IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE TRADEMARK EXAMINING DIVISION

In re Application of:

Spartan Race, Inc.

Serial No.: 88975003 :

Filed: July 25, 2018 :



Mark

RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION

The Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant's mark under Section 2(d) of

the Trademark Act on the ground that the Applicant's service mark for

for "Organizing, hosting, arranging and conducting combat and fighting sports training, training camps, and academies; wrestling instruction" when used on or in connection with the identified services so resembles two *already peacefully co-existing, not confusingly similar to each other* marks owned by different owners, namely, U.S. Registration No. 5318883 **SPARTAN DIET** for "On-line journals, namely, blogs featuring content in the fields of holistic health, nutrition and

lifestyle wellness" and U.S. Registration No. 3566322 for "Encouraging amateur sports and physical education by organizing, promoting, sponsoring, sanctioning, conducting, administering, regulating and governing amateur athletic programs and activities", that it is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive.

Applicant respectfully requests that the Examining Attorney withdraw her refusal to register for the reasons set forth below.

The Lanham Act provides for rejecting registration of a mark that "so resembles a [registered] mark . . . as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). The section continues that if "confusion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from continued use . . . of similar marks . . ., concurrent registrations may be issued." Id. The Examining Attorney correctly asserts that the likelihood of confusion determination is assisted by applying the du Pont factors outlined by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. In re E.I. du Pont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The thirteen du Pont factors are as follows: (1) the marks' similarity in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; (2) the similarity of the goods and services covered by the marks; (3) the similarity of the channels of trade; (4) the sophistication of the typical consumer; (5) the distinctiveness (sales, advertising, length of use) of the registered mark; (6) the number of other, similar marks used for similar goods or services; (7) any evidence of actual confusion; (8) the length of concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; (9) the variety of goods or services covered by the marks; (10) any discussions or agreements between the marks' owners; (11) the marks' current exclusivity in the marketplace; (12) the substantiality of potential confusion; and (13) any other evidence probative of concurrent use's effects on consumers. Id. at 1361.

Because the likelihood of confusion determination is case specific, some factors may be more or less relevant in a given case. <u>Id.</u> at 1361-62; see also <u>Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc.</u>, 637 F.3d 1344, 1355-57 (Fed. Cir. 2011); <u>In re August Storck KG</u>, 218 U.S.P.Q. 823 (T.T.A.B. 1983); <u>In re Int'l Telephone & Telegraph Co.</u>, 197 U.S.P.Q. 910 (T.T.A.B. 1978). Therefore, none of the above factors is automatically controlling. Rather, each must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine the appropriate weight given to each factor. There is simply

no mechanical test for determining likelihood of confusion and each case must be decided on its own facts.

The determinative inquiry is always not whether consumers believe the *goods or services* are similar but whether the marks' concurrent use "will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify emanate from the same *source*" (emphasis added). Paula Payne Prods. Co. v. Johnson's Publ'g Co., 473 F. 2d 901, 902 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Rexel Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. 830, 831 (TTAB 1984).

The Examining Attorney asserts that the following factors are most relevant in this case:

- (1) similarity of the marks; and
- (2) similarity and nature of the services.

A. Confusion is unlikely because the cited marks are weak.

In comparing Applicant's mark with previously registered marks, one factor that must be considered is the impact of prior registrations on the strength of the registered marks. TMEP § 1207.01 ("In testing for likelihood of confusion under Sec. 2(d), therefore, the following, when of record, must be considered: The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods).

With the co-existence of the cited US registrations for "SPARTAN" marks both in Class 41 without any risk of confusion between them, the two cited registrations cannot by any stretch be strong marks. Further evidence of the weakness of the cited registrations is that they already co-exist with the "SPARTAN" mascot marks of other academic and youth institutions (the cited Registrant "Greater Atlantic Area Christian Schools is an academic institution for elementary school and high school). For example, the cited marks already coexist without any risk of confusion with:

- US Reg. No. 4894627 **UNIVERSITY OF TAMPA SPARTANS** in Class 41 for "arranging and conducting athletic and sports events and competitions".
- US Reg. No. 2593846 **NORFOLK STATE UNIVERSITY SPARTANS** in Class 41 for "sporting activities in the nature of conducting athletic competitions and exhibitions"
- US Reg. No. 4935823 **SPARTANS** in Class 41 for "organizing and conducting athletic competitions and games in the field of youth lacrosse; organizing sporting events, namely, youth lacrosse activities; organizing, arranging, and conducting youth lacrosse events; organizing, conducting and operating youth lacrosse tournaments; sports training services in the field of youth lacrosse".

Accordingly, the cited registrations should be given a narrow scope of protection, in light of their weakness and coexistence with each other, and with U.S. the mascot registrations of other academic and youth institutions, barring registration of only virtually identical marks for virtually identical services.

B. The cited marks themselves, and the services in Applicant's mark, are so unrelated that confusion is unlikely.

With respect to Reg. No. 5318883 SPARTAN DIET, the mark is different than Applicant's mark. The mark is different because it contains an obvious visual difference to any ordinary observer – it contains the word DIET. This creates an entirely distinct and unique and separate evocation, meaning, identity and commercial impression – dieting - than Applicant's mark that

does <u>not</u> use the word DIET. Applicant's mark contains a very different visual graphic that cannot be confused with the cited registrant and that as a very different evocation, meaning, identity and commercial impression unrelated to dieting and is in fact just the opposite in the sense that it is a combat war helmet not a calorie counter.

Moreover, Applicant respectfully disagrees that the Applicant's services are similar or related to the services of Reg. No. 5318883 SPARTAN DIET.

Goods and services are not "related" simply because they co-exist in the same broad industry. They are "related" if the goods are marketed and consumed in such a way that buyers are likely to believe that all of the goods come from the same source. Homeowner's Group. Inc. v. Home Marketing Specialists, Inc., 18 USPQ2d 1587, 1594 (6th Cir. 1991). (No likelihood of confusion between marketing and advertising support services for real estate brokers under HMS and providing real estate brokerage services under HMS HOME MARKETING SPECIALISTS on non-commission or flat-fee rates.) Likelihood of confusion occurs when "the respective goods or services are related in [the] same manner, and/or that the conditions and activities surrounding the marketing of the goods are such that they would be encountered by the *same persons* under circumstances that could, because of the similarity of the marks, give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate from the same producer." In re Hal Leonard Publishing Corp., 15 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (TTAB 1990).

Put simply, a trademark registrant's rights do not extend in gross to *all* products. There must be a very close overlap, nexus or relationship between the goods before a likelihood of confusion can be found between similar marks. Indeed, many *identical* marks may and do co-exist in different fields without confusion.

"Thus NOTRE DAME brand imported French cheese has been permitted to co-

exist with NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY; BULOVA watches with BULOVA shoes; ALLIGATOR raincoats with ALLIGATOR cigarettes; THIS BUD'S FOR YOU in beer commercials with the same phrase used by a florist; WHITE HOUSE tea and coffee with WHITE HOUSE milk; BLUE SHIELD medical care plan with BLUE SHIELD mattresses; FAMILY CIRCLE magazine with FAMILY CIRCLE department store; OLE cigars with OLE tequila; and SUNKIST fruits with SUNKIST bakery products, the list continues." Quality Inns Int'l v. McDonald's Corp., 8 USPQ2d 1633, 1641 (D. Md. 1988).

In Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 954 F.2d 713 (Fed. Cir. 1992), there was no likelihood of confusion, even though the plaintiff sold E.D.S. computer services and defendant sold EDS power supplies and battery chargers, and both parties sold in some instances even to the same hospitals. There was no likelihood of confusion because of the distinct types of goods and because despite the overlap in customers, the purchases were made by different departments within those same hospitals.

Determining the similarity of goods and services is ultimately based on common sense and common experience. ITT Corp. v. XTRA Corp., 225 USPQ 723, 732 (D. Mass 1985). "The Board...has found no likelihood of confusion even with respect to identical marks applied to goods and or services used in a common industry where such goods and/or services are clearly different from each other and there is insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable basis for assuming that the respective goods as identified by their marks, would be encountered by the *same purchasers*." Borg-Warner Chem, Inc. v. Helena Chem. Co., 225 USPQ 222, 224 (TTAB 1983) (emphasis added).

Moreover, the Examining Attorney must provide evidence showing that the goods and services are related to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re White Rock Distilleries Inc.,92 USPQ2d 1282, 1285 (TTAB 2009). There is no *per se* rule that certain goods or services are related that would dictate a likelihood of confusion determination. See, e.g., Info.

Res. Inc. v. X*Press Info. Servs., 6 USPQ2d 1034, 1038 (TTAB 1988); In re Quadram Corp., 228 USPQ 863, 865 (TTAB 1985); see also M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc'ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1383, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947–48 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When the relatedness of the goods and services is not evident, well known, or generally recognized, "something more" than the mere fact that the goods and services are used together must be shown. In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 754, 113 USPQ2d 1087.

With respect to Reg. No. 5318883 SPARTAN DIET, the Applicant has been able to find no decision holding that <u>blogs</u> about holistic health, nutrition and lifestyle wellness are similar to "Organizing, hosting, arranging and conducting combat and fighting sports training, training camps, and academies; wrestling instruction". That is because they are not similar, and because there is no "something more" as respects the two disparate sets of services.

The established rule is that determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, **not on evidence of actual use**. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).

Yet, despite this rule, the Examiner has circumvented this rule by going outside of the descriptions of the application and registration - and has attached extraneous evidence. Nonetheless, the extraneous information is irrelevant and the Examiner's logic defies the reality of what is in the descriptions. The Examiner proclaims: "The attached evidence from applicant's website demonstrates that it offers registrant's services, in particular, blogs in the field of nutrition. In conclusion, the applicant's and registrants' services are related."

But Applicant has not applied here for blogs. The mere fact that Applicant might sell, let's say, automobiles or television sets or anything at all on its website and has not applied for them and is outside any description does not automatically mean (under the Examiner's logic) that whatever is sold by a party in actual use is therefore de facto "similar" to the goods of any cited registrant, just because it is sold by Applicant. If that were the case, then the Examiner would be creating new law. But that is exactly what the Examiner is doing here. The Examiner is saying that even though Applicant has not applied for blogs about health and nutrition in this Application, such blogs are per se now somehow magically similar to or the same as the applied for combat fighting, because (in violation of Stone Lion Capital Partners) the Examiner looked outside the descriptions and found a page on Applicant's website that talks about nutrition (an unapplied for service). That is entirely irrelevant to this Application claiming specific services described in the application. That is not enough to conclude that the two respective services are similar; merely selling or providing something on a website in actual use does not mean that such items sold in actual use are therefore without any analysis similar to something entirely different applied for in the different description of an Application. What matters is what is listed in the description, not what is outside the description. Under the Examiner's logic, if Applicant applied for wrestling instruction but also sold racing yachts on its website, and there was a prior third-party registration for the exact same mark for racing yachts, the Application for wrestling instruction would unequivocally have to be refused on the basis that wrestling instruction and yachts are similar, because the description in an application no longer matters and under some newly created law what now matters to determine similarity of descriptions is simply: extraneous evidence of what an Applicant actually sells. But merely selling something is not enough to blindly conclude that the goods and services *applied for* by an Applicant are related to that.

Here there is no factual basis to support finding that consumers are likely to conclude that wrestling instruction and combat fighting are similar to blogs about health. The mere fact that different goods are sold by *one entity* does not make all of these many goods sold "related" goods under the Lanham Act. Such broad comparisons are not permissible under the "something more" test. Here, the respective services are in fact both non-competitive and unrelated. The services Applicant offers under its mark are so distinct from the services offered by the prior registrant that confusion as to the source or origin of the services is entirely unlikely. Moreover, the fact that a product is in the same broad field, does not itself provide a basis for regarding them as "related" for purposes of Trademark Act Section 2(d). For example, sugar and pizza are both "food," but they are not "related" goods. Jacobs v. International Multifoods Corp., 212 USPQ 641, 642 (CCPA 1982). A determination here that combat fighting is similar to blogs about health would effectively overturn the requirement that a finding of relatedness requires "something more" than the fact that Applicant sells something not even applied for.

With respect to Reg. No. 3566322 the mark and services are likewise different. The mark is different because it contains an obvious visual difference to any ordinary observer – it contains a crucifix. A crucifix is a religious symbol. Indeed, the registrant's name includes the phrase "Christian Schools". This creates an entirely distinct and unique and separate evocation, meaning, identity and commercial impression – religion - than Applicant's mark that

does <u>not</u> use a crucifix. Applicant's mark contains a very different visual graphic that cannot be confused with the cited registrant and that as a very different evocation, meaning, identity and commercial impression unrelated to religion and is in fact just the opposite in the sense that it is a combat war helmet not a crucifix.

In determining whether two marks are likely to be confused, it is well settled that "marks must be compared in their entireties." <u>In re National Data Corp.</u>, 753 F.2d 1056, 224

USPQ 749, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Homeowners Marketing Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1991) (marks must be viewed in their entirety and in context). The similarity of the marks in their entireties must be considered with respect to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d 1361, 177 USPQ at 567 (C.C.P.A.). The Examiner must not ignore significant differences that may make the marks distinguishable, and must not break the mark into component parts for comparison. See, e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 677 F.2d 1005, 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm'r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538 (1920); Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, 162 F.2d 280, 7 U.S.P.Q. 518 (CCA 1st Cir. 1947); China Healthways Institute, Inc. v. Wang, 491 F.3d 1337, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 661 (2007) ("It is incorrect to compare marks by eliminating portions thereof and then simply comparing the residue."). The Federal Circuit has cautioned: "[t]here is no general rule as to whether letters or design will dominate in composite marks. ... No element of a mark is ignored simply because it is less dominant, or would not have trademark significance if used alone." In re Electrolyte Laboratories, Inc., 13 F.3d 930 (Fed. Cir. 1990), corrected 929 F.3d 645 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Therefore, the design elements are not to be overlooked or ignored and provide blatant additional elements and weight to distinguish Applicant's mark from the cited mark, given that the design element is are very visually different.

Additionally, the services in Reg. No. 3566322 are not related to Applicant's services. Applicant's narrow services of "Organizing, hosting, arranging and conducting combat and fighting sports training, training camps, and academies; wrestling instruction" are not related to

"Encouraging <u>amateur</u> sports and physical education by organizing, promoting, sponsoring, sanctioning, conducting, administering, regulating and governing amateur athletic programs and activities." The cited Registrant's services are therefore not broad, but in fact likewise very narrow. They are restricted and limited in scope – to amateur activities only. This makes sense; the cited Registrant is "Greater Atlanta Christian Schools". See attachment. Applicant is not an elementary school or a high school or an academic institution, and therefore does not compete with high schools or the cited Registrant that has different purchasing consumers and very different prices for the services (very expensive private school tuitions) and that have registered a team name or mascot "SPARTAN" alongside the UNIVERSITY OF TAMPA SPARTANS and NORFOLK STATE UNIVERSITY SPARTANS and the Staten Island SPARTANS youth lacrosse team. Applicant will not for example be appearing at the same school trade shows, or in the same school trade publications as the cited registrants, and parents paying expensive tuitions are sophisticated purchasers who will be more deliberate about their purchasing decision about where to send their child to school (an important life decision) and are extremely unlikely to make a mistake in their purchasing decision as to the source of the Registrant's services that offer amateur team programs under a mascot name, or to believe that Applicant is related to such expensive private school.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Examining Attorney should withdraw the refusals based on likelihood of confusion. Any mere possibility that relevant purchasers might relate the two different marks does not meet the statutorily established test of likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re Hughes Aircraft Company, 222 U.S.P.Q. 263, 264 (TTAB 1984) ("the Trademark Act does

not preclude registration of a mark where there is a possibility of confusion as to source or origin, only where such confusion is likely").

Based on all of the foregoing, no likelihood of confusion with the prior cited registrations exists. With the co-existence of the cited US registrations for "SPARTAN" marks both in Class 41 without any risk of confusion between them, there is room for Applicant's mark - with a distinctive and unique visual element of a helmet logo - to likewise co-exist. Accordingly, This Application requires no further attention. Applicant respectfully requests that the application proceed to publication in the *Official Gazette*. Any party that feels it would be damaged by the Application has a full and fair opportunity to file an opposition.

Applicant requests suspension of its Application pending final disposition of any priorfiled cited applications.

Mitted States of America United States Patent and Trademark Office

THE UNIVERSITY OF TAMPA **SPARTANS**

Reg. No. 4,894,627

Registered Feb. 2, 2016 TAMPA, FL 336061490

Int. Cls.: 25 and 41

TRADEMARK

SERVICE MARK

PRINCIPAL REGISTER

THE UNIVERSITY OF TAMPA, INCORPORATED (FLORIDA NON-PROFIT CORPORATION) 401 WEST KENNEDY BLVD.

FOR: APPAREL, NAMELY, SHIRTS, PANTS, JACKETS, COATS, SHORTS, HATS AND CAPS, ATHLETIC UNIFORMS; FLEECE PULLOVERS, LOUNGEWEAR, PAJAMAS, SOCKS, SWEAT PANTS, SWEAT SHIRTS; CHILDREN'S AND INFANT'S APPAREL, NAMELY, JUMPERS, CHEERLEADER OUTFITS, OVERALL SLEEPWEAR, PAJAMAS, ROMPERS AND ONE-PIECE GARMENTS, IN CLASS 25 (U.S. CLS. 22 AND 39).

FIRST USE 12-0-1931; IN COMMERCE 12-0-1931.

FOR: EDUCATING AT UNIVERSITY OR COLLEGES; EDUCATION SERVICES IN THE NATURE OF LECTURES, SEMINARS, CONFERENCES, COURSES OF INSTRUCTION, WORKSHOPS, SYMPOSIA AT THE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LEVEL, AND DISTRIBU-TION OF COURSE MATERIAL IN CONNECTION THEREWITH; ENTERTAINMENT SER-VICES, NAMELY, ARRANGING AND CONDUCTING ATHLETIC AND SPORTS EVENTS AND COMPETITIONS, PUBLIC SPEAKING EVENTS AND VISUAL, LITERARY AND PERFORMING ARTS PRESENTATIONS; PROVIDING FACILITIES FOR RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS; EDUCATIONAL AND ENTERTAINMENT SERVICES, NAMELY, PROVIDING EDUCATIONAL SPEAKERS AND LECTURERS, LIVE CONCERTS, FINE ART EXHIBITIONS, DRAMATIC THEATER PRODUCTIONS, LIVE PERFORMANCES BY MUSICAL GROUPS, VISUAL, LITERARY AND PERFORMING ARTS PRESENTATIONS, AND LIVE DANCE PERFORMANCES; PUBLISHING OF BOOKS, JOURNALS, MAGAZINES, AND SCIENTIFIC PAPERS, IN CLASS 41 (U.S. CLS. 100, 101 AND 107).



FIRST USE 12-0-1931; IN COMMERCE 12-0-1931.

THE MARK CONSISTS OF STANDARD CHARACTERS WITHOUT CLAIM TO ANY PAR-TICULAR FONT, STYLE, SIZE, OR COLOR.

NO CLAIM IS MADE TO THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO USE "UNIVERSITY", APART FROM THE MARK AS SHOWN.

SEC. 2(F) AS TO "TAMPA".

SER. NO. 86-611,382, FILED 4-27-2015.

Michelle K. Zen

Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office

$Reg.\ No.\ 4,\!894,\!627\ \hbox{Christopher Law, examining attorney}$

Int. Cls.: 20, 25 and 41

Prior U.S. Cls.: 2, 13, 22, 25, 32, 39, 50, 100, 101 and

107

United States Patent and Trademark Office

Reg. No. 2,593,846 Registered July 16, 2002

TRADEMARK SERVICE MARK PRINCIPAL REGISTER



NORFOLK STATE UNIVERSITY (VIRGINIA STATE AGENCY) 700 PARK AVENUE NORFOLK, VA 235048004

FOR: SEAT CUSHIONS, IN CLASS 20 (U.S. CLS. 2, 13, 22, 25, 32 AND 50).

FIRST USE 9-1-1999; IN COMMERCE 9-1-1999.

FOR: CLOTHING, NAMELY, MEN'S, WOMEN'S AND CHILDREN'S SHIRTS, SWEAT SUITS, HATS, JACKETS, T-SHIRTS, SHORTS, GOLF SHIRTS, PANTS, TANK TOPS, SWEATERS, SOCKS AND WOMEN'S BLOUSES, SKIRTS AND DRESSES, IN CLASS 25 (U.S. CLS. 22 AND 39).

FIRST USE 9-1-1999; IN COMMERCE 9-1-1999.

FOR: EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, NAMELY, PROVIDING COURSES, SEMINARS, CLASSES AND WORKSHOPS AT THE COLLEGE LEVEL; SPORTING ACTIVITIES IN THE NATURE OF CONDUCTING ATHLETIC COMPETITIONS AND EXHIBITIONS AND ENTERTAINMENT SERVICES, NAMELY, MUSICALS, THEATRICALS AND DANCE PERFORMANCES, IN CLASS 41 (U.S. CLS. 100, 101 AND 107).

FIRST USE 9-1-1999; IN COMMERCE 9-1-1999.

NO CLAIM IS MADE TO THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO USE "NORFOLK STATE UNIVERSITY", APART FROM THE MARK AS SHOWN.

SER. NO. 76-129,123, FILED 9-14-2000.

ANNE FARRELL, EXAMINING ATTORNEY

Anited States of America United States Patent and Trademark Office



Reg. No. 4,935,823

STATEN ISLAND LACROSSE SPARTANS (NEW YORK CORPORATION)

47 HAWLEY AVENUE Registered Apr. 12, 2016 STATEN ISLAND, NY 10312

Int. Cl.: 41

SERVICE MARK

PRINCIPAL REGISTER

FOR: ENTERTAINMENT IN THE NATURE OF YOUTH LACROSSE GAMES; OPERATION OF SPORTS CAMPS; ORGANIZING AND CONDUCTING ATHLETIC COMPETITIONS AND GAMES IN THE FIELD OF YOUTH LACROSSE; ORGANIZING SPORTING EVENTS, NAMELY, YOUTH LACROSSE ACTIVITIES; ORGANIZING, ARRANGING, AND CONDUCT-ING YOUTH LACROSSE EVENTS: ORGANIZING, CONDUCTING AND OPERATING YOUTH LACROSSE TOURNAMENTS; SPORTS TRAINING SERVICES IN THE FIELD OF YOUTH LACROSSE, IN CLASS 41 (U.S. CLS. 100, 101 AND 107).

FIRST USE 10-7-2007; IN COMMERCE 12-15-2014.

THE MARK CONSISTS OF TWO CONCENTRIC CIRCLES, THE OUTER CIRCLE IS GREY WITH A BLACK OUTLINE AND SEVERAL CRACKS ON THE RIGHT SIDE EDGE. THE INNER CIRCLE IS SHADED IN BLUE WITH TWO BLACK SCRATCHES, ONE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE CIRCLE. IN THE CENTER OF THE CIRCLES IS AN IMAGE OF A HEAD OF A SPARTAN SOLDIER WITH HIS ARMOR ON. HIS FACE IS WHITE WITH BLACK OUT-LINES AROUND THE EYES, A BLACK BEARD AND BLACK TEETH OUTLINES. THE ARMOR HELMET IS OUTLINED IN BLACK, THE RIGHT SIDE IS WHITE; INSIDE THE OUTLINE AND THE LEFT SIDE IS SHADED IN GREY. THERE ARE SEVERAL CRACKS ON THE HELMET, ON THE RIGHT SIDE NEXT TO THE EYE AND TWO ON THE LEFT SIDE, ONE ABOVE THE EYE AND THE SECOND ONE NEXT TO THE MOUTH. THERE IS A BLACK SHADED SCAR LINE EXTENDING ON EITHER SIDE OF THE EYE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE IMAGE. THE HEADPIECE HAS A BLUE FEATHER ON THE TOP, OUTLINED IN BLACK. THERE ARE TWO SWORDS, CROSSED ON TOP OF EACH OTHER BEHIND THE IMAGE OF THE SOLDIER. THE SWORDS ARE OUTLINED IN BLACK THEY HAVE BLUE HAND PIECES WITH BLACK ENDS AND WHITE INSIDE OF THE EDGE. THE SWORDS EXTEND PAST THE EDGES OF THE TWO CIRCLES. BELOW THE IMAGE IS THE PHRASE "SPARTANS" IN CAPITAL LETTERS, WITH BLACK OUTLINES, EDGES AND SCRATCH MARKS, SHADED IN GREY. BOTH OF THE LETTERS "S" ARE SLIGHTLY BIGGER THAN THE OTHER LETTERS AND EXTEND DOWNWARDS MORE THAN THE REST.



Michelle K. Zen


Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office

THE COLOR(S) BLUE, GREY, BLACK AND WHITE IS/ARE CLAIMED AS A FEATURE OF THE MARK.


Reg. No. 4,935,823 SER. NO. 86-679,953, FILED 7-1-2015.


KAPIL BHANOT, EXAMINING ATTORNEY

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HAPPENING AROUND CAMPUS





SPARTANS AROUND THE WORLD



In the News



USING ART FOR IMPACT: THE MEMORY PROJECT

2/7/2019

GAC students in Meredith Baker's enrichment class have taken on a special project this semester. They have engaged with the Memory Project, a charitable nonprofit organization that invites art



FORMER FOOTBALL PLAYERS VISIT GAC TO DELIVER IMPORTANT MESSAGE AMIDST SUPER BOWL HYPE

2/5/2019

Did you know that students who start drinking before the age of 15 are five times more likely to develop an alcohol



have faced substantial challenges, such as violence, war, extreme poverty, neglect, and loss of parents.

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urging them to take a pledge of alcohol and drug abstinence.

Read More



Senior Jack Jacquet is a Gwinnett Daily Post Super Six Athlete for soccer! A remarkably talented player, he had 11 goals and 13 assists last season and was

