To: | Moxie Apparel LLC (jbutler@cornerstonefunding.net) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90322041 - MOXIE - N/A |
Sent: | April 30, 2021 10:36:41 AM |
Sent As: | ecom111@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90322041
Mark: MOXIE
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Moxie Apparel LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: April 30, 2021
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 1460942, 1460943 and 5718670 (MOXIE). Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
COMPARISON OF MARKS
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, Applicant’s proposed mark is “MOXIE” with a heart design Registrant’s marks are all “MOXIE” in either standard character or slightly stylized.
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The literal portion of the marks is identical in all cases – MOXIE. Stylization cannot avoid this confusion, because although applicant’s mark appears in a particular font, two of the registrant’s marks are in standard character. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style or stylization; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Thus, the fact that registrant’s marks are in standard character while applicant’s mark has stylization and design elements does not obviate confusion in this case. A consumer viewing the marks would still assume that MOXIE and MOXIE on identical goods identify the same source.
The design of the heart is likewise insufficient to differentiate them for the following reason - when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar for purposes of a likelihood of confusion analysis.
If the marks of the respective parties are highly similar, the inquiry must move to a consideration of the commercial relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.
COMPARISON OF GOODS
Applicant’s goods are “Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic uniforms.”
Registrant’s goods are “t-shirts; shirts; polo shirts; sweatshirts; athletic shirts; caps; hats; athletic jackets.”
Applicant and registrant are both offering identical shirts, hats, caps, and “athletic uniforms” is broad enough to encapsulate the narrower goods of athletic shirts and jackets which often comprise such uniforms. On the whole, the applicant and registrant are offering the same types of clothing goods. Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods and/or services. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Registration of Applicant’s proposed mark is therefore refused registration under Section 2(d) as likely to cause confusion with a registered mark.
SPECIMEN REFUSAL – NO USE WITH IDENTIFIED GOODS/SERVICES
Specimen does not show use in specific class(es). Registration is refused because the specimen does not show the applied-for mark as actually used in commerce in connection with any of the goods and/or services specified in International Class(es) 25. Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); In re Keep A Breast Found., 123 USPQ2d 1869, 1876-79 (TTAB 2017); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(d), (g)(i). An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark as actually used in commerce for each international class of goods and/or services identified in the application or amendment to allege use. 15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a); see In re Gulf Coast Nutritionals, Inc., 106 USPQ2d 1243, 1247 (TTAB 2013).
Specifically, although a tag attached to a garment would be an acceptable specimen, the tag in isolation without any indication of what it is attached to fails to show the required use in association with the goods identified in the application.
Examples of specimens. Specimens for goods include a photograph of (1) the actual goods bearing the mark; (2) an actual container, packaging, tag or label for the goods bearing the mark; or (3) a point-of-sale display showing the mark directly associated with the goods. See 37 C.F.R. §2.56(b)(1), (c); TMEP §904.03(a)-(m). A webpage specimen submitted as a display associated with the goods must show the mark in association with a picture or textual description of the goods and include information necessary for ordering the goods. TMEP §904.03(i); see 37 C.F.R. §2.56(b)(1), (c).
Any webpage printout or screenshot submitted as a specimen must include the webpage’s URL and the date it was accessed or printed on the specimen itself, within the TEAS form that submits the specimen, or in a verified statement under 37 C.F.R. §2.20 or 28 U.S.C. §1746 in a later-filed response. See 37 C.F.R. §2.56(c); TMEP §§904.03(i), 1301.04(a).
Response options. Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:
(1) Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods and/or services identified in the application or amendment to allege use. A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.” The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.
(2) Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b) (which includes withdrawing an amendment to allege use, if one was filed), as no specimen is required before publication. This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements, including a specimen.
For an overview of the response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy these options using the online Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Specimen webpage.
NEW DRAWING REQUIRED – WHITE BACKGROUND
Applicant has submitted a special form drawing on a colored background, which is unacceptable.
A “special form drawing” of a mark includes or consists of special characteristics such as elements of design or color, style(s) of lettering, and unusual symbols and forms of punctuation. TMEP §807.04(a). The requirements for a special form drawing are as follows:
(1) Shows the mark either in black on a white background, if color is not a feature of the mark, or in color on a white background, if color is a feature of the mark.
(2) Is of sufficient quality that will reproduce well.
(3) Includes in the application a description of all literal and design elements in the mark.
37 C.F.R. §§2.37, 2.52(b), 2.53(b)-(c), 2.54(e); see TMEP §§807.04-.04(a), 808.01-.02.
Applicant must therefore submit a new drawing of the mark, showing the mark in question on a white background. For more information about special form drawings and drawings in general, and instructions on how to submit a drawing, see the Drawing webpage.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MARK AND COLOR CLAIM
A mark in black and white need not be claimed as a color mark. By submitting a black and white drawing, and not claiming or referencing color, applicant may protect their mark in all colors. The applicant’s above issue with needing the mark to be on a white background can be further ameliorated by amending to remove the color claim, and amend the description of the mark to avoid a reference to color. The following is suggested:
Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
See 37 C.F.R. §2.37; TMEP §§808 et seq.
TRADEMARK COUNSEL – ADVISORY
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant is encouraged to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in this process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Caitlin Watts-Fitzgerald/
Caitlin Watts-FitzGerald
Examining Attorney
Law Office 111
571-272-9015
Caitlin.Watts-Fitzgerald@USPTO.GOV
RESPONSE GUIDANCE