To: | Zendesk, Inc. (svtmdocket@reedsmith.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90571583 - SUNSHINE - T36868US00 |
Sent: | October 05, 2021 05:28:49 PM |
Sent As: | ecom117@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90571583
Mark: SUNSHINE
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Zendesk, Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. T36868US00
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: October 05, 2021
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
This Partial Refusal Applies To Classes 38 Only
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5663772. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Applicant’s mark is SUNSHINE (in standard characters) in pertinent part for “Communication services, namely, providing electronic transmission of information stored in a database via interactively communicating computer systems, in the field of customer relationship management (CRM)” in Class 38.
Registrant’s mark is SUNSHINE MOBILE (in standard characters) for “Communications by means of mobile phones; mobile telephone communications; telephone and mobile telephone voice services; mobile telephone messaging services; video telephone services; leasing of mobile telephone lines; mobile telephone telecommunications services provided via prepaid telephone calling cards; transmission of messages by mobile telephone; mobile telephony services; telephone communication, namely, electronic mobile pay-as-you-go telephone communication; communication network consultancy; providing access to a mobile telecommunication network services; providing access to mobile telecommunication networks; wireless broadband communications services; provision of wireless application voice over internet protocol (VOIP) services including those utilising a secure communications channel; electronic network communications, namely, electronic transmission and streaming of digital media content for others via global and local computer network; providing access to electronic communications networks; transmission of information by electronic communications networks; providing telecommunications connections to a global computer network or the internet; transmission of messages, data and content via the internet and other communications networks; hire, leasing or rental of telecommunication apparatus, instruments, installations or components for use in the provision of all the aforementioned services; information, advice and consultancy in relation to all the aforesaid services” in Class 38.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of Marks
A likelihood of confusion exists here because the respective marks, SUNSHINE and SUNSHINE MOBILE, are highly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall impression.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, the marks are similar in appearance and sound due to starting with the identical term SUNSHINE. Further, although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)). Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark. Finally, the additional term in registrant’s mark, MOBILE, is highly descriptive and is disclaimed which gives it little trademark significance. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
As a result, because the marks are comprised in large part of the same or similar wording, they have a similar appearance, sound and connotation. Thus, these marks create a confusingly similar impression.
Comparison of Services
A likelihood of confusion also exists because the parties’ services are related. The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe transmission of information by electronic communications networks, which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow communication services, namely, providing electronic transmission of information stored in a database via interactively communicating computer systems, in the field of customer relationship management (CRM). See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.
Consequently, because the marks are similar in appearance, sound, connotation and convey a similar impression, and the services are highly similar, consumers are likely to be confused as to their source. Therefore registration in Class 38 must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Foreign Registration Certificate Required
A copy of a foreign registration must consist of a document issued to an applicant by, or certified by, the intellectual property office in the applicant’s country of origin. TMEP §1004.01. If an applicant’s country of origin does not issue registrations or Madrid Protocol certificates of extension of protection, the applicant may submit a copy of the Madrid Protocol international registration that shows that protection of the international registration has been extended to the applicant’s country of origin. TMEP §1016.
Therefore, applicant must provide a copy of the foreign registration from applicant’s country of origin. If the foreign registration is not written in English, applicant must also provide an English translation. 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §1004.01(a)-(b). The translation should be signed by the translator. TMEP §1004.01(b).
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Amit K. Shoor/
Amit K. Shoor
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 117, USPTO
571-272-7126
amit.shoor@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE