U.S. patent application number 14/446316 was filed with the patent office on 2014-11-13 for cellular device identification and location with emergency number selectivity enforcement (cilense) for moving vehicles.
The applicant listed for this patent is Edward A. Wilson, Kelce S. Wilson, Kristine A. Wilson. Invention is credited to Edward A. Wilson, Kelce S. Wilson, Kristine A. Wilson.
Application Number | 20140335846 14/446316 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 44224979 |
Filed Date | 2014-11-13 |
United States Patent
Application |
20140335846 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Wilson; Kristine A. ; et
al. |
November 13, 2014 |
Cellular device Identification and Location with Emergency Number
Selectivity Enforcement (CILENSE) for Moving Vehicles
Abstract
A system for restricting operation of wireless devices, for
example cell phones, comprises a controller and a plurality of
sensors. The system restricts device usage, while permitting
emergency phone calls, for example 911 calls. The sensors receive
transmissions from devices, and use the transmissions for
identification and determining whether a device is within a
restricted zone. One disclosed method is triangulation, using time
of arrival of transmissions at the sensors. If the device is within
the zone, the controller sends device identification, and possibly
a customized restriction request, to a remote node, for example a
control node of a cell phone network operator. The operator then
uses its network resources to implement the requested restrictions.
Communication between the controller and the remote node is secure,
possibly encrypted, to minimize malicious interference. A wireless
control can define vertices of the zone and exempt certain devices
from restrictions. Jamming is not required.
Inventors: |
Wilson; Kristine A.;
(Murphy, TX) ; Wilson; Kelce S.; (Murphy, TX)
; Wilson; Edward A.; (Prescott, AZ) |
|
Applicant: |
Name |
City |
State |
Country |
Type |
Wilson; Kristine A.
Wilson; Kelce S.
Wilson; Edward A. |
Murphy
Murphy
Prescott |
TX
TX
AZ |
US
US
US |
|
|
Family ID: |
44224979 |
Appl. No.: |
14/446316 |
Filed: |
July 29, 2014 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
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13763638 |
Feb 9, 2013 |
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14446316 |
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12692601 |
Jan 23, 2010 |
8380170 |
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13763638 |
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61168610 |
Apr 12, 2009 |
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61170626 |
Apr 19, 2009 |
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Current U.S.
Class: |
455/418 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04W 4/12 20130101; H04W
12/08 20130101; H04K 2203/16 20130101; H04M 1/72519 20130101; H04M
1/72577 20130101; H04M 1/72572 20130101; H04W 64/00 20130101; H04K
3/84 20130101; H04K 3/65 20130101; H04W 12/06 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
455/418 |
International
Class: |
H04W 64/00 20060101
H04W064/00; H04W 4/12 20060101 H04W004/12; H04M 1/725 20060101
H04M001/725 |
Claims
1. A method for controlling operation of an active mobile
communication device, comprising the following steps implemented
using a machine processor: performing a first determination of
whether the device is in a moving vehicle, including determining
the relative position of the device in the vehicle, the determining
the relative position including determining whether the device is
in a passenger area of the moving vehicle or not; performing a
second determination of whether the device is to be excepted from
control or not, both the first determination and the second
determination being made for a plurality of devices within a
proximity group of communication devices, the proximity group being
in proximity to the vehicle; producing a signal as a function of
the first and second determinations; disabling a texting function
of the device in response to the signal; sending a signal to the
device indicating that the texting function is disabled; and
operating a controller and at least three sensors, communicatively
coupled to the controller, to perform the first determining and the
second determining.
2. The method of claim 1 further comprising: communicating
disabling signals for the device to a cellular network
operator.
3. The method of claim 1 further comprising: communicating
disabling signals for the device to disable at least one function
selected from the list consisting of: incoming voice calls and
outgoing voice calls.
4. The method of claim 3 further comprising: determining whether
certain communication events are to be exempted from disabling.
5. The method of claim 1 further comprising: determining whether
the disabling of functions is to be relaxed; and responsive to
determining that the disabling of functions is to be relaxed,
generating a relaxation signal.
6. The method of claim 1 further comprising: repeatedly making at
least the first determination; and responsive to the first and
second determinations, repeatedly sending the signal for disabling
the texting function of the device.
7. The method of claim 1 wherein the first determining includes
triangulating a position of the device.
8. The method of claim 1 wherein the first determining includes
using direction of arrival information from at least one of the
sensors.
Description
RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0001] This a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.
13/763,638, filed on Feb. 9, 2013, which is a continuation of U.S.
patent application Ser. No. 12/692,601, filed on Jan. 23, 2010, now
U.S. Pat. No. 8,380,170, and claims priority thereto, and further
claims priority from U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No.
61/168,610, filed on Apr. 12, 2009 and U.S. Provisional Patent
Application Ser. No. 61/170,626, filed on Apr. 19, 2009.
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0002] The present invention relates generally to cellular device
detection and control by a third party, and more particularly to
limiting cellular device usage, within a defined control zone, to
predetermined allowable actions.
BACKGROUND
[0003] "Please silence your cell phones." But people don't. Either
they forget, or they're just plain inconsiderate. So, cell phones
ring in theaters, libraries, during church services and even during
funerals. Sometimes, the bright light of a cell phone screen can
irritate movie-goers, if someone is typing a text message or email
in an otherwise dark theater. The requests and signs, displayed in
areas intended for a disturbance-free experience, simply do not
work much of the time.
[0004] In other situations, cell phone usage has more dire
consequences. Cell phones in prisons can facilitate criminal
activity, enabling violent prisoners to plan escapes or control
gang activity outside prison walls. An Oct. 22, 2008 Associated
Press release, titled "Prison Officials Hindered by Pro-Cell-Phone
Rules", documented a murder that was facilitated by a cell phone
used within a prison. A Nov. 21, 2008 USA Today article, titled
"Smuggled phones flourish in prisons--Federal law bans signal
jamming", describes escapes, drug deals, and harassment of victims
by prisoners using cell phones.
[0005] Prison officials are currently searching for ways to address
the problem of cell phone usage within prisons and, according to
both articles referenced above, some state officials have even
considered the use of cell phone jammers that violate the Federal
Communications Act. Besides their illegality, such jammers can also
interfere with emergency calls, which can create new dangers.
[0006] The current situation, that state officials are considering
violating federal laws and are willing to block even access to
emergency services in some areas, in order to combat a more
pervasive threat posed by cell phone usage, is clear evidence that
there has been a failure by others to effectively curtail cellular
device usage within defined control zones, while still permitting
access to emergency services.
[0007] Further evidence, that there has been a failure of others to
solve the problem of cell phone usage in certain areas, includes
recent incidents of jurors using cell phones to surf the internet
to look for outside evidence on a case. A Mar. 17, 2009 New York
Times article, titled "As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping
Up", quoted the president of the American Society of Trial
Consultants as stating "It's really impossible to control it."
[0008] Not any more.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0009] For a more complete understanding of the present invention,
reference is now made to the following descriptions taken in
conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:
[0010] FIG. 1 illustrates an embodiment of a system for restricting
operation of wireless devices.
[0011] FIGS. 2 and 3 illustrate prior art systems for restricting
operation of wireless devices.
[0012] FIG. 4 illustrates another embodiment of a system for
restricting operation of wireless devices.
[0013] FIG. 5 illustrates wireless devices showing indications of
restricted operation.
[0014] FIG. 6 illustrates another embodiment of a system for
restricting operation of wireless devices.
[0015] FIG. 7 illustrates another embodiment of a system for
restricting operation of wireless devices.
[0016] FIG. 8 illustrates a method of restricting operation of
wireless devices.
[0017] FIG. 9 illustrates a method associated with restriction of
wireless device operation.
[0018] FIG. 10 illustrates another method associated with
restriction of wireless device operation.
[0019] FIG. 11 illustrates another method associated with
restriction of wireless device operation.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
[0020] FIG. 1 illustrates an embodiment of a system 100 for
restricting operation of wireless devices, and includes an
embodiment of a Cilense.TM. system. However, the prior art systems,
illustrated in FIGS. 2 and 3, will be described first, in order to
assist in understanding the novelty of the present invention.
[0021] FIG. 2 illustrates a prior art jamming device 201, which
transmits high power radio waves to create an interference zone
202, intended to prevent usage of a wireless device 203, shown as a
cellular phone. Other wireless devices could also be affected. Base
station tower 204 would be the serving base station, if not for the
operation of jammer 201. One principle of operation is that the
radio signal 205 from jammer 201 overpowers the radio signal 206
from tower 204, preventing device 203 from properly processing any
communications from tower 204. Alternatively, or additionally,
jammer 201 could interfere with tower 204 receiving communications
from device 203. Only one direction of the communication path
between device 203 and tower 204 needs to be interrupted, in order
to prevent usage of most cellular devices.
[0022] FIG. 3 illustrates a prior art decoy system 301, which
tricks wireless device 303, shown as a cellular phone, into
registering with a decoy base station node 308, thereby dropping
communication with the proper serving base station tower 304. Decoy
base station node 308 will not accept calls initiated by a user of
device 303, and once device 303 has dropped registration with tower
304, any ongoing calls will be dropped and incoming calls from the
operator of tower 304 will not connect.
[0023] The principle of operation is that within zone 302, the
radio signal 305 from decoy base station transmitter 307 is
stronger than the radio signal 306 from proper serving base station
tower 304. Since older models of cell phones typically attempt to
register with the strongest serving cell tower, this system relies
on that programmed-in behavior to cause the cell phone to swap to
decoy system 301, comprising decoy base station node 308 and decoy
base station transmitter 307. Presumably, decoy base station node
308 has processing capability necessary to trick device 303 into
completing a hand-off from proper serving base station tower 304 to
decoy system 301.
[0024] Other systems use GPS signals, received by a cell phone, to
determine whether a person is in a moving vehicle, and if so, to
prevent the use of the cell phone. Still other systems rely on
local transmitters to send a signal, which is received by the cell
phone, to instruct the cell phone to restrict functionality.
[0025] All of these systems suffer from severe drawbacks. Jammers
are illegal, and can present significant safety problems, because
they prevent even critical, legitimate emergency calls, such as
calls to 911 in the US. Jammers can also create interference that
prevents operation of even devices that should not have their usage
restricted. It is difficult to tailor the size and shape of a
restriction zone controlled by a jammer solution. Further,
multipath and shadowing effects can defeat a jammer, even sometimes
within the intended restriction zone.
[0026] The decoy system is effectively impractical for many
situations in need of a restriction zone. Transmitting on cellular
telephone frequencies typically requires a government-issued
license, and such activity is heavily regulated. Due to radio
frequency interference issues, licenses may not be available for
potential customers of a decoy solution. Decoy solutions also
suffer from the same zone boundary definition problems as jammer
solutions, as well as risks that multipath and shadowing effects
will disable the decoy's ability to present a luring target for a
device within the intended restriction zone. Users of both jammer
and decoy solutions are likely to be inundated with complaints by
their local area neighbors, as unwanted transmitted energy, from
the jammer or decoy, spills out of the area that is under the
ownership or control of the person or entity, who is entitled to
create a restriction zone on their own property.
[0027] Further, decoy systems operate on an assumption that may not
be valid in future generations of cellular devices. A possible
change in the operation of cellular devices is that base station
hand-off may not be based on which of multiple, nearby base
stations provides the strongest signal, but rather, which one can
provide the highest data rate or lowest bit error rate. This
additional hand-off criterion requires significant additional
complexity for a decoy system because, for a decoy system to
function with such newer phones, the decoy will need to spoof
replies to network communication parameter inquiries from the cell
phone, with better answers than the legitimate serving base
station. Otherwise, there may be no hand-off, even if the decoy
provides a stronger signal.
[0028] Systems using GPS signals are subject to easy over-ride by a
cell phone user, simply by disabling the GPS receiver. Also, at
times when the cell phone's GPS receiver is enabled, but not
tracking GPS satellites well enough to obtain a position or speed
measurement, a GPS-based system simply will not work. Systems which
rely on local transmitters to send a restricted-use signal to a
cell phone, for example using ultrasonic waves or Bluetooth, are
subject to over-ride if the cell phone user makes any modifications
to the cell phone that interferes with the reception or processing
of a restricted-use signal.
[0029] Returning now to FIG. 1, system 100 will be described. In
contrast with the shortcomings of the described prior art, the
inventive system described herein (a) does not cause radio
interference for neighbors; (b) provides for an easily-tailored
restriction zone--even a zone that can move at appreciable speeds,
for example within an airplane passenger cabin; (c) does not rely
on reception and processing by the wireless device of potentially
unavailable signals, for example GPS signals; and (d) is not
subject to such easy defeats, as described above.
[0030] Embodiments of the disclosed system for restricting
operation of wireless devices, for example cell phones, comprise a
controller and a plurality of sensors, for example three or more.
Embodiments of the system can therefore restrict device usage, even
while permitting emergency phone calls, for example 911 calls in
the US and other emergency telephone numbers in other locations.
The system operates remotely from a cellular base station site, and
so may remain under control of an entity that is not a cellular
network operator and does not have access to cellular base station
site equipment.
[0031] The sensors receive transmissions from wireless devices, and
use data within the transmissions to identify particular devices,
for example device identification or registration data, which the
device is transmitting to a base station. The transmissions can
also be used to determining whether an identified device is within
a restricted zone. One disclosed method is triangulation, using
time of arrival of transmissions at the sensors, although other
methods are disclosed, such as using transmission time slot
information from time domain multiplexing systems, to estimate the
range of a device from a sensor. For triangulating systems,
sensor-to-controller communication delays are accounted for, to
enable more accurate position calculation of the device. Direction
of arrival may be used in some systems, by incorporating
directional antennas in one or more sensors.
[0032] If a wireless device is within the restriction zone, the
controller sends device identification, and possibly a customized
restriction request, to a remote node, for example a control node
of a cell phone network operator. The cell phone network operator
then uses its network resources to implement the requested
restrictions. This reduces the chance that user modification of the
wireless device can defeat the operation of the system to restrict
device usage.
[0033] In some embodiments, communication between the controller
and the remote node is secure, possibly encrypted, to minimize
malicious interference, for example from hackers who would attempt
to disable the cell phone of someone who is not in a restriction
zone, or prevent disabling of a device that is within a restriction
zone. In some embodiments, a wireless control can define vertices
of the zone, exempt certain devices from restrictions or customize
restrictions, and even assist with calibrating sensor positions
during system setup.
[0034] System 100 comprises a controller 101 and three sensors,
102a-102c, each of which includes a radio receiver capable of
intercepting signals from cellular devices 140, 141, and 142.
Additional sensors may be used. Each sensor should have a way to
uniquely identify itself to controller 101, such as by using a
sensor-specific communication channel, or providing some type of
encoding on data sent to controller 101. In the illustrated
embodiment, sensors 102a and 102c are illustrated as being coupled
to controller 101 with lines. The coupling between sensors
102a-102c may be wired or wireless, including radio and infrared
data links. Sensor 102b is illustrated as attached to controller
101. In some embodiments, a sensor may be attached physically to a
controller, for ease of transportation and setup, although this is
not required.
[0035] Controller has two defined restriction zones, zone 150 and
zone 151, which is separate from zone 150. This is possible
because, in the illustrated embodiment, controller 101 can enforce
multiple, arbitrarily-shaped restriction zones. The restriction
zones are defined within the memory of controller 101. When the
position of a wireless device is calculated, controller 101
determines whether that wireless device is inside or outside of a
restriction zone. As illustrated, wireless devices 140 and 141 are
within zone 150, while wireless device 142 is outside of both zones
150 and 151, even though device 142 is within a triangle defined by
the positions of sensors 102a-102c. It should be noted that, since
even positions can be determined for wireless devices that are
outside of a triangle defined by the positions of sensors
102a-102c, zone 150 extends past sensor 102a.
[0036] Simple triangulation schemes could be used, which have lower
computational requirements, such as systems that define a
restriction zone such that the sensors comprise the vertices of the
restriction zone. A nearly arbitrarily-shaped zone can be created
with such a system, by using a plurality of sensors, such that each
combination of three sensors forms a sub-zone. Thus, a rectangular
exclusion zone could be formed using four sensors, A,B,C,D, with
A,B,C forming the vertices of one triangular sub-zone, and B,C,D
forming the vertices of a second, adjacent triangular sub-zone.
[0037] Because devices 140 and 141 are inside zone 150, controller
101 will identify them, using their transmissions to base station
towers 121 and 134, which are intercepted by one or more of sensors
102a-102c. Controller may also obtain identification information
for device 142, because it is in range of at least one of sensors
102a-102c. Since cell phones identify themselves when attempting to
register with a base station, or initiate a communication session,
and typically radiate in multiple directions, controller 101 can
listen to the attempted registration or communication date traffic,
and identify the devices using information available to base
station towers 121 and 122. The identification information for at
least devices 140 and 141 will be communicated to the cellular
network operators, so that the cellular network operators can
restrict communication between their base station and any devices
that are using that operator's network.
[0038] These restrictions may include blocking voice calls, while
allowing emergency calls, blocking outgoing text (SMS) messages,
blocking incoming text messages, and blocking other data
transactions, such as incoming and outgoing non-voice
communication. Additional restrictions could be blocking voice
calls, either incoming or outgoing, unless they are on a list of
pre-approved numbers. Other restrictions could be that calls are
blocked unless an urgent call fee is paid to allow the urgent call
through. This enables urgent calls in some restriction zones, but
provides an incentive for the users to minimize their time and
duration. The urgent call fee may be per call, with an optional
per-minute additional charge. This potential revenue stream can
serve as an incentive for cellular phone network operators to
comply with a third party request to block a call to a customer.
Some restrictions may be that a predefined total talk time is
permitted, or a pre-approved number of calls and texts may be
permitted. In some embodiments, non-communication functionality may
be restricted, for example, in dark areas, having a brightly
illuminated screen may be a distraction.
[0039] Other restrictions could be that phones are set to vibrate
mode, automatically, just in case the owners forget to do it
themselves, but calls are still permitted though. Then considerate
people, aware that a call is coming in, can move to a more secluded
area to take the call. However, non-communication functionality
restriction may require that the wireless device receive and comply
with an instruction, from either the cellular operator network or
controller 101, to restrict the functionality.
[0040] The restrictions are possible to implement in cellular
network equipment, because the cellular networks handle the
communication traffic received at a base station tower from a
cellular device. Typical cellular networks already have the ability
to block traffic from a particular cellular device upon, the device
owner's account being suspended for non-payment of a bill. Yet,
even for such an account suspension emergency calls, for example
calls to 911 in the US, are still supported. Upon receiving a
request from controller 101, a cellular network operator can
perform actions somewhat similar to those taken for a delinquent
account, but on a considerably shorter term basis.
[0041] Controller 101 has security tokens, for example encryption
keys 103 and 104, which may comprise keys for symmetric encryption,
asymmetric encryption, or both. This is because, in the illustrated
embodiment, controller 101 is connected to a cellular network
operator control node 120 and a cellular network operator control
node 130 through a public computer network 110. Nodes 120 and 130
have counterpart keys 123 and 134, respectively. Public computer
network 110 may be the internet, which is filled with malicious
threats. For example, hacker computer 111 is also connected to
computer network 110. If a more private connection was available,
for example a dedicated connection between controller 101 and node
120 or node 130, it might be a desirable solution, based on
security requirements. This is because hacker computer 111 could be
used to undermine the operation of controller 101, for example by
sending modified usage restriction requests for a particular
wireless device to one of nodes 120 and 130, or by spoofing one of
nodes 120 and 130, so that controller 101 sends restriction
requests and device identity information to hacker computer 111,
instead of nodes 120 and 130. Without proper safeguards, an
external hacker could either prevent system 100 from functioning,
or maliciously cause a wireless device to endure restricted
operation, even if it is outside all restriction zones. Further,
controller 101 may include a decoy ad-hoc network node, so that if
device 140 attempted to set up a self-assembling network with
device 142, to leverage the connectivity of device 142, this
attempt would be frustrated. Controller 101 could also send out
instructions to devices 140-142, and any other devices within
range, to disable self-assembling or any other ad-hoc network
capability, in order to isolate device 140. However, if controller
101 continues its self-assembling network attempts, it can identify
any of devices 140-142 that are not complying with the network
disabling, and then request that nodes 120 and 130 restrict
operation of the non-compliant devices.
[0042] Node 120 is connected to serving base station tower 121 and
distant base station tower 122 through a cellular network
infrastructure. Serving base station tower 121 is the base station
that serves wireless devices in the area of zones 150 and 151,
whereas tower 122 is a on the same network, but likely too far away
to provide service in that area. Tower 122 could be a metacell
though, that provides fill-in coverage for areas shadowed from
tower 121, and thus could cover portions of zones 150 and 151. Node
130 is similarly connected to serving base station tower 130.
Multiple cellular operator nodes and serving base station towers
are illustrated, because different cellular network operators often
use different towers and different control nodes to serve
overlapping geographical areas. Thus, node 120 is owned and
operated by one cellular carrier, and node 130 is owned and
operated by another.
[0043] If controller 101 cannot determine which carrier is
associated with a particular one of devices 140 and 141,
identifying information for both devices 140 and 141 can be sent to
both nodes 120 and 130. The computational equipment at each of
nodes 120 and 130 can then identify whether device 140 or 141 is a
subscriber device being served by that network and, if so, take the
requested blocking actions. Otherwise, if nodes 120 and 120 do not
recognize one of devices 140 and 141, the request for that device
can be ignored.
[0044] In order to provide the service of blocking data traffic for
a subscriber, upon the request of a third party, the cellular
network operators must have both some motivation to comply, as well
as some degree of certainty that the request is coming from a valid
source. For places such as prisons, courthouses, streets within
school zones, other areas where cell phone usage can impact public
safety, and even temporary locations with visiting dignitaries,
operator compliance may become a legislated requirement. For
non-legislated blocking, the fee arrangement for urgent calls,
described above, may provide some motivation. Even with a
government-mandated compliance policy though, the network operator
will still request reasonable assurance that the request for
restricted operation of a device is coming from an authorized
source.
[0045] One option for ensuring authorization is that, when
controller 101 moves into a new area, it registers with all of the
operators who are operating towers in the area. Network operators
then have a database of the operational systems, such as controller
101, which are associated with towers in close proximity. Part of
this process may include the exchange or distribution of encryption
keys or other security tokens, so that the controller and the
network control nodes may engage in a challenge-response process
when setting up a channel to communicate restriction requests.
There may also be responses from the network nodes, acknowledging
the requests and indicating compliance or refusal to comply. If the
messages and responses are encrypted, then encryption provides not
only security from eavesdropping by a hacker, but proper decryption
indicates authenticity of the claimed sender. Public key encryption
can be used, so that each a tower (such as 121, 122 and 131) can
digitally sign its recent transmitted security code, and controller
101 can digitally sign its request. This provides 2-way
authentication between controller 101 and one of the nearby network
operators.
[0046] Other options include that the towers, such as 121, 122 and
131, send a security code that changes rapidly, and information
from this security code must be included with a restriction request
as a time-changing security authentication credential, so that only
systems having a reception capability within the vicinity of a
serving tower can send a valid request for device operation
restriction. Using this option, controller 101 may need to identify
the base stations attached to towers 121, 122, and 131, or at least
those providing signal strength sufficient to serve cellular
devices within at least a portion of zones 150 and 151. Network
operators can reduce their vulnerability to replay attacks by
requiring that a recent security code, sent out from one of its
towers, be used in construction of the restriction request. This
can include using a hash value of a transmitted security code as an
encryption key for at least a portion of data sent by controller
101, and other authentication schemes. A replay attack could occur
if hacker computer 111 intercepts a message from controller 101 to
node 120, stores it, and then transmits it to node 120 at a later
time. The result would be that a device could have restricted
operation, even if it moved outside zone 150. Having time-varying
security codes, along with a cellular network operator verifying
that a device had been recently registered to a base station in
proximity of controller 101, can reduce the likelihood that
malicious attempts to interfere with the proper operation of system
100 will be successful. Thus, a network operator may verify that a
request from controller 101 include recent security information
transmitted from a network tower operated by the network operator,
along with security information identifying controller 101, prior
to complying with any request. Since the network operator knows the
location of each of its towers, if a first request associated with
a first tower came in from a device purporting to be controller
101, and then another request associated with a second tower, that
was far removed from the first tower, arrived immediately
afterward, the network operator might suspect the presence of a
hacker attempting to maliciously disable cellular devices and not
comply with the request. However, since a legitimate controller
might be mobile, such as within an airplane, boat, train or bus,
some means is needed to ensure that a controller can be registered
with the network operator to be within the vicinity of different
towers at different times. For mobile versions of controller 101,
controller 101 would need to register with networks automatically
under circumstances similar to a cellular device tower hand-off,
except controller 101 would register with multiple carriers and
possibly multiple towers of the same carrier, simultaneously.
[0047] Other security considerations include controller 101
informing the users of devices 140 and 141 whether they are
restricted, and possibly also the user of device 142 that it may be
restricted if device 142 enters nearby zone 150. Part of this
communication could include controller 101 identifying itself to
the affected devices 140-142, for example, by communicating an
identification code, associated with controller 101.
[0048] In the illustrated embodiment, encryption keys 103 and 104,
installed in controller 101, can be used to communicate securely
with nodes 120 and 130. Key 103 is a security counterpart to key
123, so that using keys 103 and 123, controller 101 and node 120
can communicate securely. Similarly, key 104 is a security
counterpart to key 134, so that controller 101 and node 130 can
communicate securely. If public key encryption is used, controller
101 could encrypt messages for both nodes 120 and 130 with the same
private, asymmetric key. This provides authentication, but maybe
not privacy, because anyone having a copy of the public, asymmetric
key could decrypt the messages and learn which wireless devices are
within zones 150 and 151. It may be desirable to restrict public
access to this information. However, if the public asymmetric key
is only "public" to nodes 120 and 130, then an asymmetric key
system could work.
[0049] Embodiments of a controller, such as controller 101, may
send requests in various ways. Controller 101 may simply forward
device identification, which nodes 120 and 130 will interpret as a
request to enforce pre-arranged default usage restrictions. Another
option may be to identifying specific restrictions, such as
permitting some functionality out of SMS, email, voice, and other
data exchanges, while blocking others. Multiple options also exist
for relaxing, or lifting usage restrictions, when a device moves
from inside zone 150 to the outside. Nodes 120 and 130 may operate
in such a manner that the restriction requests time out after a
predetermined period, for example a minute, and if another
restriction request has not been received from controller 101 by
that time, the restrictions are lifted. In this situation,
controller 101 repeatedly communicates identifying information for
devices 140 and 141, within zone 150, to one or both of remote
nodes 120 and 130, for however long both of devices 140 and 141
remains within zone 150. Upon a device moving outside of zone 150,
controller 101 merely fails to update the identification. The
time-out will expire, and the device that moved outside of zone 150
will resume operation upon the expiration of the time-out period.
Alternatively, controller 101 could affirmatively inform one or
both of nodes 120 and 130 that a device has moved outside a zone,
so that service to that device can resume more rapidly.
[0050] System 100 also comprises a wireless user control 105,
although in some embodiments, a user control may have a wired
connection to controller 101. User control may be used for a
plurality of functions, including (a) calibrating the locations of
sensors 102a-102c during system setup or maintenance, (b) defining
vertices of restriction zones 150 and 151, and (c) identifying a
particular wireless device, such as device 141, for exemption or
modified restriction rules. For example, if restriction zone 150
encompasses a prison, device 141 may belong to someone who is
authorized to carry a cellular device into the area, for example a
guard or an attorney visiting a client. For some embodiments, the
different functions may be accomplished with different controls. In
some embodiments, controller 101 will support multiple user
controls 105. For security, controller 101 and user control 105 may
encrypted communications between them. Additional security
arrangements and data compression, applicable to both wireless and
wired network communications, should also be considered for
improving system 100.
[0051] User control 105 includes a user input control 106, which
may include a plurality of buttons, a touch screen, a trackball, or
any suitable input system for receiving input from a user. Input
functions may include triggering a calibration function within the
controller, to identify the location of a sensor. For example,
during setup and initial calibration, a user may position sensors
102a-103c, then visit each of the sensors in turn, actuating user
input 106, when the user control 105 is in close proximity with a
sensor, to transmit a calibration signal from user control 105 to
sensors 102a-102c. If user control 105 is adjacent to sensor 102a,
then sensor 102a will be the first to receive any calibration
signals transmitted by user control 105, possibly through wireless
communication system 107. Communication system 107 may also be used
to communicate with controller 101.
[0052] By measuring the time delay to the other sensors, 102b and
102c, the relative distance between sensors 102a and 102b, as well
as the relative distance between sensors 102a and 102c may be
determined By then moving user control 105 to be adjacent to sensor
102c, and repeating the calibration signal transmission process,
the relative distance between sensor 102c and 102b may further be
determined.
[0053] Calibrating the sensor positions in this manner may result
in controller 101 calculating different time of arrival information
from sensor 102a to sensor 102c than the reverse path, from sensor
102c to sensor 102a. This is because the communication delays
between controller 101 and each of sensors 102a and 102c may be
different. There are a number of options for compensating for this
delay. One is to use only relative communication delay differences.
Another is to use precise knowledge of communication delay between
one of the sensors 102a-102c and controller 101, to calculate exact
delay for each of the sensors 102a-102c. This second option is
easier if predetermined cable lengths, with known propagation delay
times, are used, and if the sensors' and controller's response
times are also known. If sensor 102b is attached to controller 101
and connected with a hard-wired communication interface, then
moving user control 105 adjacent to sensor 102b and repeating the
calibration transmission process can provide the final data needed
for the position calibrations. If none of the absolute
communication delays are known, then relative delay information
must be used.
[0054] For calibration at sensor 102a, the absolute time delays are
Ta=Ca; Tb=Cb+Pab; Tc=Cc+Pac, where Ta is the time delay between
sensor 102a receiving a calibration signal from user control 105,
and controller 101 receiving it, Ca is the communication delay
between sensor 102a and controller 101; Tb is the time delay
between sensor 102b receiving a calibration signal, and controller
101 receiving it, Cb is the communication delay between sensor 102b
and controller 101, Pab is the propagation delay between sensor
102a and sensor 102b; and Tc is the time delay between sensor 102c
receiving a calibration signal, and controller 101 receiving it, Cc
is the communication delay between sensor 102c and controller 101,
Pac is the propagation delay between sensor 102a and sensor 102c.
The propagation delay between user control 105 and sensor 102a is
assumed to be zero, for simplification. Propagation delay is the
physical distance, multiplied by the speed of light, which is a
constant value. Thus, distance measurements may be obtained easily,
once propagation times are calculated.
[0055] The relative delays, calculated by controller 101 are
Tab=Cb+Pab-Ca and Tac=Cc+Pac-Ca, where Tab is the time between the
calibration signal arriving from sensor 102a and sensor 102b, and
Tac is the time between the calibration signal arriving from sensor
102a and sensor 102c. If the communication delay from sensor 102a
is long enough, either or both of Tab and Tac may be negative.
[0056] For calibration at sensor 102b, the absolute time delays are
Ta=Ca+Pba; Tb=Cb; Tc=Cc+Pbc, and the relative time delays are
Tba=Ca+Pba-Cb and Tbc=Cc+Pbc-Cb. For purposes of calibration, Pba
can be assumed to be identical to Pab. Thus, Tab, the delay between
sensors 102a and 102b when calibrating at sensor 102a, will differ
from Tba, the delay between sensors 102a and 102b when calibrating
at sensor 102b, by twice the difference between Ca and Cb.
[0057] For calibration at sensor 102c, the absolute time delays are
Ta=Ca+Pca; Tb=Cb+Pcb; Tc=Cc, and the relative time delays are
Tca=Ca+Pca-Cc and Tcb=Cb+Pcb-Cc. For purposes of calibration, Pca
can be assumed to be identical to Pac, and Pcb can be assumed to be
identical to Pbc. Thus, Tac, the delay between sensors 102a and
102c when calibrating at sensor 102a, will differ from Tca, the
delay between sensors 102a and 102c when calibrating at sensor
102c, by twice the difference between Ca and Cc. Similarly, Tbc,
the delay between sensors 102b and 102c when calibrating at sensor
10b, will differ from Tcb, the delay between sensors 102b and 102c
when calibrating at sensor 102c, by twice the difference between Cb
and Cc.
[0058] If at least one of Ca, Cb, and Cc is known, then the others
may be calculated using measured Tab, Tba, Tac, Tca, Tbc, and Tcb.
For simplification, assume sensor 102b is attached to controller
101 by a short enough cable that Cb can be approximated as zero. Ca
is then just half of the difference between Tab and Tba, and Cc is
half of the difference between Tbc and Tcb. In this manner,
baseline calculations can be made that are needed for later
triangulation calculations.
[0059] As an alternative calibration scheme, one or more of sensors
102a-102c could have a calibration transmitter, which is triggered
by controller 101. This could be useful if frequent position
calibration is expected, or the sensors are in positions that are
difficult to reach, and it is inconvenient to send someone to visit
each sensor, whenever a calibration is needed. For this scheme,
which is made easier if sensor 102b is co-located with controller
101, so that Cb is small enough, controller 101 sends out
instructions to each of sensors 102a and 102c, I turn, instructing
them to transmit a calibration signal. The delays can be calculated
similarly as described for calibration with user control 105.
[0060] The next process in the setup of the illustrated embodiment
is defining restriction zones. Defining zone 150 can be
accomplished by moving user control 105 to each of the vertices of
the desired restriction zone, and actuating user input 106. One
method to define the zone would include circumnavigating the
desired zone in a single direction, and actuating user input 106 at
each desired vertex. The positions of user control 105 at each
vertex can be calculated by triangulation, or whatever other method
is employed for position calculation by system 100. Then, the final
vertex can be connected, within a zone boundary database in
controller 101, to the first vertex. The process can be repeated,
if additional restriction zones, for example second restriction
zone 151, are desired.
[0061] After system 100 is set up and operating, it may be
desirable to make exceptions to the typical set of restrictions.
For example, device 141 may be treated by system 100 differently
than device 140. To enable this, user control 105 has a short
range, directional wireless sensor 108, which enables
identification of a wireless device in close proximity, and on the
proper side of, user control 105. Actuating user input 106, when
pointing user control at nearby device 141, then flags to
controller 101 that device 141 is to be treated differently than
device 140. The restrictions may be more severe, more lenient, or
even totally waived. Thus, user control 105 and controller 101 are
jointly configured to identify a device for restriction exceptions
when user control 105 is in close proximity with the device. This
need not be after controller 101 has already requested restricted
device operation. It could occur prior to a device entering a
restriction zone, so that, when the device enters the zone, the
initial restriction request is already modified or won't be
sent.
[0062] One example use would be in a dark theater, in which the
restrictions are not to block calls, but rather that all phones are
set on vibrate mode. This allows people within the theater to be
aware that someone is calling, and to step outside to take the
call. However, one person may not be so considerate, and may be
speaking loudly during a call. If a theater worker requests that
the person be quiet, and that person does not comply, then the
theater worker can use user control 105 to instruct controller 101
to request odes 120 and 130 to terminate the call. A similar
arrangement can be used for people having excessive text message
conversations in a dark theater, while not making reasonable
accommodations to limit the bright light shining in other people's
eyes. A theater worker can then easily disable the text message
ability of the phone, until the owner steps outside the restriction
zone, and controller 101 releases the cell phone from the
restrictions. Enhanced or relaxed restrictions for a particular
device may be permanent, for the duration that the device is within
the restriction zone, or temporary, so that enhanced or limited
privileges expire before the device leaves the restriction
zone.
[0063] Other methods for determining the positions of devices
140-142 exist, which could be used if all three of sensors
102a-102c are not able to simultaneously pick up transmissions. If
devices 140-142 operate using time domain duplexing (TDD) or time
domain multiple access (TDMA), they will have an assigned
transmission time slot, controlled by the serving base station's
clock. Using the assumption that the device will begin to transmit
at its scheduled time, and if controller is synchronized to the
same clock, a range from the device to a sensor can be estimated.
This gives a radial distance from one sensor. If two sensors can
intercept the transmission, then radial distance measures from two
sensors can be compared, and may allow determination of whether a
device is within zone 150.
[0064] Multipath effects make using direction of arrival an
unreliable sole source of information. This is because a bounce
path, from a different direction than the true direction from a
sensor to a wireless device, could provide a stronger signal.
However, even in this situation, the true path will provide the
earliest signal. Making direction of arrival measurements requires
directional sensors, which can be provided with an antenna array
arrangement on one of the sensors. If each of the multipath signals
received by a sensor is compared against the others, not only for
power levels, but also for time of arrival, then direction of
arrival information can be used to assist with location. For
example, consider the possibility that sensor 102c does not receive
a transmission from device 141. Attempting to calculate the
position of device 141, using merely time of arrival information
for signals received by sensors 102a and 102b, will result in two
possible locations for device 141. One position will be in its
illustrated position, within zone 150. The other position will be
outside zone 150, slightly above and to the left of the illustrated
position of tower 121. Using direction of arrival information, if
sensor 120b is able to identify that device 141 is located
counter-clockwise from a reference line between sensors 120a and
120b, or sensor 120a is able to identify that device 141 is located
clockwise from that same reference line, then the position of
device 141 can be fixed as within zone 150 and not nearby tower
121. The law of cosines is a well-known equation that can be used
using a combination of range and angle information, and a related
derivation can also be applied in some situations using only range
information.
[0065] Ascertaining identifying information of a device, or
determining an identity of a device, by controller 101 may not
involve determining a unique number or address associated with a
device. Identification information for a wireless device may be
data uniquely associated with a wireless device, such as an
assigned phone number or an address, but may also be other
identifying information, such as general information that is
specific enough to enable a remote processor to ascertain the
identity of the device. Examples include a time of a recent
transmission, a copy of recently transmitted data, transmission
channel information, and physical location relative to nearby
towers. Thus, if controller 101 can communicate that device 141
recently transmitted a certain data stream, even if the data stream
were encrypted and controller 101 could not interpret the contents,
and that device 141 was likely visible to a certain sector of tower
131, then controller 101 has provided enough information that
processor 135 at node 130 could potentially identify that
controller 101 was referencing device 141--if node 130 is within
the network that device 141 is using. If device 141 was using the
other network, node 120, then node 120 would be able to identify
device 141. Processor 135 may therefore need to maintain a history
of recently received data from served wireless devices, and have
other logic necessary to determine a specific device from a
description of its behavior, which is received from controller 101.
In some situations, controller 101 may be able to ascertain unique
data associated with a wireless device, for example, possibly if a
device were to attempt to register with a base station, if nodes
120 and 130 shared information with controller 101 about devices
registered with towers 121 and 131, to enable exact device
identification, or if controller 101 were connected to a decoy
node, such as node 301, illustrated in FIG. 3.
[0066] FIG. 4 illustrates another embodiment of a system 400 for
restricting operation of wireless devices, for example in an
airplane passenger compartment 410. This illustrated system 400 can
help enforce an airline policy that passengers turn off phones when
airplane is ready to take off. As an added bonus, the restriction
zone 450 actually moves along with airplane 410, automatically. In
airplane passenger compartment 410, system 400 comprises controller
401 and remote, external sensors 102a and 102c, which can all
operate within a moving vehicle. A third sensor is integrated
within controller 401. Controller 401 uses its antenna to
wirelessly communicate with nodes 120 and 130 though network 110,
while operating within a moving vehicle, such as within airplane
passenger compartment 410, while the airplane is moving away from a
passenger boarding gate.
[0067] To highlight the need for multiple sensors to solve
positions using time of arrival information alone, as inputs to
triangulation calculations, consider the possibility that
controller 401 has not activated its internal sensor. As before,
the user of device 140 is within a restriction zone, but this time
it is zone 450, because the user of device 140 is a passenger. The
user of device 142 is outside the plane, possibly waiting to board.
Assume, for this explanation, that transmissions from device 142
can enter airplane passenger compartment 410, possibly through the
windows. In this situation, when the airplane flight crew wishes to
restrict cell phone operation, device 140 should be restricted, but
device 142 should not be.
[0068] As illustrated, the distance 402 between device 142 and
sensor 102a is the same as the distance 403 between device 142 and
sensor 102c. Similarly, the distance 405 between device 140 and
sensor 102a is the same as the distance 406 between device 140 and
sensor 102c. Thus, the time of arrival differences between sensors
102a and 102c are identical for both devices 140 and 142.
Controller 401 will then calculate the positions of both devices
140 and 142 to be on the same set of possible points. These points
will form a plane, exactly half way between sensors 102a and 102c,
and perpendicular to a straight line connecting sensors 102a and
102c. As viewed from above, according to the perspective of the
illustration, this plane becomes straight line 408. Thus, the
position of a wireless device at any point on line 408 will be
indistinguishable from the position of any other device at a
different point that same line 408. Line 408, in two dimensions, is
a line of ambiguity. Considered in three dimensions, it is a plane
of ambiguity.
[0069] Now, adding the time of arrival measurement for a sensor
within controller 401, distance differences become apparent. The
distance 404 between device 142 and controller 401 is shorter than
distance 403, but not by much. In contrast, the distance 407
between device 140 and controller 401 is considerably shorter than
distance 406. Thus, using the difference between distances 407 and
406, controller 401 can determine that device 140 is inside zone
450, while using the difference between distances 404 and 403,
controller 401 can determine that device 142 is outside zone 450.
Controller 401 can just use a threshold as decision criteria, based
on the maximum distance difference for a hypothetical device
exactly on the boundary of zone 450.
[0070] It should be noted that, even with this third measurement,
if only time of arrival information is available, controller 401
cannot necessarily determine which side of airplane passenger
compartment 410 that device 142 may actually be. If controller 401
is positioned poorly, for example, it is positioned on a straight
line between sensors 102a and 102c, the ambiguity plane for the
position of device 142 will become an ambiguity circle on the
former ambiguity plane, centered on a line connecting sensors 102a
and 102c, with a radius determined by the difference between
distances 403 and 404. This ambiguity circle will surround airplane
passenger compartment 410, but if airplane passenger compartment
410 is the nearly-circular cross-sectioned tube, typical for
airplanes, then controller 401 will properly determine that device
142 is outside zone 450. That is, even if controller 401 cannot
determine whether device 140 is to the left, right, above, or below
airplane passenger compartment 410.
[0071] Fortunately, for many situations, controller 401 can operate
with the assumption that all wireless devices are at approximately
the same height. This assumption is valid enough in open air areas,
such as wide, flat, level fields where most people are standing on
the ground at the same height, and vertical variations are minimal
in comparison to horizontal positional variations. In tall,
multi-level buildings though, vertical displacement can be an
issue. Systems operating in those environments will require more
sensors to solve vertical displacement ambiguities. In order to
solve vertical displacement ambiguities, there must be some
vertical diversity in the sensors. Merely adding more sensors in
the same plane will not solve ambiguities as to whether a device,
not in the same plane as all of the sensors, is above or below that
plane.
[0072] FIG. 5 illustrates wireless devices 140 and 141 showing
indications of restricted operation. Wireless device 140 is
displaying a message 500, indicating that emergency callas are
allowed, but other phone calls and text messages are not allowed.
The message could have been triggered by communication from
controller 101 or one of nodes 120 and 130. Other information could
be displayed, including whether vibrate mode has been activated, or
whether email and internet access are affected, and whether
non-communication functionality has been restricted. Wireless
device 141 displays a message 501, indicating different
restrictions than are imposed on device 140. This may be because
device 140 had been pre-registered with controller 101, for lesser
restrictions than device 140, prior to entering zone 150, or
because the exception process, described above in the discussion of
FIG. 1, had been performed after device 141 had already been
restricted similarly to device 140.
[0073] FIG. 6 illustrates another embodiment of a system 600 for
restricting operation of wireless devices. System 600 comprises a
computing apparatus 601, which may be an embodiment of controller
101, described in the discussion of FIG. 1. Computing apparatus 601
comprises a communication module 602, which communicatively couples
apparatus 601 to a media drive 603 for computer readable media,
illustrating an optical disk, as well as network 110 and sensors
102a-102d. Other types of computer readable media, such as
non-volatile memory devices and magnetic media may also be used.
Communication module 602 is illustrated as having an antenna for
wireless communication with user control 105. Communication module
602 may be a single module or may comprise many different modules,
and may comprise hardware, such as connectors, firmware, and even
software, such as internet connectivity software.
[0074] Apparatus 601 also comprises at least one central processing
unit (CPU) 604, although multiple processors may be used, and a
memory 605. Memory 605 may comprise volatile and non-volatile
memory, and even other computer readable media. In the illustrated
embodiment, memory 605 holds part of communication module 602.
Memory 605 holds other modules and data sets used in the operations
described above, although many of the illustrated modules may also
have hardware or firmware components. These include a control
module 606, which can interface with other illustrated modules, and
coordinate their operations for sensor position calibration, zone
definition, restriction request communication, device exception
handling, position calculations, and other functions.
[0075] Operator database 607 has information relevant to
communication with nodes 120 and 130 and any other cellular network
operations nodes. This may include internet addresses of node
computers and security protocols. Security module 608 has security
functionality, possibly including encryption and hash routines. It
is used for securing communications with remote operator control
nodes, for example nodes 120 and 130 and, in the illustrated
embodiment, has access to keys 103 and 104. As a clarification to
the differences between security module 608 and keys 103 and 104,
security module 608 contains algorithms, and possibly hardware
random number generators. Timing module 609 is used as a time
reference, and may be used to keep a clock synchronized with a base
station clock for use in the TDD and TDMA enabled range-finding
systems previously described. However, timing module 609 may have
its own internal clock, which is free from external synchronization
with base station clocks. Timing module can be used for both the
time of arrival calculations, as well as the tracking time-out
periods for devices within a restriction zone, so that timely
updates can be sent to nodes 120 and 130.
[0076] Calibration and setup module 610 can be configured to
operate with remote interface module 611, which handles
communication with user control 105, sensor position database 612,
and zone boundary database 613. Sensor position database 612, and
zone boundary database 613 may be based on time of arrival
information only, and therefore have only relative positions, such
as radial distances, or may have GPS coordinates, if any of sensors
102a-102d or user control 105 had GPS data and sent it to apparatus
601 during calibration and setup. Data in some embodiments of zone
boundary database 613 will comprise the vertices of at least one
closed polygon. Remote interface module 611 also works with
blocking rules database 614 and detected device database 615 to
handle exceptions for selected devices. For example, blocking rules
database 61 could permanently store the identity of device 641, so
that the next time device 641 entered zone 150, it would go to
relaxed restrictions, rather than default restrictions. Math module
616 may comprise standard triangulation calculation routines, which
are known in the art. For example, U.S. Pat. No. 5,327,144 by Stilp
et al. and U.S. Pat. No. 5,890,068 by Fattouche et al. disclose
triangulation schemes for locating cellular devices.
[0077] FIG. 7 illustrates another embodiment of a system 700 for
restricting operation of wireless devices. System 700 comprises a
controller 701, which also comprises a sensor. System also
comprises sensors 702-709, numbered clockwise. The restriction zone
is the entire area covered by the set of triangular sub-zones
711-717. The combination of zones 714 and 715, formed by controller
701 and sensors 705, 706 and 709, illustrates how a
rectangular-shaped region can be set up using triangles. During
setup, each sensor is paired with two others, in the memory of
controller 701, to form the triangular sub-zones. When a triangular
sub-region is formed in this manner, the triangle will have no
reflexive angles.
[0078] During operation, when a wireless device is identified,
controller 701 sequentially solves an inside/outside calculation
for each of the sub-zones, until one calculation returns an inside
condition, or all sub-zones have been considered. If a device is
within any of the sub-zones, then a usage restriction is requested.
In some embodiments, a controller, for example controller 701, may
send a usage restriction request directly to a wireless device
rather than involving the network operator. For this to work
though, the device must comply with the request. Using a network
operator to implement the request takes compliance by the device
out of primary consideration as a defeat to the system's operation.
Other variations can exist, if controller 701 is the only sensor
available. If controller uses the TDD and TDMA range finding
method, described earlier, then the restriction zone can be a
sphere around controller 701. Adding direction of arrival
discrimination to the sensor on controller 701 enables the shape of
the restriction zone to be tailored, such that it extends further
in range in some directions.
[0079] FIG. 8 illustrates a method 800 of restricting operation of
wireless devices. In block 801, the sensor positions are
calibrated. A method for performing this has been described
previously, and a method is also illustrated in FIG. 9. In block
802, the restriction zones are defined. A method for performing
this has been described previously, and a method is also
illustrated in FIG. 10. In block 803, the controller registers with
cellular network operators, for example by exchanging security
tokens between controller 101 and each of nodes 120 and 130,
illustrated in FIG. 1.
[0080] In the illustrated method, normal operations of the system
begin in block 804 and cycle while the system remains in operation.
It should be understood that variations in the order of the blocks
of method 800 may occur. Devices are identified in block 804, and
their positions calculated in block 805. For those devices within a
restriction zone, the exceptions from restrictions, as well as
restriction customizations are identified in block 806. In block
807, a secure communication link is set up between the controller
101 and at least one of node 120 and node 130, if a secure link
does not exist. The secure link may use encryption, and be, for
example, a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) session. Alternatively, data
could be sent over unsecured sessions, but the data should be
secured, such as by encryption. The requests are communicated to
the network operators in block 808, and may be just identification
information, if a default restriction type has been previously
defined, or may be relaxation requests or restriction customization
requests. In block 809, exceptions for certain devices are stored,
perhaps in blocking rules database 614 of FIG. 6. A method for
performing this has been described previously, and a method is
illustrated in FIG. 11. Therefore, a method of restricting the
operation of a radio communication device may comprise determining
an identity of a device, using a radio transmission from the
device; determining whether the identified device is within a
predefined usage restriction zone, using time of arrival
information from a plurality of sensors, for a radio transmission
from the device; and securely communicating the identity of the
identified device to a remote node, across a public computer
network. The method may further comprise repeatedly communicating
the identity of the identified device to the remote node, while the
identified device remains within the usage restriction zone.
[0081] FIG. 9 illustrates a method 900 of calibrating sensor
positions. In block 901, a calibration signal is sent from the
location of a sensor. This can be the sensor itself, or a user
control adjacent to a sensor. In block 902, the time of arrival
differences are measured. In decision block 903, it is determined
whether enough sensor positions have been measured in order to
complete the calculations. For a system having four or more
sensors, or sensors with known communication delay times, there may
not be a need to send calibration signals from all of the sensors.
In block 904, the data for time of arrival differences are adjusted
for communication delays between each of the sensors and the
controller. In some systems, multiple controllers or
sub-controllers can be used, with time of arrival compensations
including the transit times for routing information to other
places, rather than directly to a single controller. In block 905,
distances between the sensors are determined, using the propagation
delays of the calibration signals. GPS information can be used to
establish actual position data, rather than just relative position
data in block 906, if the information is available. The results of
the sensor position calibration process are then stored in RX
position database 612, of FIG. 6.
[0082] FIG. 10 illustrates a method 1000 of defining a restriction
zone. In block 1001, a calibration signal is sent from the location
of a vertex of the desired restriction zone, possibly from wireless
user control 105. In block 1002, the time of arrival differences
are measured from that vertex to each of the sensors, and are
compensated for with communication delay information found earlier,
in method 900. In block 1003, vertex positions are determined and
stored in zone boundary database 613, of FIG. 6. In decision block
1004, it is determined whether all the vertices have been defined
for the zone. If not, then another calibration signal is sent from
the next desired vertex, as method 1000 returns to block 1001. When
all the vertices have been set, the restriction zone is then
defined as a closed polygon with vertices in the order of
measurement, except that the final vertex is connected with the
first, to close the polygon. This is accomplished in blocks 1005
and 1006.
[0083] FIG. 11 illustrates a method 1100 of handling exceptions to
the restrictions. In block 1101, a wireless device is identified
for exceptional treatment, whether exemption from restriction, more
sever restriction, or less severe restriction. This can be
accomplished with user control 105 in close proximity, and pointing
at the device, as described in relation to FIG. 1. In decision
block 1102, it is determined whether the exception will be durable,
that is, it will endure even after the device has left a
restriction zone, so that the exceptions are automatically applied
when the device next enters a restriction zone. If the exceptions
are not durable, then in decision block 1103, it is determined
whether they are temporary, and will expire after a set period of
time. If so, then a timer is set in block 1104, perhaps using
timing module 609 of FIG. 6. The exception information regarding
the device identity, durability, and duration, is then stored in
block 1105, and if necessary, communicated to a network node in
block 1106.
[0084] Network operators play a crucial role in the operation of
some of the disclosed embodiments. They make a restriction decision
after receiving a request from a Cilense.TM. system, and may insist
on verifying the authenticity and authorization of the request. In
some situations, an operator may over-ride the requested
restrictions and substitute a different set. The operator may then
communicate back to the requester confirming or denying the
request, or informing about a modification. In some situations, a
network operator may cooperate with restaurant ad theater owners
willingly, and therefore may reserve the right to deny or modify
the restriction request. In other situations, the requester may
have police or government authority, so the operator may have a
duty to comply.
[0085] The operator may inform the restricted device of the
restriction, possibly informing the device about the ability to
send or receive urgent calls for a fee. This may be automatic, or
in response to an attempted call or sending of a message, and may
be displayed or sent as an audio message. Outside callers may be
informed about the restrictions by the network equipment, when
attempting to call the restricted device. The device may be
provided instructions by the network to enter a battery-saving
mode, dim the screen, enter vibrate or silent mode, display a
message on the screen of the device, or return from restricted
operation modes, or refrain from participating in any
self-assembling, peer-to-peer or ad-hoc networks, and then comply
if the instructions satisfy security screening criteria. The
restriction on network participation is to prevent a cellular
device within a restriction zone from communicating through another
nearby cellular device that is outside the restriction zone, and
riding on that nearby cellular device's network connectivity to
send and receive prohibited messages, thereby thwarting the
operation restrictions. Wireless devices nearby a restriction zone,
but located outside, or else within the restriction zone and exempt
from the restrictions, which are also range of the ad-hoc network
connectivity of restricted devices, may receive and acquiesce to
requests to temporarily disable self-assembling or ad-hoc network
capability, or to deny connectivity to identified devices within
the restriction zone. The wireless device may further display the
authority or some identifying information about the entity
requesting the restriction, and may receive this from either the
entity itself or from the serving network. The status of the device
with in a restriction zone may be returned as part of a chaperone
service, which enables someone to remotely ascertain the location
of another person's cell phone.
[0086] Although the present invention and its advantages have been
described above, it should be understood that various changes,
substitutions and alterations can be made herein without departing
from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the
appended claims. Moreover, the scope of the present application is
not intended to be limited to the particular embodiments described
in the specification.
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