U.S. patent number 11,366,896 [Application Number 16/717,045] was granted by the patent office on 2022-06-21 for system and method for detecting anomalous events based on a dump of a software process.
This patent grant is currently assigned to AO KASPERSKY LAB. The grantee listed for this patent is AO Kaspersky Lab. Invention is credited to Maxim Y. Golovkin, Alexey V. Monastyrsky, Mikhail A. Pavlyushchik, Alexey M. Romanenko.
United States Patent |
11,366,896 |
Monastyrsky , et
al. |
June 21, 2022 |
System and method for detecting anomalous events based on a dump of
a software process
Abstract
A system and method is provided for detecting anomalous events
based on a dump of an address space of a software process in a
memory of a computing device. An exemplary method includes
detecting at least one event occurring in an operating system of
the computing device during an execution of the software process,
determining a context of the detected event, wherein the context
comprises a dump of an address space of the software process
containing code that was being executed at the moment of occurrence
of the detected event, selecting a set of features of the dump for
use in determining whether or not the event is anomalous,
transforming the selected set of features of the dump into a
convolution, determining a popularity of the convolution by polling
a database, and determining that the detected event is an anomalous
event if the determined popularity is below a threshold value.
Inventors: |
Monastyrsky; Alexey V. (Moscow,
RU), Pavlyushchik; Mikhail A. (Moscow, RU),
Romanenko; Alexey M. (Moscow, RU), Golovkin; Maxim
Y. (Moscow, RU) |
Applicant: |
Name |
City |
State |
Country |
Type |
AO Kaspersky Lab |
Moscow |
N/A |
RU |
|
|
Assignee: |
AO KASPERSKY LAB (Moscow,
RU)
|
Family
ID: |
1000006384579 |
Appl.
No.: |
16/717,045 |
Filed: |
December 17, 2019 |
Prior Publication Data
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Document
Identifier |
Publication Date |
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US 20200125726 A1 |
Apr 23, 2020 |
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Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
Issue Date |
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16015654 |
Jun 22, 2018 |
10558801 |
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15720334 |
Sep 29, 2017 |
10489586 |
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Foreign Application Priority Data
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Jun 16, 2017 [RU] |
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RU2017121120 |
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Current U.S.
Class: |
1/1 |
Current CPC
Class: |
G06F
21/52 (20130101); G06F 21/563 (20130101); G06F
21/54 (20130101); G06F 21/554 (20130101); G06F
21/56 (20130101); H04L 63/1408 (20130101); H04W
12/128 (20210101); H04L 63/1441 (20130101); G06F
21/561 (20130101); G06F 2221/033 (20130101); G06F
2221/034 (20130101); H04L 63/145 (20130101) |
Current International
Class: |
G06F
21/55 (20130101); G06F 21/52 (20130101); G06F
21/54 (20130101); H04L 9/40 (20220101); H04W
12/128 (20210101); G06F 21/56 (20130101) |
Field of
Search: |
;726/6 |
References Cited
[Referenced By]
U.S. Patent Documents
Primary Examiner: Brown; Anthony D
Attorney, Agent or Firm: ArentFox Schiff LLP Fainberg;
Michael
Parent Case Text
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser.
No. 16/015,654, filed on Jun. 22, 2018, which is a continuation of
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/720,334, filed on Sep. 29,
2017, which claims the benefit of priority under 35 U.S.C.
119(a)-(d) to a Russian Application No. 2017121120, filed on Jun.
16, 2017, all of which are incorporated by reference herein in
their entirety.
Claims
What is claimed:
1. A method for detecting anomalous events based on a dump of an
address space of a software process in a memory of a computing
device, comprising: detecting, by a hardware processor of the
computing device, at least one event occurring in an operating
system of the computing device during an execution of the software
process, the at least one event comprising a manifestation of a
condition of the operating system, a service or a network;
determining, by the hardware processor, a context of the detected
at least one event, wherein the context comprises a dump of an
address space of the software process containing code that was
being executed at the moment of occurrence of the detected at least
one event; selecting, by the hardware processor, a set of features
of the dump for use in determining whether or not the at least one
event is anomalous; transforming, by the hardware processor, the
selected set of features of the dump into a convolution
representation; determining, by the hardware processor, a
popularity of the convolution representation by polling a database,
wherein the popularity is determined based at least on a number of
client devices on which the convolution representation is being
currently evaluated; and determining, by the hardware processor,
that the detected at least one event is an anomalous event if the
determined popularity is below a threshold value.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the determination of the
popularity is performed within one of: a predetermined subnetwork
and all accessible subnetworks.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the set of selected features
comprises a feature for indicating a presence of at least one
indirect call.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the set of selected features
comprises a feature for indicating a presence of a position
independent executable software program code.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the set of selected features
comprises a feature for indicating a presence of a self-modifying
executable software program code.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the database contains data
relating to a frequency of a plurality of detected events occurring
in a plurality of client devices.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the database contains data
relating to the number of client devices on which the convolution
representation is being currently evaluated to determine the
popularity of the string or vector representation in the
database.
8. A system for detecting anomalous events based on a dump of an
address space of a software process in a memory of a computing
device, the system comprising: a hardware processor of the
computing device configured to: detect at least one event occurring
in an operating system of the computing device during an execution
of the software process, the at least one event comprising a
manifestation of a condition of the operating system, a service or
a network; determine a context of the detected at least one event,
wherein the context comprises a dump of an address space of the
software process containing code that was being executed at the
moment of occurrence of the detected at least one event; select a
set of features of the dump for use in determining whether or not
the at least one event is anomalous; transform the selected set of
features of the dump into a convolution representation; determine a
popularity of the convolution representation by polling a database,
wherein the popularity is determined based at least on a number of
client devices on which the convolution representation is being
currently evaluated; and determine that the detected at least one
event is an anomalous event if the determined popularity is below a
threshold value.
9. The system of claim 8, wherein the determination of the
popularity is performed within one of: a predetermined subnetwork
and all accessible subnetworks.
10. The system of claim 8, wherein the set of selected features
comprises a feature for indicating a presence of at least one
indirect call.
11. The system of claim 8, wherein the set of selected features
comprises a feature for indicating a presence of a position
independent executable software program code.
12. The system of claim 8, wherein the set of selected features
comprises a feature for indicating a presence of a self-modifying
executable software program code.
13. The system of claim 8, wherein the database contains data
relating to a frequency of a plurality of detected events occurring
in a plurality of client devices.
14. The system of claim 8, wherein the database contains data
relating to the number of client devices on which the convolution
representation is being currently evaluated to determine the
popularity of the string or vector representation in the
database.
15. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing thereon
instructions, when executed by a processor perform a method for
detecting anomalous events based on a dump of an address space of a
software process in a memory of a computing device, the
instructions comprising instructions for: detecting at least one
event occurring in an operating system of the computing device
during an execution of the software process, the at least one event
comprising a manifestation of a condition of the operating system,
a service or a network; determining a context of the detected at
least one event, wherein the context comprises a dump of an address
space of the software process containing code that was being
executed at the moment of occurrence of the detected at least one
event; selecting a set of features of the dump for use in
determining whether or not the at least one event is anomalous;
transforming the selected set of features of the dump into a
convolution representation; determining a popularity of the
convolution representation by polling a database, wherein the
popularity is determined based at least on a number of client
devices on which the convolution representation is being currently
evaluated; and determining that the detected at least one event is
an anomalous event if the determined popularity is below a
threshold value.
16. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15,
wherein the determination of the popularity is performed within one
of: a predetermined subnetwork and all accessible subnetworks.
17. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15,
wherein the set of selected features comprises a feature for
indicating a presence of at least one indirect call.
18. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15,
wherein the set of selected features comprises a feature for
indicating a presence of a position independent executable software
program code.
19. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15,
wherein the set of selected features comprises a feature for
indicating a presence of a self-modifying executable software
program code.
20. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15,
wherein the database contains data relating to a frequency of a
plurality of detected events occurring in a plurality of client
devices.
21. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15,
wherein the database contains data relating to the number of client
devices on which the convolution representation is being currently
evaluated to determine the popularity of the string or vector
representation in the database.
Description
FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY
The present disclosure relates generally to the field of computer
security and, more particularly, to a system and method for
detecting anomalous events based on a dump of an address space of a
software process in a memory of a computing device.
BACKGROUND
With the current widespread use and variation of software
applications in today's technology world, one of the most
widespread methods of penetrating computer devices with malicious
software involves the exploitation of vulnerabilities present in
the software installed on the particular device.
To prevent the exploitation of vulnerabilities, companies and/or
individuals will use both passive methods in the form of
eliminating the vulnerabilities themselves and active methods in
the form of detecting the actual exploiting of vulnerabilities.
Passive methods are used for already known vulnerabilities, whereas
active methods are used for both known and unknown
vulnerabilities.
Existing detection technologies are in fact capable of detecting
the actual exploiting of a vulnerability with the use of known
techniques and mechanisms, but unfortunately these methods are not
able to detect and prevent new techniques of exploitation of
vulnerabilities that employ new principles and mechanisms of
exploitation. For example, in order to make the execution of
shellcodes (i.e., a small piece of code used as the payload in the
exploitation of a software vulnerability) impossible, technologies
have been developed that prevent execution in the stack, but in
their place techniques of return-oriented programming have
appeared. In general, return-oriented programming are computer
security exploit techniques that allows an attacker to execute code
in the presence of security defenses such as non-executable memory
and code signing.
The existing defensive technologies have proven to be powerless
against return-oriented programming. Thus, new solutions, for
example, as described in U.S. Patent Publication No. 2016/0196428,
have been developed to protect against these attacks. In view of
these new solutions, there remains a need to detect a deviation in
the functioning of a computer system from normal operation, which
might indicate that the system has been attacked by a technique of
exploiting a vulnerability in the software. The solving of this
problem would make it possible to move away from the techniques of
exploitation of vulnerabilities themselves, which are changing and
improving, to focus on external symptoms of an attack, which remain
the same when the techniques change.
SUMMARY
Accordingly, as disclosed herein, exemplary systems and methods are
provided to detect anomalous events occurring in an operating
system of a computing device. In particular, the disclosed systems
and methods provide for detecting anomalous events based on a dump
of an address space of a software process in a memory of a
computing device.
Thus, in one aspect, a method is provided for detecting anomalous
events based on a dump of an address space of a software process in
a memory of a computing device. In this aspect, the method
includes, by a hardware processor of the computing device,
detecting at least one event occurring in an operating system of
the computing device during an execution of the software process,
determining a context of the detected at least one event, wherein
the context comprises a dump of an address space of the software
process containing code that was being executed at the moment of
occurrence of the detected at least one event, selecting a set of
features of the dump for use in determining whether or not the at
least one event is anomalous, transforming the selected set of
features of the dump into a convolution, determining a popularity
of the convolution by polling a database, and determining that the
detected at least one event is an anomalous event if the determined
popularity is below a threshold value.
In one aspect, the determination of the popularity is performed
within one of: a predetermined subnetwork and all accessible
subnetworks.
In one aspect, the set of selected features comprises a feature for
indicating a presence of at least one indirect call.
In one aspect, the set of selected features comprises a feature for
indicating a presence of a position independent executable software
program code.
In one aspect, the set of selected features comprises a feature for
indicating a presence of a self-modifying executable software
program code.
In one aspect, the database contains data relating to a frequency
of a plurality of detected events occurring in a plurality of
client devices.
In one aspect, the database contains data relating to a number of
client devices on which the convolution representation is being
currently evaluated to determine the popularity of the string or
vector representation in the database.
In another aspect a system is disclosed for detecting anomalous
events based on a dump of an address space of a software process in
a memory of a computing device, the system comprising: a hardware
processor of the computing device configured to: detect at least
one event occurring in an operating system of the computing device
during an execution of the software process, determine a context of
the detected at least one event, wherein the context comprises a
dump of an address space of the software process containing code
that was being executed at the moment of occurrence of the detected
at least one event, select a set of features of the dump for use in
determining whether or not the at least one event is anomalous,
transform the selected set of features of the dump into a
convolution, determine a popularity of the convolution by polling a
database, and determine that the detected at least one event is an
anomalous event if the determined popularity is below a threshold
value.
In another aspect, a non-transitory computer readable medium is
provided for storing thereon instructions, when executed by a
processor perform a method for detecting anomalous events based on
a dump of an address space of a software process in a memory of a
computing device, the instructions comprising instructions for:
detecting at least one event occurring in an operating system of
the computing device during an execution of the software process,
determining a context of the detected at least one event, wherein
the context comprises a dump of an address space of the software
process containing code that was being executed at the moment of
occurrence of the detected at least one event, selecting a set of
features of the dump for use in determining whether or not the at
least one event is anomalous, transforming the selected set of
features of the dump into a convolution, determining a popularity
of the convolution by polling a database, and determining that the
detected at least one event is an anomalous event if the determined
popularity is below a threshold value.
The above simplified summary of example aspects serves to provide a
basic understanding of the present disclosure. This summary is not
an extensive overview of all contemplated aspects, and is intended
to neither identify key or critical elements of all aspects nor
delineate the scope of any or all aspects of the present
disclosure. Its sole purpose is to present one or more aspects in a
simplified form as a prelude to the more detailed description of
the disclosure that follows. To the accomplishment of the
foregoing, the one or more aspects of the present disclosure
include the features described and exemplary pointed out in the
claims.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated into and
constitute a part of this specification, illustrate one or more
example aspects of the present disclosure and, together with the
detailed description, serve to explain their principles and
implementations.
FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of a system of monitoring the
execution of software installed on a client according to an
exemplary aspect.
FIG. 2 illustrates a flowchart for method of detecting anomalous
events based on an evaluation of the popularity of convolutions of
events according to an exemplary aspect.
FIG. 3 illustrates a flowchart for a method of forming a set of
convolutions of safe events according to an exemplary aspect.
FIG. 4 illustrates a flowchart for a method of detecting an
anomalous event based on a set of convolutions of safe events
according to an exemplary aspect.
FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a general-purpose computer system
(which may be a personal computer or a server) on which the
disclosed systems and method can be implemented according to an
example aspect.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Various aspects are now described with reference to the drawings,
wherein like reference numerals are used to refer to like elements
throughout. In the following description, for purposes of
explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to
promote a thorough understanding of one or more aspects. It may be
evident in some or all instances, however, that any aspect
described below can be practiced without adopting the specific
design details described below. In other instances, well-known
structures and devices are shown in block diagram form in order to
facilitate description of one or more aspects. The following
presents a simplified summary of one or more aspects in order to
provide a basic understanding of the aspects. This summary is not
an extensive overview of all contemplated aspects, and is not
intended to identify key or critical elements of all aspects nor
delineate the scope of any or all aspects.
As described herein, a "module" (or program module) can be
considered a program object containing code that expands the
functionality of a process that has been initiated, such as an
operating system kernel module, or a dynamic library.
As described herein, "convolution" can be considered, for example,
an intelligent hash where features of an event are convoluted into
a string or also a vector where the features of an event are
convoluted into coordinates and the like. In general, it is any
object into which the features of an event (hereafter, "features")
can be convolved for carrying out mathematical and logic operations
on them. For example, the convolving of features is an arbitrary
transformation of features into a string representation, a vector
representation, or a combination of these.
An "event" as described herein can be an identified manifestation
of a certain condition of an operating system, a service or a
network. Information about the event may be contained in a software
message, for example, from the operating system (or a portion
thereof), indicating what has taken place. In other words, events
from the operating system include anything "outside" of the program
that can affect how the program behaves. It should be appreciated
that such events can occur at any time while the program is
running, in almost any order. Moreover, according to the exemplary
aspect, there can usually be many kinds and types of events in the
system, for example, the launching of processes; the loading of
modules; file operations; registry operations; and the like.
Moreover, in an exemplary aspect, the context of an event is the
totality of states of the operating system at the moment of
occurrence of the events which directly affect its occurrence.
Examples of context content will be indicated below.
In addition, in general, an "anomalous" event is an identified
manifestation of a certain condition of an operating system, a
service or a network indicating the occurrence of a previously
unknown situation. In a particular instance, an anomalous event is
a secure event--an identified manifestation of a certain condition
of a system, a service or a network indicating a possible violation
of the information security policy or a failure of defensive
measures, or the occurrence of a previously unknown state which may
have a relation to security.
FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of a system of monitoring the
execution of software installed on a client according to an
exemplary aspect. As shown, a software agent 110 (i.e., an "agent")
is installed on the side of the client 100. Also in the operating
system of the client 100, one or more interceptors 120, connected
to the agent 110, can be installed. In a particular aspect, event
tracing for windows ("ETW") 120a, as known to those skilled in the
art, can be used as the interceptors. The interceptors 120 are
provided is to detect events occurring in the operating system and
communicate this detection to the agent 110, for example, by
sending a notification directly to the agent 110, and/or by an
entry in the events log (not indicated in FIG. 1, but stored in the
local database 160) to which the agent 110 has access.
Moreover, the agent 110 may receive notifications either on all
possible events in the system which can be detected by the
interceptors 120 or only on one kind of events of interest (such as
only the launching of processes). The agent 110 can include a
collection module 130 that is used after the agent registers an
event of interest detected by the interceptors 120. The collection
module 130 obtains the context of the event registered. In a
particular instance, the context of the event includes the call
stack preceding the occurrence of the event and the dump of the
memory section containing the code that was being executed at the
moment of occurrence of the event. Using the call stack, one or
more of the following can be obtained: at least a list of
procedures and functions being executed at the given moment of
time, the list of modules containing those procedures and
functions, and also the types and values of all parameters being
transferred to the modules, for example, upon calling of functions
exported by a module. In addition, the context may include
information on jumps from at least the Last Branch Record ("LBR")
and the Branch Trace Store ("BTS") (as described in Intel.RTM.
Microarchitecture Codename Nehalem Performance Monitoring Unit
Programming Guide, the contents of which are incorporated herein by
reference)--memory buffers and registers. In this aspect, the LBR
and BTS contain information on the program execution, i.e., the
addresses of jumps, execution branches, and the like (otherwise
preserving the given traces). In a particular aspect, the
interceptors 120 upon detecting an event preserve its context,
which will then be obtained by the collection module 130 of the
agent 110 (for example, transferred to the collection module 130 or
requested by the collection module 130) and in such cases the
collection module 130 has no need to independently receive the
entire required context or a certain portion of it.
According to an exemplary aspect, one or both of the client 110 and
the server 200 can further include a convolution formation module
140. In this aspect, the context obtained by the collection module
130 is sent to the convolution formation module 140. In one
instance, this may be sent to the convolution formation module 140
present at the client 100, in another instance it may be sent to
the server 200. The convolution formation module 140 extracts from
the received context the features (examples of features will be
described below) and forms/generates a convolution. Likewise, the
convolution formation module 140 transforms the context of the
event (see below). As stated, convolution according to the
exemplary aspect is taken in its broadest meaning, not only for a
particular hash (where the features are convolved into a string)
but also a vector (where the features are convolved into
coordinates) and others--in other words, any object into which the
features of an event may be convolved in order to carry out
mathematical and logic operations on them. The forming of the
convolutions of events for any given algorithms may be used in
which, for example, hashes for files are formed from the obtained
features, for example, as described in Russian Patent Publication
No. RU 2,580,036, or vectors can be formed for files, for example,
as described in Russian Patent Publication No. RU 2,614,557, or
HTML pages. The contents of Russian Patent Publication Nos. RU
2,580,036 and RU 2,614,557 are hereby incorporated by reference in
their entirety.
Furthermore, according to an exemplary aspect, a comparison module
150 may be located either at the server 200 and/or at the client
110. This comparison module 150 is configured to determine the
popularity of the resulting convolution of the event and to compare
the resulting convolution with other convolutions, such as
convolutions contained in a set of secure convolutions which is
kept in a local database 160 or a remote database 170, interacting
as well with the server 200. The local database 160 also keeps the
events log and the context of events previously detected,
especially events of loading modules into processes.
The system described above is used for monitoring of the execution
of software installed on clients 100. As a result of such
monitoring, anomalous events are detected in the operating system
which may be the result of an exploitation of a vulnerability of
the software installed on the client 100. It is noted that the term
"client" 100 in the present disclosure is employed in the
client-server paradigm, i.e., it is an element of a computing
architecture, and not a network one. By client 100 is meant in the
present disclosure any computing device in a network which requests
through an agent 110 services which are provided by the interface
of a server 200, and by server 200 is meant any computing device
with which said agent 110 of a client 100 interacts, obtaining
collected data from the agent 110 and sending to it messages and
commands (thereby providing services to the client 100). Next,
methods are described that can be implemented by the disclosed for
monitoring the execution of software installed on clients 100.
FIG. 2 illustrates a flowchart for method of detecting anomalous
events based on an evaluation of the popularity of convolutions of
events according to an exemplary aspect. As shown, in step 210,
there is launched in the operating system at the client 100 side an
agent 110 which registers events occurring in the operating system
of the client 100 during the execution of processes. Next, in step
220, interceptors 120 installed in the operating system of the
client 100, and connected to the agent 110, detect an event
occurring in the operating system and report this to the agent 110,
which in step 230 registers the event occurring, and receives with
the aid of the collection module 130 the context of that event.
According to an exemplary aspect, the context may include, for
example, at least the call stack at the moment of occurrence of the
event, where there is obtained from the call stack at least a list
of procedures and functions being executed at the given moment of
time, a list of modules containing those procedures and functions,
and also the types of data and the values of all parameters being
transferred to the modules. Moreover, the call stack may include,
for example, the dump of the memory section (address space) of the
process containing the code which was being executed at the moment
of occurrence of the event; information on jumps from at least the
LBR and the BTS; and/or a list of modules which were loaded into
the process prior to the occurrence of the event, information on
this being accessible, for example, in the events log kept in the
local database 160.
Having obtained the context, in step 240 the convolution formation
module 140 selects from this the features for formation of the
convolution of the event on the basis of these features. Prior to
selecting the features, in a particular instance, it is necessary
to transform the obtained context. The transformation of a context
is a complex of methods and algorithms aimed at optimizing the
representation and formats of data from the standpoint of the
problems being solved and the goals of the analysis. The
transformation of the context does not set itself the goal of
changing the informational content of the data which includes the
context. The transformation is executed to present the context in
such a form that the data may be used most effectively (an example
of a transformation shall be given below).
According to exemplary aspect, the transformation of data for
performing the convolution can be, for example, quantization;
sorting; merging (pasting); grouping; data set configuration;
tabularization of values; calculable values; data coding;
normalization (scaling).
For example, the call stack (also true of the dump, an example of
which is provided below) is transformed in the following way:
debugging symbols are obtained for the modules participating in the
call stack; the call stack is normalized by the use of the
debugging symbols. Before applying the debugging symbols to the
results of disassembly of the dump:
TABLE-US-00001 .text:00428339 loc_428339: ; CODE XREF:
_wmain+159.uparw.j .text:00428339 mov ecx, [esp+4Ch+var_BC]
.text:0042833D push edi .text:0042833E call sub_404D95
.text:00428343 or [esp+4Ch+var_4], 0FFFFFFFFh .text:00428348 lea
ecx, [esp+4Ch+var_38] .text:0042834C call sub_401274 .text:00428351
.text:00428351 loc_428351: ; CODE XREF: _wmain+51.uparw.j
After applying the debugging symbols:
TABLE-US-00002 .text:00428339 loc_428339: ; CODE XREF:
_wmain+159.uparw.j .text:00428339 mov ecx, [esp+4Ch+_plugsinList] ;
this .text:0042833D push edi ; storage .text:0042833E call
PluginsList::LoadFromStorage(Storage const &) .text:00428343 or
[esp+4Ch+var_4], 0FFFFFFFFh .text:00428348 lea ecx,
[esp+4Ch+var_38] ; this .text:0042834C call
boost::detail::shared_count::~shared_count(void) .text:00428351
.text:00428351 loc_428351: ; CODE XREF: _wmain+51.uparw.j
With the help of disassembly and emulation, a set of features is
obtained for the obtained dump (presence/absence of indirect calls,
position independent code, self-modifying code, and so on). After
the transformation, the features are selected and the convolution
is formed. As indicated, the features used are: the names of the
modules loaded and the sequence of their loading (taken from the
events log), the names of the procedures and functions being
implemented at the given time, the values of the parameters being
transferred to the modules prior to the call for procedures and
functions being exported by these modules (taken from the call
stack), information on jumps (taken from the dump, LBR, BTS), the
presence/absence of indirect calls, position independent code,
self-modifying code (dump). The convolution may be formed by any
method known from the prior art. The transformation of the context,
as well as the formation of the convolution, may be done either at
the client 100 side or at the server 200 side (this is true of all
methods carried out by the system of monitoring of the execution of
software), for the performance of these operations at the server
200 side the context (for the transformation) and the features (for
the formation of the convolution) are first sent to the server 200
by the client 100. In step 250 the popularity of the convolution of
the event at the given moment of time is determined. According to
the exemplary aspect, the popularity is determined by polling a
database (local database 160 or remote database 170).
Moreover, according to an exemplary aspect, the popularity is
considered, as computed by a particular method either the total
number of detections of events at the current moment of time whose
convolution popularity is being determined; and/or the number of
clients 100 on which the given event whose convolution popularity
is being determined has been detected at the current moment of
time, regardless of the number of detections on the client. In
other words, the popularity is being considered for the frequency
of a plurality of detected events that correspond to the detected
event of the client device 100 to determine how often the event is
occurring in the set of the plurality of devices, for example. It
should be appreciated that the current moment of time can be
considered a certain point of time and over a given period of time
(e.g., 1 microsecond, 1 second or the like, for example).
The popularity may also be global (within all accessible
subnetworks) or local (popularity only within a certain
subnetwork), for example, within that subnetwork in which the
investigated event was detected. Thus, the databases 160 and 170
which are accessed in order to determine the popularity of the
convolution of an event save a particular number, which in a
particular instance is calculated by the server 200. In step 260,
the event detected on the client 100 is judged to be anomalous if
the popularity of the convolution of the detected event at the
current moment of time is below a threshold value. This
determination can be performed by the agent on the client device
100 (e.g., comparison module 150) and/or the comparison module 150
on the server 200, for example. If the popularity is greater than
the threshold as determined at step 260, the event is determined to
be secure at step 270. Otherwise, if the popularity is less than
the threshold, the event is deemed anomalous at step 280.
Appropriate action may be taken by the client 100 based on the
determination of whether the detected event is anomalous as further
described herein.
According to an exemplary aspect, there may be several techniques
used to determine whether the detected event is anomalous. For
example, the detected event can be determine to be anomalous if,
for example, the local popularity of the convolution of the event
is below a threshold value; the global popularity of the
convolution of the event is below a threshold value; and/or the
local and global popularity of the convolution of the event is
below a threshold value.
The threshold values for the global popularity of the convolution
of the event and the popularity in the subnetwork (local) are
assigned independently. The events judged as being anomalous will
be further investigated later on and if necessary they will be
blocked on the clients 100 by the agent 110. For example, if the
detected events are determined to be anomalous, the client device
100 (and/or agent 110) can be configured to perform a remediation
action, such as, for example, deleting the software process that
performed the anomalous event(s), quarantining that software
process and/or alerting a user of the client device 110 that the
software process may be malicious.
The system for monitoring the execution of software is also used to
form the convolutions of secure events (consequently, this system
may be used to obtain the convolution of any given event) and a set
of convolutions of secure events. The set may already exist and
then it is merely supplemented when carrying out the method, or it
may also be absent and be created in the process of carrying out
the method and will start to be filled up.
FIG. 3 illustrates a flowchart for a method of forming a set of
convolutions of safe events according to an exemplary aspect. As
used herein, "secure events" can be considered "safe" events whose
occurrence is not the result of an exploitation of a vulnerability
or the execution of a malicious software. In step 300, there is
launched in the operating system on the side of at least one client
100 known to be secure (a secure client is a client not containing
malicious software and not able to be attacked in the process of
implementing the method by the exploitation of a vulnerability), an
agent 110 (e.g., a first software agent) that registers events of
at least one kind that occur in the operating system of the client
100, where the kinds of events may be one or more of: launching of
processes; loading of modules; file operations; registry
operations; and the like.
In step 310, the interceptors 120 installed in the operating system
of the client 100, and connected to the agent 110, detect an event
occurring in the operating system. Next, at step 320, the agent 110
registers the event occurring and obtains by the collection module
130 of the agent 110 the context of that event, one possible makeup
of the context having been presented above. From the context, in
step 330, the convolution formation module 140 selects the features
and on the basis of the features selected it forms the convolution
of the event, then adds the convolution of the event to the set of
convolutions of secure events at step 340. In a particular
instance, steps 330 to 340 are executed on the server 200 (for
which the context obtained from the clients 100 in step 320 is
relayed to the server in "raw" or already transformed form), and
the set of convolutions of secure events is kept in the remote
database 170 and may afterwards be loaded onto any given client
100, or the client 100 may organize a polling of the database 170,
without loading the entire set into the local database 160.
The sets of convolutions of secure events are used to detect
anomalous events on clients 100. The set itself may be stored
either locally in the database 160 or remotely in the remote
database 170, which may be accessed by the client 100.
FIG. 4 illustrates a flowchart for a method of detecting an
anomalous event based on a set of convolutions of safe events
according to an exemplary aspect. Likewise, as in all other
methods, in step 400 there is launched in the operating system at
the client 100 side another agent 110 (e.g., a second software
agent) that registers events occurring in the operating system of
the client 100, in step 410 the interceptors 120 installed in the
operating system and connected to the agent 110 detect the event
which has occurred in the operating system. For example, in the
exemplary aspect, these new events can be considered "unclassified"
as they have not yet determined whether to be anomalous or
safe/secure. Next at step 420, the agent 110 registers the
unclassified event occurring and obtains the context of that event,
one possible makeup of the context having been presented above.
From the context, in step 430, the features are selected and on the
basis of the features selected the convolution of the unclassified
event is formed. The obtained convolution of the unclassified event
is compared in step 440 with the group of previously formed
convolutions of secure/safe events from the set formed by the
method described above. Next, at step 450, the unclassified event
is judged to be anomalous if, upon comparison, the formed
convolution of the detected event does not match up with any
convolution of an event from the group of convolutions of events
from the indicated set of secure/safe events. Otherwise, the
unclassified event is deemed secure as shown at step 460, for
example. In one aspect, if the unclassified event is determined to
be anomalous, the software process associated with the unclassified
event can be deleted or quarantined from the client device.
In general, in the present disclosure, by agent 110, interceptors
120, collection module 130, convolution formation module 140, and
comparison module 150 can be implemented using, for example, real
devices, systems, components, a group of components realized with
the use of hardware, such as integrated microcircuits
(application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)) or
field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA)) or, for example, in the form
of a combination of software and hardware, such as a microprocessor
system and set of program instructions, and also on neurosynaptic
chips. The functionality of the agent 110, the interceptors 120,
the collection module 130, the convolution formation module 140,
and the comparison module 150 may be realized exclusively by
hardware, and also in the form of a combination, where some of the
functionality is realized by software, and some by hardware. In
some variant aspects, a portion of the agent 110, the interceptors
120, the collection module 130, the convolution formation module
140, and the comparison module 150 may be implemented on the
processor of a general-purpose computer (such as that shown in FIG.
5 and described below), which also applies to both the client 100
and the server 200.
Specifically, FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a general-purpose
computer system (which may be a personal computer or a server) on
which the disclosed systems and method can be implemented according
to an example aspect. As shown, the computer system 20 includes a
central processing unit 21, a system memory 22 and a system bus 23
connecting the various system components, including the memory
associated with the central processing unit 21. The system bus 23
is realized like any bus structure known from the prior art,
including in turn a bus memory or bus memory controller, a
peripheral bus and a local bus, which is able to interact with any
other bus architecture. The system memory includes read only memory
(ROM) 24 and random-access memory (RAM) 25. The basic input/output
system (BIOS) 26 includes the basic procedures ensuring the
transfer of information between elements of the personal computer
20, such as those at the time of loading the operating system with
the use of the ROM 24.
