United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

COMBINED EXAMINER’S AMENDMENT/PRIORITY ACTION NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.

 

 

Issue date:  April 21, 2021

 

 

PRIORITY ACTION

 

Applicant must address issues shown below.  On April 16, 2021, the examining attorney and Allison Hagey discussed the issues below.  Applicant must timely respond to these issues.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); TMEP §708.05.

 

I.         SEARCH OF THE OFFICE RECORDS

 

Application Refused--Section 2(d) Refusal—Likelihood of Confusion

The examining attorney refuses registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d) because the applicant’s applied-for mark when used on or in connection with the identified goods and/or services so resembles the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3611678, 5218201 and 4143892 as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or deceive. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  Please see the enclosed registrations.

 

Case Law Determinations Governing Likelihood of Confusion Analysis

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  Furthermore, the relevant du Pont factors are not necessarily “of equal weight in a given case, and any one of the factors may control a particular case.” Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F3d 1344, 1355, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

 

The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.  In this case, the examining attorney finds the following du Pont factors are most relevant: the similarity of the marks, the similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and the similarity of the trade channels for these goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

The applicant’s proposed mark is BUENAVIDA; the registered marks are LA BUENA VIDA VINEYARDS, GOODLIFE, and GOOD LIFE BREWING COMPANY.

 

Comparison of the Proposed Mark to the Cited LA BUENA VIDA VINEYARDS

Comparison of the Respective Marks

When making a similarity comparison for purposes of Section 2(d) analysis, the marks must be viewed in their entireties.  See TMEP §1207.01(b).  Nevertheless, marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See e.g., Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, the similar portion of both the applicant’s proposed mark and the registered mark is the identical term “BUENA VIDA.”

 

The examining attorney refuses registration of the mark BUENAVIDA on the grounds that it will cause a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark LA BUENA VIDA VINEYARDS because a significant portion of the applicant’s proposed mark has an identical sound, appearance, and meaning as that of the registered mark.  Similarity in sound alone has been found sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  RE/MAX of Am., Inc., v. Realty Mart, Inc. 207 USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469 (TTAB 1975); In re Cresco Mfg. Co., 138 USPQ 401 (TTAB 1963). TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). 

 

The Spanish article LA[1] and descriptive and disclaimed term VINEYARDS appearing in the cited registration does not alter this determination.  When comparing similar marks, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has found that inclusion of the term “the” at the beginning of one of the marks will generally not affect or otherwise diminish the overall similarity between the marks.  See In re Thor Tech Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1635 (TTAB 2009) (finding WAVE and THE WAVE “virtually identical” marks; “[t]he addition of the word ‘The’ at the beginning of the registered mark does not have any trademark significance.”); In re Narwood Prods. Inc., 223 USPQ 1034, 1034 (TTAB 1984) (finding THE MUSIC MAKERS and MUSIC-MAKERS “virtually identical” marks; the inclusion of the definite article “the” is “insignificant in determining likelihood of confusion”).

 

Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, the applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, the applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.  The similarity between the respective marks caused by the similarity between the BUENAVIDA wording in the proposed mark and the BUENA VIDA wording in the cited registration outweighs the disparity between them caused by the Spanish article LA and the highly descriptive and disclaimed term VINEYARDS appearing in the cited registration. 

 

This is especially true considering, (as more fully explained below) that the respective goods are deemed to be highly related, if not identical, found in the same channels of trade, and marketed to the same consumers.  The courts have consistently and repeatedly found that where the goods of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods.  See, In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Accordingly, the examining attorney finds that the applicant’s proposed mark so resembles the registered mark that confusion as to source is likely.

 

Comparison of the Respective Goods

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).  It is well settled that the compared products and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The examining attorney refuses registration of the mark BUENAVIDA because the channels of trade in which the applicant’s goods travel are similar to those used by the registrant.  The applicant’s goods are identified as:

Hard seltzer.

 

The goods named in the registration comprise:

Wine. 

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application or registration, the identified goods are presumed to “travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  In this case, the identifications set forth in the application and registration have no restrictions as to their nature, type, channel of trade or class of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.

 

As evidence that consumers are accustomed to a single source identifier in relation to both the applicant’s and the registrant’s products, the examining attorney encloses five (5) separate trademark registrations in which the same mark is used in relation to both wine and hard seltzer.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the identified products are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Dallas, 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1218 (TTAB 2001), citing In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); and In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).  As additional evidence establishing that wine and hard seltzer are found in the same channels of trade, marketed to the same consumers, and commonly produced by the same entity under the same mark, the examining attorney refers to the attached webpages of BAREFOOT[2] and TRULY[3] showing such use.  Evidence obtained from the Internet may be used to support a determination under Section 2(d) that goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009); In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1371 (TTAB 2009). 

 

In light of this evidence and the required presumptions under the relevant case law, the examining attorney must find that the respective goods are related in that they are consistently found in the same channels of trade and marketed to, or encountered by, the same consumers under a single mark—a situation that would necessarily give rise to a mistaken belief by consumers that these goods come from a common source, when in fact, they do not.  As such, the respective goods are considered related for purposes of likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

In sum, given the similarity between the respective marks when viewed in light of the relatedness between the respective goods as well as the similarity between the channels of trade for such goods, it is likely that consumers will be confused as to the ultimate source of these products and associate the applicant’s proposed mark with the cited LA BUENA VIDA VINEYARDS registration.  Accordingly, the examining attorney refuses registration of the applicant’s proposed mark pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Comparison of the Proposed Mark to the Cited GOODLIFE and GOOD LIFE BREWING COMPANY Registrations

Comparison of the Respective Marks

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the examining attorney must compare the marks for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Similarity in any one of these elements is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB (1988); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); see TMEP §§1207.01(b).

 

The test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The issue is whether the marks create the same overall impression. See Racot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed Cir. 2000); Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vicon Industries Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The examining attorney refuses registration of the proposed mark BUENAVIDA on the grounds that it will cause a likelihood of confusion with the registered GOODLIFE and GOOD LIFE BREWING COMPANY marks.  In this case, the applicant’s proposed mark is merely the foreign equivalent of the wording in the cited registrations.

 

Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, a mark in a common, modern foreign language and a mark that is its English equivalent may be held confusingly similar.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(vi); see, e.g., In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1127-28 (TTAB 2015); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1025 (TTAB 2006).  Consequently, marks comprised of foreign wording are translated into English to determine similarity in meaning and connotation with English word marks.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Equivalence in meaning and connotation may be sufficient to find such marks confusingly similar.  See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d at 1127-28; In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1025.  The doctrine is applied when “the ordinary American purchaser” would “stop and translate” the foreign term into its English equivalent.  Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1377, 73 USPQ2d at 1696 (quoting In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp., 190 USPQ 109, 110 (TTAB 1976)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(vi)(A).  The ordinary American purchaser includes those proficient in the foreign language.  In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1352, 90 USPQ2d 1489, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1024.

 

The applicant’s mark comprises the Spanish wording BUENAVIDA.[4]  It is well settled that Spanish is a common, modern language in the United States. Ricardo Media, Inc. v. Inventive Software, LLC, 2019 USPQ2d 311355 (TTAB 2019) (Spanish).  In this case, the ordinary American purchaser would likely stop and translate the mark because Spanish is a common, modern language spoken by an appreciable number of consumers in the United States.  Specifically, evidence from U.S. Census Bureau shows that Spanish is spoken by approximately 60 million US consumers and that the attached evidence shows the wording in the mark directly translates into the wording found in the cited registrations.  Accordingly, the examining attorney finds that doctrine of foreign equivalents applies, and also, given the close relationship between the respective goods (as more fully explained below) that the applicant’s proposed mark so resembles the registered marks in relation to meaning and commercial impression that confusion as to source is likely.

 

Comparison of the Respective Goods

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).  It is well settled that the compared products and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The examining attorney refuses registration of the mark BUENAVIDA because the channels of trade in which the applicant’s goods travel are similar to those used by the registrants.  The applicant’s goods are identified as:

Hard seltzer.

 

The goods named in Registration Nos. 5218201 (GOODLIFE) and 4143892 (GOOD LIFE BREWING COMPANY) comprise:

Beer. 

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application or registration, the identified goods are presumed to “travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  In this case, the identifications set forth in the application and registration have no restrictions as to their nature, type, channel of trade or class of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.

 

As evidence that consumers are accustomed to a single source identifier in relation to both the applicant’s and the registrant’s products, the examining attorney encloses seven (7) separate trademark registrations in which the same mark is used in relation to both beer and hard seltzer.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the identified products are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Dallas, 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1218 (TTAB 2001), citing In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); and In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).  As additional evidence establishing that beer and bard seltzer are found in the same channels of trade, marketed to the same consumers, and commonly produced by the same entity under the same mark, the examining attorney refers to the attached webpages of MARCH FIRST BREWING[5] and MARBLE BREWING[6] showing such use.  Evidence obtained from the Internet may be used to support a determination under Section 2(d) that goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009); In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1371 (TTAB 2009). 

 

In light of this evidence and the required presumptions under the relevant case law, the examining attorney must find that the respective goods are related in that they are consistently found in the same channels of trade and marketed to, or encountered by, the same consumers under a single mark—a situation that would necessarily give rise to a mistaken belief by consumers that these alcoholic beverages come from a common source, when in fact, they do not.  As such, the respective goods are considered related for purposes of likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

In sum, given the similarity between the respective marks when viewed in light of the noted relatedness between the respective goods and the similarity between the channels of trade for these goods, it is likely that consumers will be confused as to the ultimate source of these alcoholic beverage products and associate the applicant’s proposed mark with the cited registrations.  Accordingly, the examining attorney refuses registration of the applicant’s proposed mark pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Prior Pending Applications

During the search of the Office’s records, the examining attorney also discovered several potentially conflicting marks in prior-flied pending applications that may present a bar to registration of the applicant’s proposed mark.

 

Information regarding U.S. Application Serial Nos. 90300423 and 90115311 is enclosed. The actual or effective filing date of referenced applications precede the applicant’s filing date. (See attached referenced applications.) If the marks in the referenced applications register, the applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between these respective marks. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. Therefore, upon receipt of the applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.

 

In response to this Office action, the applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between the applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications. The applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits the applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

EXAMINER’S AMENDMENT

 

Application has been amended as shown below.  As agreed to by the individual identified in the Priority Action section, the examining attorney has amended the application as shown below.  Please notify the examining attorney immediately of any objections.  TMEP §707.  In addition, applicant is advised that amendments to the goods and/or services are permitted only if they clarify or limit them; amendments that add to or broaden the scope of the goods and/or services are not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a).

 

Translation Statement

The application is amended to add the following translation statement is to the record:

 

The English translation of the Spanish wording BUENAVIDA in the mark is GOOD LIFE.

 

See 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(9), 2.61(b); TMEP §§809, 809.03.

 

Applicant’s Response

There is no required format or form for responding to an Office action.  For this application to proceed further, the applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, the applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  The applicant may also have other options specified in this Office action for responding to a refusal and should consider those options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, the applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.  For more information and general tips on responding to USPTO Office actions, response options, and how to file a response online, Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” on the USPTO’s website.

 

If the applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02.  Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.

 

When an application has abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) with a $100 fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(a)(1), (b)(1)

 

Responses to Office actions must be properly signed.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2); TMEP §§712, 712.01.  If an applicant is not represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §§611.03(b), 611.06(b)-(h), 712.01.  In the case of joint applicants, all must sign.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §611.06(a). 

 

If an applicant is represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney authorized to practice before the USPTO, the attorney must sign the response.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(i); TMEP §§611.03(b), 712.01.  The only attorneys who may sign responses are (1) attorneys in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state or territory, or (2) Canadian trademark attorneys or agents reciprocally recognized by the USPTO’s Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) who are appointed in connection with a U.S.-licensed attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), 11.14(a), (c), (e).  Foreign attorneys, other than recognized Canadian trademark attorneys or agents, do not have authority to sign responses.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 11.14(c)(1), (e).  If an applicant is initially represented by an attorney, and then later retains another U.S.-licensed attorney from a different firm, the newly retained attorney may not sign responses until the applicant files a new power and/or revocation of attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.18(a)(7); TMEP §604.03.  Please Note:  In all cases, the signer must be identified by first and last name and title or position.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(d).

 

If the applicant has technical questions about the TEAS response to Office action form, applicant can review the electronic filing tips available online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eFilingTips.htm and email technical questions to TEAS@uspto.gov.

 

If the applicant or its appointed attorney has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.

 

/Michael Tanner/

Michael Tanner

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 119

Telephone: 571-272-9706

Email: Michael.Tanner@uspto.gov

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond. 

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.