining attorney has refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
Applicant should include the following information on all correspondence with the Office: (1) the name and law office number of the trademark examining attorney; (2) the serial number of this application; (3) the mailing date of this Office action; and, (4) applicant's telephone number. 37 C.F.R. §2.194(b)(1); TMEP §302.03(a).
If applicant has questions about its application or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney directly at the number below.
TEAS PLUS APPLICANTS MUST SUBMIT DOCUMENTS ELECTRONICALLY OR SUBMIT FEE: TEAS Plus applicants should submit the following documents using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html: (1) written responses to Office actions; (2) preliminary amendments; (3) changes of correspondence address; (4) changes of owner’s address; (5) appointments and revocations of attorney; (6) amendments to allege use; (7) statements of use; (8) requests for extension of time to file a statement of use, and (9) requests to delete a §1(b) basis. If any of these documents are filed on paper, they must be accompanied by a $50 per class fee. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(iv) and 2.23(a)(i). Telephone responses will not incur an additional fee. NOTE: In addition to the above, applicant must also continue to accept correspondence from the Office via e-mail throughout the examination process in order to avoid the additional fee. 37 C.F.R. §2.23(a)(2).
/AndreaRHack/
Andrea R. Hack
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 108
Ph: 571.272.5413
Fax: 571.273.5413
RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: If there are any questions about the Office action, please contact the assigned examining attorney. A response to this Office Action should be filed using the Office’s Response to Office action form available at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm. If notification of this Office action was received via e-mail, no response using this form may be filed for 72 hours after receipt of the notification. Do not attempt to respond by e-mail as the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.
If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response. Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.
STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov. When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen. If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.
