UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Serial Number  77/002637

 

The assigned trademark examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application filed on September 19, 2006, and has determined the following.

REGISTRATION REFUSED--LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 0806773.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

The Court in In re E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), listed the principal factors to be considered in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  Any one of the factors listed may be dominant in any given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); In re L.C. Licensing Inc., 49 USPQ2d 1379 (TTAB 1998); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration where an applied-for mark so resembles a registered mark that it is likely, when applied to the goods and/or services, to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive the potential consumer as to the source of the goods and/or services.  TMEP §1207.01.  The Court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), listed the principal factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  Among these factors are the similarity of the marks as to appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression, and the relatedness of the goods and/or services.  The overriding concern is to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the registrant.  In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lone Star Mfg. Co. v. Bill Beasley, Inc., 498 F.2d 906, 182 USPQ 368 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, all circumstances surrounding the sale of the goods and/or services are considered.  Industrial Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  These circumstances include the marketing channels, the identity of the prospective purchasers, and the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods and/or services.  In comparing the marks, similarity in any one of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In comparing the goods and/or services, it is necessary to show that they are related in some manner.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755, 757 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

The applicant has applied for registration of the proposed mark, INHANCE and design.  The registrant’s mark is ENHANCE.

The marks are compared for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b).

In the present case, the respective marks are highly similar in appearance, sound, commercial impression and connotation. 

If the marks of the respective parties are identical or highly similar, the examining attorney must consider the commercial relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties carefully to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re Concordia International Forwarding Corp., 222 USPQ 355 (TTAB 1983).  Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

The relevant good of the applicant are identified as “clothing.”  The goods of Registration No. 0806773 are identified as “girdles, panty girdles, brassieres, panties, corselets, garter belts; ladies' and girls' sleepwear and lingerie consisting of slips, peignoirs, half slips, pajamas, chemises, negligees, night gowns, kimonas, bathing suits, stockings, blouses, gloves, dresses, skirts; and ladies' and girls' sportswear consisting of sweaters and jackets.” 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  Instead, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  On-line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

In the present case, the goods of the parties could well be presumed to be from the same source inasmuch as the goods of the parties relate to clothing items.  Neither the application nor the registration(s) contain any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. V. KangaROOS U.S.A. Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994).  The decisions in the clothing field have held many different types of apparel to be related under Section 2(d).  Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 286 F.2d 623, 128 USPQ 549 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (“WINTER CARNIVAL” for women’s boots v. men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233 (TTAB 1992) (“ELANCE” for underwear v. “ELAAN” for neckties); In re Melville Corp. 18 USPQ2d 1386 (TTAB 1991) (“ESSENTIALS” for women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets v. women’s shoes); In re Pix of America, Inc., 225 USPQ 691 (TTAB 1985) (“NEWPORTS” for women’s shoes v. “NEWPORT” for outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397 (TTAB 1982) (“OMEGA” for hosiery v. trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444 (TTAB 1975) (“GRANADA” for men’s suits, coats, and trousers v. ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400 (TTAB 1964) (“SLEEX” for brassieres and girdles v. slacks for men and young men).

 

Consequently, the goods of the present parties clearly move in the same normal channels of trade, are available to all potential customers and may be utilized for the same or similar (i.e., related) purposes by the same classes of purchasers. 

Accordingly, based on the highly similar nature of the marks and the similarity of the goods of the parties, there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

PRIOR PENDING APPLICATIONS

Information regarding pending Application Serial Nos. 78875256 and 78875249 is also enclosed.  The filing dates of the referenced applications precede applicant’s filing date.  There may be a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d) between applicant’s mark and the referenced marks.  If one or more of the referenced applications registers, registration may be refused in this case under Section 2(d).  37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon entry of a response to this Office action, action on this case may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed applications.

 

If applicant believes that there is no potential conflict between this application and the earlier-filed applications, then applicant may present arguments relevant to the issue in a response to this Office action.  The election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue at a later point.

 

IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS

The identification of goods is unacceptable as indefinite because as worded, the exact nature of the goods is unclear.  Where indicated, the applicant must specify the nature of the goods by its common commercial name.  Additionally, it is unclear as to what the applicant means by cellular phones or wireless devices, i.e., whether the devices relate to the downloadable ringtones or whether the applicant intends that the devices are sold separately.  If the devices are sold separately, the applicant must clarify the exact nature of the wireless devices by its common commercial name. 

 

Applicant must rewrite the identification of goods in its entirety because of the nature and extent of the amendment.  37 C.F.R. §2.74(b).

 

The applicant may adopt any or all of the following identifications, if accurate:

               “Prerecorded CDs featuring music, prerecorded DVDs and audiovisual recordings [Please clarify, i.e., audio and video tapes and cassettes] featuring music and dancing, downloadable ringtones, graphics, images, music and spoken word via the Internet, cellular phones and wireless devices,” in International Class 9.

               “Music magazines,” in International Class 16.

               “Clothing, namely, [Specify nature of goods by their common commercial name, i.e., athletic uniforms, bathing suits, beachwear, belts, blouses, body suits, bras, briefs, coats, dresses, gloves, gym suits, jackets, jeans, jerseys, jogging suits, leotards, mittens, neckwear, pants, pullovers, rain wear, scarves, shirts, shorts, skirts, ski wear, sleep wear, socks, surf wear, sweat pants, sweat shirts, sweaters, swim wear, tennis wear, tights, tops, bottoms, T-shirts, underwear, wet suits, dry suits, wrist bands],” in International Class 25.

TMEP §1402.01.

Please note that, while the identification of services may be amended to clarify or limit the services, adding to the services or broadening the scope of the services is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Therefore, applicant may not amend the identification to include services that are not within the scope of the services set forth in the present identification.

 

For assistance regarding an acceptable listing of goods and/or services, please see the on-line searchable Manual of Acceptable Identifications of Goods and Services, at <http://tess2.gov.uspto.report/netahtml/tidm.html>. 

 

RECITATION/CLASSIFICATION OF SERVICES

The recitation of services is unacceptable as indefinite because as worded, the exact nature of the services is unclear.  The applicant also classified the services in the incorrect International Class.

 

Applicant must rewrite the recitation of services in its entirety because of the nature and extent of the amendment.  37 C.F.R. §2.74(b).

The applicant may adopt the following recitation, if accurate:

          “Retail store services and on-line retail store services featuring prerecorded music and video and related merchandise,” in International Class 35.

TMEP §1402.01.

Please note that, while the identification of services may be amended to clarify or limit the services, adding to the services or broadening the scope of the services is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Therefore, applicant may not amend the identification to include services that are not within the scope of the services set forth in the present identification.

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and/or services in trademark applications, please see the online searchable Manual of Acceptable Identifications of Goods and Services at http://tess2.gov.uspto.report/netahtml/tidm.html.

 

DRAWING CONTAINS GRAY – CLARIFICATION NEEDED

 

Attached is a copy of the drawing page submitted with the application. 

 

The drawing shows the mark in black and/or white and gray.  However, the application does not specify whether color is a feature of the mark or the mark is intended to be represented only in black and white.  There are only two options for presenting the mark:  (1) color drawings, and (2) black and white drawings.  The appearance of gray has created an ambiguity as to whether the mark features color or is intended to be in black and white, and clarification is required.  37 C.F.R. §§2.52(b)-(b)(1); TMEP §807.07(e). 

 

(1)   If the proposed mark is not in color, applicant must submit the following statement:  “The mark is not in color.” 

 

(2)   If color is a feature of the proposed mark, applicant must submit both a statement listing all the colors claimed as a feature of the mark and a statement describing where the colors appear in the mark.  The color claim and color location statement must include all the colors in the mark.  37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(1); TMEP §§807.07 et seq.  If any of these colors are not being used as color in the mark, the color location statement must describe where the black, white and gray appear in the mark and state that it constitutes background, outlining, shading or transparent areas and is not part of the mark.  The following format is suggested:  “The colors black, gray and white are claimed as a feature of the mark.  The color white appears in the human silhouette design.  The color gray appears in the musical note design.  The color black appears in the square design as well as in the wording INHANCE.

PLEASE NOTE:  Because it delays processing, submission of duplicate papers is discouraged.  Unless specifically requested to do so by the Office, parties should not mail follow up copies of documents transmitted by fax.  Cf. ITC Entertainment Group Ltd. V. Nintendo of America Inc. 45 USPQ2d 2021 (TTAB 1998).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Howard Smiga /HS/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 102

571-272-9220

571-273-9102 Fax

 

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office action form available on our website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If the Office action issued via e-mail, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office action to respond via TEAS.  NOTE:  Do not respond by e-mail.  THE USPTO WILL NOT ACCEPT AN E-MAILED RESPONSE.
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above, and include the serial number, law office number, and examining attorney’s name.  NOTE:  The filing date of the response will be the date of receipt in the Office, not the postmarked date.  To ensure your response is timely, use a certificate of mailing.  37 C.F.R. §2.197.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.