To: | Team Industrial Services, Inc. (trademark@boulwarevaloir.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90666660 - SMARTSTOP - TEAM-Smartst |
Sent: | December 08, 2021 04:11:57 PM |
Sent As: | ecom127@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90666660
Mark: SMARTSTOP
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Team Industrial Services, Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. TEAM-Smartst
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: December 08, 2021
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Applicant’s mark is SMARTSTOP, for “Isolation device used in pipes and pipelines”, in Class 11.
Registration No. 4143887 is SMART-STOP, for “metal door stops”, in Class 06.
Registration No. 4206926 is SMART STOP HINGE PIN DOOR STOP, plus a design, for “metal door stops”, in Class 06.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, applicant’s mark SMARTSTOP and the registered marks SMART-STOP and SMART STOP HINGE PIN DOOR STOP share a visually and phonetically similar dominant element: SMART STOP; thus, the marks sound and appear similar, and convey a similar overall commercial impression. The marks have their differences, however, these differences do not obviate the likelihood of confusion.
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
In looking at Registration No. 4206926, the design element conveys the vague impression of a stop sign and is insufficiently distinctive to alter the registered mark's overall commercial impression from that engendered by the mark's literal element, SMART STOP HINGE PIN DOOR STOP. Further, despite the mark's design element, consumers will use SMART STOP HINGE PIN DOOR STOP to refer to or request the associated goods. Thus, the literal element is the registered mark's dominant element and source-indicating essence.
For applicant’s mark SMARTSTOP and the registered mark SMART-STOP, the marks are visually and audibly similar, with the only difference in the marks being that applicant’s mark appears as a compound mark, whereas registrant’s mark appears as the same two words, separated by a hyphen. Further, the first wording of the registered mark SMART STOP HINGE PIN DOOR STOP and applicant’s mark, SMARTSTOP are visually and audibly similar, with the registered mark appearing as two separate words. While registrant’s mark includes the additional wording HINGE PIN DOOR STOP, this wording is disclaimed, rendering the initial wording the more dominant element of the mark. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
Thus, for each of the marks, the part of the mark consumers are most likely to focus on and recall is the same: SMART STOP. From the foregoing, it follows that both applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark engender an overall commercial impression that is highly similar.
In short, the marks are identical in part, sharing the dominant feature SMART STOP. None of the design element in the registered mark, the additional wording in the registered marks, nor the slight difference in appearance changes the overall commercial impression of the marks.
Therefore, when compared in their entireties, the marks are confusingly similar.
Looking at the goods, applicant’s isolation devices being pipe fittings and seals are related to registrant’s metal door stops, in that it is common for entities to provide various types of hardware, together under the same mark and in the same trade channels. The attached evidence from ACE and Ferguson show entities that provide metal door stops and pipe fittings/seals, together under the same mark and in the same trade channels.
Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Use of the confusingly similar marks in relation to the related goods would lead to a likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, given the similarity of applicant’s mark to registrant’s mark, and the related nature of the goods those marks identify, there is a likelihood of source confusion. Therefore, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS REQUIREMENT
An in depth knowledge of the relevant field should not be necessary for understanding a description of the goods. TMEP §1402.01. “[T]echnical, high-sounding verbiage” should be avoided. Cal. Spray-Chem. Corp. v. Osmose Wood Pres. Co. of Am., 102 USPQ at 322.
The identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because it is indefinite and overbroad, and could include goods in other international classes. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01, 1402.03. Specifically, the wording “isolation device” does not clearly identify specific goods by a common, commercial name, and could include seismic isolation devices for buildings in Class 07 and shock isolation devices for vehicles in Class 12. Further, it appears that applicant’s goods are a type of pipe fitting or seal, which is classified based whether the goods are metal or non-metal.
Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate, with changes highlighted in bold:
Class 06: Isolation devices, namely, metal pipe fittings and metal seals used in pipes and pipelines
Class 17: Isolation devices, namely, non-metal pipe fittings and non-metal seals used in pipes and pipelines
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
MULTIPLE-CLASS APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS
(1) List the goods and/or services by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class.
(2) Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule). The application identifies goods that are classified in at least 2 classes; however, applicant submitted a fee sufficient for only 1 class. Applicant must either submit the filing fees for the classes not covered by the submitted fees or restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.
See 37 C.F.R. §2.86(a); TMEP §§1403.01, 1403.02(c).
For an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(b) multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Multiple-class Application webpage.
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Josh Galante/
Joshua M. Galante
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 127
571-272-4310
Josh.Galante@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE