Offc Action Outgoing

LEADER

SITONIT OFFICE SEATING, INC.

Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

    SERIAL NO: 76/433340

 

    APPLICANT:                          SITONIT OFFICE SEATING, INC.

 

 

        

 

    CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

    RICHARD P. SYBERT

    GORDON REES LLP

    101 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 1600

    SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101

   

RETURN ADDRESS: 

Commissioner for Trademarks

2900 Crystal Drive

Arlington, VA 22202-3513

ecom103@uspto.gov

 

 

 

    MARK:          LEADER

 

 

 

    CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:   N/A

 

    CORRESPONDENT EMAIL ADDRESS: 

 

Please provide in all correspondence:

 

1.  Filing date, serial number, mark and

     applicant's name.

2.  Date of this Office Action.

3.  Examining Attorney's name and

     Law Office number.

4. Your telephone number and e-mail address.

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, WE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF OUR MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

 

Serial Number  76/433340

 

This letter responds to the applicant’s communication filed on February 19, 2003.

 

Applicant’s substitute specimen has been entered in the record.

 

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 2,544,574 as to be likely, when used on  the identified goods, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

 

The examining attorney has considered the applicant’s arguments carefully but has found them unpersuasive.  For the reasons below, the refusal under Section 2(d) is maintained and made FINAL.

 

SECTION 2(d) FINAL REFUSAL

 

 

Applicant argues that the term LEADER’S is perceived as a surname and at the same time argues that it is descriptive. The refusal is based upon Section 2(d) not Section 2(e) (1) or Section 2(e)(4). The applicant’s mark LEADER is confusingly similar to the registrant’s mark, LEADERS CASUAL FURNITURE. To argue that the registrant’s mark is descriptive or that it is a surname is irrelevant.

 

Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act bars registration where a mark so resembles a registered mark, that it is likely, when applied to the goods/services, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive. TMEP §1207.01.  The Court in In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), listed the principal factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  Among these factors are the similarity of the marks as to appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression and the similarity of the goods/services.  The overriding concern is to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods/services.  Miss Universe, Inc. v. Miss Teen U.S.A., Inc., 209 USPQ 698 (N.D. Ga. 1980).  Therefore, any doubt as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the registrant.  Lone Star Mfg. Co. v. Bill Beasley, Inc., 498 F.2d 906, 182 USPQ 368 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 

 

The marks in question are “LEADER” v. “LEADERS CASUAL FURNITURE.

 

The test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side‑by‑side comparison.  The issue is whether the marks create the same overall impression. Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vicon Industries Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The dominant portion of the marks are LEADER and LEADERS. The fact that the registrant’s mark is in the plural form is insignificant in a trademark sense and does not distinguish the marks.

 

The examining attorney must look at the marks in their entireties under Section 2(d). Nevertheless, one feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re National Data Corp., 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976). In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1988).  TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii). 

 

Furthermore, the goods of the applicant are clearly related to the services of the registrant. The registrant offers retail store services which feature furniture. There are no restrictions in the recitation as to the trade channels or purchasers or the type of furniture sold by the registrant.

 

It is well settled that the issue of likelihood of confusion between marks must be determined on the basis of the goods or services as they are identified in the application and the registration. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Paula Payne Products Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., Inc., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ 76 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Since the identification of the registrant’s services includes furniture without any restrictions, it is presumed that the registration encompasses all types of furniture including those in the applicant’s more specific identification, that they move in all normal channels of trade and that they are available to all potential customers.  In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981).  TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii). 

 

Furthermore, it is well settled that the same or similar mark used for goods and for services dealing with related goods can lead to a likelihood of confusion. In re Gerhard Horn Investments, Ltd. 217 USPQ 1181 (TTAB 1983); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc., 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983).

 

As to the argument that the buyers are sophisticated, the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  See In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 1988); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983).  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii). 

 

Finally, the examining attorney must resolve any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion in favor of the prior registrant.  In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir., 1988).  TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i). 

 

Please note that the only appropriate responses to a final action are (1) compliance with the outstanding requirements, if feasible, (2) filing of an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, or (3) filing of a petition to the Director if permitted by 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b). 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §715.01.  Regarding petitions to the Director, see 37 C.F.R. §2.146 and TMEP Chapter 1700.  If the applicant fails to respond within six months of the mailing date of this refusal, this Office will declare the application abandoned.  37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). 

 

Lesley LaMothe

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 103

703-308-9103 ext 487

e-mail- lesley.lamothe@uspto.gov

 

 

How to respond to this Office Action:

 

To respond formally using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), visit http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html and follow the instructions.

 

To respond formally via E-mail, visit http://www.gov.uspto.report/web/trademarks/tmelecresp.htm and follow the instructions.

 

To respond formally via regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing Return Address listed above and include the serial number, law office and examining attorney’s name on the upper right corner of each page of your response.

 

To check the status of your application at any time, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/

 

For general and other useful information about trademarks, you are encouraged to visit the Office’s web site at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY.

 


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