Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

Issue date:  January 26, 2022

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:

 

• Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

TRADEMARK ACT SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 1824319, 3132214, 4335468, 5653892, 5856058, 6147203, and 6249830.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Registrants’ marks are:   

 

Registration No. 1824319 - CONAIR SUPREME in standard characters for “electric hair brushes and curling irons”

 

Registration No. 3132214 - SUPREME in standard character for “Lavatories, namely, hand-wash bowls”

 

Registration No. 4335468 - SOUSVIDE SUPREME in a stylized font for “ovens for sous vide cooking”

 

Registration No. 5653892 - CHEF'S SUPREME in standard characters for “Electric food and beverage warmers; electric coffee brewers; electric food dehydrator; Cabinets used to control temperature and humidity for heating and proofing food goods; Chafing dishes; hot plates; overhead lamps; Electric apparatuses for cooking, namely, ovens, waffle makers, toasters, fryers, grills, tortilla presses, rice cooker”

 

Registration No. 5856058 - SUPREME in standard characters for “Plumbing fixtures, namely, lavatories, sinks, toilets and toilet bowls”

 

 

Registration No. 6147203 - HYDRA-SUPREME in standard characters for “Water and industrial fluid filtration and purification units and replacement cartridges and filters thereof” and

 

Registration No. 6249830 - GOLDEN SUPREME in standard characters for “Electric heaters and holders for hair irons; Portable electric heaters and holders for hair irons”.

 

Applicant’s applied-for mark is “SUPREME” stylized for “air conditioners; apparatus for disinfecting water; cooking ovens; electric fans for personal use; electric radiators; electric stoves; hair dryers; lighting apparatus, namely, lighting installations; pipes being parts of sanitary facilities; water purification machines; water purifying apparatus for household purposes”.

 

Overall “‘commercial impression’ is occasionally used as a proxy for the ultimate conclusion of similarity or dissimilarity of marks resulting from a comparison of their appearance, sound, and meaning.”  Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding the marks VEUVE ROYALE and VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN confusingly similar); see also Money Station Inc. v. Cash Station Inc., 70 F.3d 1290, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1150, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that MONEY STATION and CASH STATION are confusingly similar as applied to the services specified in its application).

 

As a primary matter, the marks are confusingly similar because they share a nearly identical dominant element. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Here, the applicant’s mark and each of the registered marks share the term “SUPREME”. This supports the determination that the marks are confusingly similar.

 

As to the registered marks with added wording that are not identical to applicant’s mark, although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Lastly, where the goods and/or services of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Therefore, as the marks share nearly identical dominant elements and because overall, the marks have a highly similar commercial impression, the marks are highly similar in the context of the likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe its goods, specifically, the cooking oven, hair dryers, Water purification machines; Water purifying apparatus for household purposes

which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrants’ more narrow electric hair brushes in Registration No. 1824319, ovens for sous vide cooking in Registration No. 4335468, electric apparatuses for cooking, namely, ovens in Registration No. 5653892, Water and industrial fluid filtration and purification units and replacement cartridges and filters thereof in Registration No. 6147203. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

The application also includes several goods, namely, “hair dryers”, which are related to the electric hair brushes in Registration No. 1824319 and related to the “electric heaters and holders for hair irons; portable electric heaters and holders for hair irons” in Registration No. 6249830, as well as “pipes being parts of sanitary facilities” which are related to the “lavatories, namely, hand-wash bowls” in Registration No. 3132214 and the “plumbing fixtures, namely, lavatories, sinks, toilets and toilet bowls” in Registration No. 5856058 because they are used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use and are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

To the extent evidence may not address all of the items in applicant’s identification, relatedness does not have to be established for every good or service.  It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any or some item(s) encompassed by the identification within a particular class in an application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981).  In this case, relatedness has been established for many of the identified items, which is enough to show a likelihood of confusion.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal – Conclusion

 

The applied-for mark is similar in sound and appearance to each of the registered marks, and the parties’ respective goods are highly related.  It is likely that a consumer could mistakenly believe applicant’s goods are offered by one of the registrants or vice versa.  For these reasons, as detailed supra, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal – Response Options

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

PRIOR PENDING APPLICATION ADVISORY

 

The filing date of pending U.S. Application Serial No. 90550214 precedes applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced application.  If the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the two marks.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application.

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

ASSISTANCE

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Laura Fionda/

Laura E. Fionda

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

Phone: 571-272-7897

Email: laura.fionda@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on January 26, 2022 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90670339

 

A USPTO examining attorney has reviewed your trademark application and issued an Office action.  You must respond to this Office action in order to avoid your application abandoning.  Follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the Office action HERE.  This email is NOT the Office action.

 

(2)  Respond to the Office action by the deadline using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  Your response must be received by the USPTO on or before 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  Otherwise, your application will be abandoned.  See the Office action itself regarding how to respond.

 

(3)  Direct general questions about using USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and whether there are outstanding deadlines to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

After reading the Office action, address any question(s) regarding the specific content to the USPTO examining attorney identified in the Office action.

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO may mail or email you trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  The USPTO will only email official USPTO correspondence from the domain “@uspto.gov.”

 

·         Hiring a U.S.-licensed attorney.  If you do not have an attorney and are not required to have one under the trademark rules, we encourage you to hire a U.S.-licensed attorney specializing in trademark law to help guide you through the registration process.  The USPTO examining attorney identified above is not your attorney and cannot give you legal advice, but rather works for and represents the USPTO in trademark matters.