The personal computer 20, in turn, includes a hard disk 27 for
reading and writing of data, a magnetic disk drive 28 for reading
and writing on removable magnetic disks 29 and an optical drive 30
for reading and writing on removable optical disks 31, such as
CD-ROM, DVD-ROM and other optical information media. The hard disk
27, the magnetic disk drive 28, and the optical drive 30 are
connected to the system bus 23 across the hard disk interface 32,
the magnetic disk interface 33 and the optical drive interface 34,
respectively. The drives and the corresponding computer information
media are power-independent modules for storage of computer
instructions, data structures, program modules and other data of
the personal computer 20.
The present disclosure provides the implementation of a system that
uses a hard disk 27, a removable magnetic disk 29 and a removable
optical disk 31, but it should be understood that it is possible to
employ other types of computer information media 56 which are able
to store data in a form readable by a computer (solid state drives,
flash memory cards, digital disks, random-access memory (RAM) and
so on), which are connected to the system bus 23 via the controller
55.
The computer 20 has a file system 36, where the recorded operating
system 35 is kept, and also additional program applications 37,
other program modules 38 and program data 39. The user is able to
enter commands and information into the personal computer 20 by
using input devices (keyboard 40, mouse 42). Other input devices
(not shown) can be used: microphone, joystick, game controller,
scanner, and so on. Such input devices usually plug into the
computer system 20 through a serial port 46, which in turn is
connected to the system bus, but they can be connected in other
ways, for example, with the aid of a parallel port, a game port or
a universal serial bus (USB). A monitor 47 or other type of display
device is also connected to the system bus 23 across an interface,
such as a video adapter 48. In addition to the monitor 47, the
personal computer can be equipped with other peripheral output
devices (not shown), such as loudspeakers, a printer, and so
on.
The personal computer 20 is able to operate within a network
environment, using a network connection to one or more remote
computers 49. The remote computer (or computers) 49 are also
personal computers or servers having the majority or all of the
aforementioned elements in describing the nature of a personal
computer 20. Other devices can also be present in the computer
network, such as routers, network stations, peer devices or other
network nodes.
Network connections can form a local-area computer network (LAN)
50, such as a wired and/or wireless network, and a wide-area
computer network (WAN). Such networks are used in corporate
computer networks and internal company networks, and they generally
have access to the Internet. In LAN or WAN networks, the personal
computer 20 is connected to the local-area network 50 across a
network adapter or network interface 51. When networks are used,
the personal computer 20 can employ a modem 54 or other modules for
providing communications with a wide-area computer network such as
the Internet. The modem 54, which is an internal or external
device, is connected to the system bus 23 by a serial port 46. It
should be noted that the network connections are only examples and
need not depict the exact configuration of the network, i.e., in
reality there are other ways of establishing a connection of one
computer to another by technical communication modules, such as
Bluetooth.
In various aspects, the systems and methods described herein may be
implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination
thereof. If implemented in software, the methods may be stored as
one or more instructions or code on a non-transitory
computer-readable medium. Computer-readable medium includes data
storage. By way of example, and not limitation, such
computer-readable medium can comprise RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM,
Flash memory or other types of electric, magnetic, or optical
storage medium, or any other medium that can be used to carry or
store desired program code in the form of instructions or data
structures and that can be accessed by a processor of a general
purpose computer.
In the interest of clarity, not all of the routine features of the
aspects are disclosed herein. It will be appreciated that in the
development of any actual implementation of the present disclosure,
numerous implementation-specific decisions must be made in order to
achieve the developer's specific goals, and that these specific
goals will vary for different implementations and different
developers. It will be appreciated that such a development effort
might be complex and time-consuming, but would nevertheless be a
routine undertaking of engineering for those of ordinary skill in
the art having the benefit of this disclosure.
Furthermore, it is to be understood that the phraseology or
terminology used herein is for the purpose of description and not
of restriction, such that the terminology or phraseology of the
present specification is to be interpreted by the skilled in the
art in light of the teachings and guidance presented herein, in
combination with the knowledge of the skilled in the relevant
art(s). Moreover, it is not intended for any term in the
specification or claims to be ascribed an uncommon or special
meaning unless explicitly set forth as such.
The various aspects disclosed herein encompass present and future
known equivalents to the known modules referred to herein by way of
illustration. Moreover, while aspects and applications have been
shown and described, it would be apparent to those skilled in the
art having the benefit of this disclosure that many more
modifications than mentioned above are possible without departing
from the inventive concepts disclosed herein
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