United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90365975
Mark: BD
|
|
Correspondence Address: 3200 N. CENTRAL AVE., SUITE 2000
|
|
Applicant: Bad Dragon Enterprises, Inc.
|
|
Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
|
FINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: September 08, 2021
INTRODUCTION
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 09/03/2021.
In a previous Office action(s) dated 04/15/2021, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark. Applicant was also notified of a prior-filed application which would present a potential refusal of registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) should it register. The prior-filed application(s) has since abandoned and no longer presents an issue.
Applicant’s arguments with respect to the refusal(s) have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below.
Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in the summary of issues below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:
REFUSAL – SECTION 2(d) – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
THIS REFUSAL APPLIES TO INTERNATIONAL CLASS 21 ONLY
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the following mark:
U.S. Registration No. 6306708 (“BD” for “Christmas tree ornaments and decorations; Christmas tree ornaments with a music feature; Christmas tree ornaments, namely, bells; Ornaments for Christmas trees, except lights, candles and confectionery”)
Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously attached registration(s).
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Applicant’s applied-for mark is “BD” in stylized lettering with a design form. The mark in U.S. Registration No. 6306708 is “BD” in stylized lettering form.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The applied-for mark contain(s) design elements. For a composite mark containing both words and a design, the word portion may be more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used when requesting the goods and/or services. Joel Gott Wines, LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1431 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581-82, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir 1983)). Thus, although such marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). In this case, the wording in the applied-for mark is the more important feature of the mark. The marks would not be further distinguished by the additional design components since a consumer would reference the marks by the written word portion.
The written element of the applied-for mark is “BD”. U.S. Registration No. 6306708 is “BD”. Thus, the written elements are identical. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). Moreover, marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Given the written elements are identical, the marks are confusingly similar.
As such, viewed as a whole, applicant’s mark is substantially similar in sound, connotation and commercial impression to the registered mark.
Comparison of the Goods
The applicant’s and registrant’s good(s) and/or service(s) relevant to the refusal are listed above.
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The trademark attorney has attached evidence from USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a representative sample of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. Please see the attached third party registration evidence, which shows that the goods and/or services at issue (Christmas tree ornaments, coffee mugs, drinking glasses, travel mugs) are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
The previously attached Internet evidence relating to “Lenox”, “West Elm”, “Kate Spade”, and “Mikasa”—and the currently attached Internet evidence relating to “Crate & Barrel” and “Pottery Barn”—shows the same entity provides Christmas ornaments, mugs, drinking glasses, and travel mugs. Consequentially, this evidence shows that the relevant goods and/or services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
ADVISORY – PARTIAL ABANDONMENT OF APPLICATION
Applicant’s Arguments with respect to the Refusal
Applicant makes 6 main arguments with respect to the refusal:
1) The marks are dissimilar in appearance.
Applicant argues that the only commonality between the marks is the letters “BD”. Applicant argues that the two marks are stylized differently. Applicant notes that applicant’s mark contains a design element that is not present in registrant’s mark.
However, case law establishes that the word portion is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar in a composite mark. While the two marks are stylized differently, the two marks are pronounced the same. Case law establishes that similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. Therefore, the marks could be considered confusingly similar.
2) The two marks are significantly dissimilar in meaning, connotation, and commercial impression.
Applicant argues that the letters “BD” stand for “Bad Dragon” in applicant’s mark. In contrast, applicant argues that “BD” is arbitrary and engenders the commercial impression of a line of family friendly, whimsical, holiday present themed Christmas tree ornaments as opposed to the naughty, fantasy-themed, non-holiday, adult nature of applicant’s mark.
However, there is nothing preventing consumers from assuming the two marks have the same meaning because both marks are “BD” with no other wording. This is not the hypothetical situation of “BD Bad Dragon” and “BD Blue Dawn” where the additional wording makes it clear that “BD” refers to different concepts.
3) The parties’ goods will not be encountered by the same consumers and are unrelated.
Applicant argues that its channel of trade are adult product stores and distributors. In contrast, applicant notes that registrant makes family-themed, holiday present themed Christmas tree ornaments that would not be sold through adult products stores or distributors.
However, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The applied-for identification at issue is not “Coffee mugs; Drinking glasses; Travel mugs; all of which is sold through adult product stores and distributors”. Rather, the identification is “Coffee mugs; Drinking glasses; Travel mugs”. As written, such goods could be confusingly similar to Christmas ornaments since companies provide household goods and holiday ornaments. See previously and currently attached evidence.
4) Registrant’s goods and applicant’s goods are unrelated.
Applicant argues the mere fact that several third party sellers cited in the office action provides Christmas ornaments, coffee mugs, drinking glasses, and travel mugs does not warrant the conclusion that consumers would be confused, mistaken or deceived into believing that registrant is the source of applicant’s mugs and glasses or that applicant is the source of registrant’s Christmas tree ornaments.
Please see additionally attached evidence in this office action.
5) Consumer sophistication makes possible confusion very unlikely.
The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011). Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser. In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 375518 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
6) There is no evidence of actual confusion despite years of concurrent use.
“‘[A] showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.’” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii). “[T]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original). “Uncorroborated statements of no known instances of actual confusion . . . are of little evidentiary value,” especially in ex parte examination. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1317, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Based on the foregoing, the refusal of registration is made FINAL.
CONCLUSION
Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:
(1) a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or
(2) an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). There is a fee required for filing a petition. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
How to respond. Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).
/Xu, Elaine/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 128
(571) 270-5297
elaine.xu@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE