Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

Issue date:  April 01, 2021

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

Search of Office Records

The trademark examining attorney has searched the Office’s database of registered and pending marks and has found a conflicting mark that bars registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d).  TMEP §704.02; see 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

·         Section 2(d) Refusal—Likelihood of Confusion

·         Potential Likelihood of Confusion—Prior Pending Applications

·         Amended Consent Statement Required

·         Identification of Services

Section 2(d) Refusal—Likelihood of Confusion:

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5993911.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.

Applicant’s mark is “ICON” for “Entertainment in the nature of live performances by a DJ providing non-downloadable musical entertainment” in International Class 41.

U.S. Registration Number 5993911 is “DJ IKON” and design for “Entertainment in the nature of a haunted house attraction; Entertainment in the nature of dance performances; Entertainment in the nature of light shows; Entertainment services in the nature of a bounce house; Entertainment services in the nature of development, creation, production and post-production services of multimedia entertainment content; Entertainment services in the nature of live mixed martial arts (MMA) events; Entertainment services in the nature of presenting live musical performances; Entertainment services, namely, arranging for ticket reservations for amusement park attractions; Entertainment services, namely, conducting parties; Entertainment services, namely, providing advice and information for music, video and film concept and script development; Entertainment, namely, live music concerts; Adult entertainment services, namely, gentlemen's clubs featuring exotic dancing; Arranging and conducting nightclub entertainment events; Arranging and conducting special events for social entertainment purposes; Conducting entertainment exhibitions in the nature of music and light shows; Educational and entertainment services, namely, a continuing program about popular music accessible by radio, television, satellite, audio, video and computer networks” in International Class 41.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01. 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

Comparison of the Marks:

Applicant’s applied-for mark is “ICON” and registrant’s mark is “DJ IKON” and design. 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

In the present case, the compared marks share the virtually identical word ICON and IKON, which are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar.  Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the compared marks are confusingly similar.  In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007) (citing Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (C.C.P.A. 1968)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).  There is no correct pronunciation of a mark; thus, consumers may pronounce a mark differently than intended by the mark owner.  See In re Viterra, Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Interlego AG v. Abrams/Gentile Entm’t, Inc., 63 USPQ2d 1862, 1863 (TTAB 2002)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).  In the present case, the wording ICON and IKON could clearly be pronounced the same.  Such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the compared marks are confusingly similar.  In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007) (citing Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (C.C.P.A. 1968)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).  Furthermore, the additional descriptive wording and design featured in the registered mark do not obviate the stated refusal. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

Accordingly, consumers are likely to associate the shared virtually identical wording ICON and IKON with services that emanate from a single source under a single mark—namely, in connection with the applicant’s and registrant’s underlying closely related services.

As indicated below, the applicant’s services and registrant’s services are virtually identical.  Where the services of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s mark are confusingly similar in appearance and create a similar overall commercial impression.

Relatedness of the Services

The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

The presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b) is that the registrant is the owner of the mark and that their use of the mark extends to all services identified in the registration.  15 U.S.C. §1057(b).  In the absence of limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers in the services in the registration, the presumption is that the services move in all trade channels normal for such services and are available to all potential classes of ordinary consumers of such or services.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

Furthermore, it is noted that “‘[a] showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.’”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii).  “[T]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.”  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original).

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe “entertainment services in the nature of presenting live musical performances”, which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including the following more narrowly identified services in the application: “Entertainment in the nature of live performances by a DJ providing non-downloadable musical entertainment” in International Class 41.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, registration is refused under Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion.

Although applicant’s applied-for mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. However, if applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

Potential Likelihood of Confusion—Prior Pending Applications:

 The filing dates of pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 90094846, 90130292, 90048191, 88725621, 88399278, and 86653926 precede applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced applications.  If one or more of the marks in the referenced applications register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.

 In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

Amended Consent Statement Required:

Applicant submitted a consent statement indicating the following: “I consent to the use and registration by of my name ‘DJ ICON’ as a trademark and/or service mark with the USPTO.” However, applicant must clarify whether the name ICON in the mark identifies a particular living individual.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§813, 1206.03.  In this case, the application neither specifies whether the name in the mark identifies a particular living individual nor includes a written consent.  See TMEP §§813.01(a)-(b), 1206.04(a), 1206.05.

To register a mark that consists of or comprises the name of a particular living individual, including a first name, pseudonym, stage name, or nickname, an applicant must provide a written consent personally signed by the named individual.  15 U.S.C. §1052(c); TMEP §§813, 1206.04(a).  

Accordingly, if the name in the mark does not identify a particular living individual, applicant must submit a statement to that effect (e.g., “The name shown in the mark does not identify a particular living individual.”). 

However, if the name in the mark does identify a particular living individual, applicant must submit both of the following: 

(1)        The following statement:  “The name shown in the mark identifies a living individual whose consent to register is made of record.”  If the name is a pseudonym, stage name, or nickname, applicant must provide the following statement:  “ICON identifies Ernesto Martinez, a living individual whose consent is of record.”

(2)        A written consent, personally signed by the named individual(s), as follows:  “I, Ernesto Martinez, consent to the use and registration of my name, ICON, as a service mark with the USPTO.”

For an overview of the requirements for names appearing in marks, and instructions on how to satisfy this requirement using the online Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form, see the Name/Portrait/Signature of Particular Living Individual in Mark webpage. 

Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814. 

Identification of Services:

The bolded portions of the applicant’s identification of services must be clarified because it fails to describe the nature of the services with sufficient particularity. See TMEP §§ 1402.01; 1402.03.  Specific issues will be addressed within each class below.  As to each of the recitations of services, applicant must use the common commercial or generic names for the services, be as complete and specific as possible, and avoid the use of indefinite words and phrase. See TMEP §§ 1402.01; 1402.03(a).

An application must specify, in an explicit manner, “the particular goods and/or services on or in connection with which the applicant uses, or has a bona fide intention to use, the mark in commerce.”  TMEP §1402.01; see 15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6).  Therefore, proper punctuation in identifications of goods and/or services is necessary to delineate explicitly each product or service within a list and to avoid ambiguity.

In general, commas should be used in an identification (1) to separate a series of related items identified within a particular category of goods or services, (2) before and after “namely,” and (3) between each item in a list of goods or services following “namely” (e.g., personal care products, namely, body lotion, hand soap, shampoo).  TMEP §1402.01(a).  Semicolons generally should be used to separate a series of distinct categories of goods or services within an international class (e.g., personal care products, namely, body lotion; deodorizers for pets; glass cleaners).  Id.  However, colons and periods should not be used in an identification of goods and/or services.  Id. 

In the recommendations below, the examining attorney sought to offer comprehensive proposals in instances where the recitation of services was indefinite.  Applicant is not required to accept these proposals, but any further changes must be within the scope of the recitations set out in the application.  Please see below for a more thorough discussion. 

Additionally, where necessary, the examining attorney has indicated where applicant must supply additional information.  In such cases, the wording is presented in bold print within brackets, for example, “Computer software for {specify the function of the programs, e.g., use in database management, use as a spreadsheet, word processing, etc., and if software is content- or field-specific, the content or field of use}.”  In such case, applicant must supply the required information within the brackets and must remove the brackets from the recitation of services.

It is noted that the Trademark Act requires that a trademark or service mark application must include a “specification of … the goods [or services]” in connection with which the mark is being used or will be used.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(2) (emphasis added), (b)(2) (emphasis added); see 15 U.S.C. §1053.  Specifically, a complete application must include a “list of the particular goods or services on or in connection with which the applicant uses or intends to use the mark.”  37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6) (emphasis added).  This requirement for a specification of the particular services applies to applications filed under all statutory bases.  See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a)(2), 1051(b)(2), 1053, 1126(d)-(e), 1141f; 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.01(b)-(c).

The USPTO has the discretion to determine the degree of particularity needed to clearly identify services covered by a mark.  In re Fiat Grp. Mktg. & Corp. Commc’ns S.p.A, 109 USPQ2d 1593, 1597 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re Omega SA, 494 F.3d 1362, 1365, 83 USPQ2d 1541, 1543-44 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).  Accordingly, the USPTO requires the description of services in a U.S. application to be specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.  TMEP §1402.01; see In re Fiat Grp. Mktg. & Corp. Commc’ns S.p.A, 109 USPQ2d at 1597-98; Cal. Spray-Chem. Corp. v. Osmose Wood Pres. Co. of Am., 102 USPQ 321, 322 (Comm’r Pats. 1954). 

“The purpose of the identification of goods [and/or services] is to provide the general population, including consumers and members of the relevant industry, with an understandable description of the goods and services, which is done by using the common commercial name for the goods [and/or services].”  In re Gulf Coast Nutritionals, Inc., 106 USPQ2d 1243, 1247 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Sones, 590 F.3d 1282, 1289, 93 USPQ2d 1118, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).  If there is no common, ordinary name for the services, applicant should describe the services using wording that would be generally understood by the average person.  See Schenley Indus., Inc. v. Battistoni, 112 USPQ 485, 486 (Comm’r Pats. 1957); Cal. Spray-Chem. Corp. v. Osmose Wood Pres. Co. of Am., 102 USPQ 321, 322 (Comm’r Pats. 1954); TMEP §1402.01.

An in depth knowledge of the relevant field should not be necessary for understanding a description of the services.  TMEP §1402.01.  “[T]echnical, high-sounding verbiage” should be avoided.  Cal. Spray-Chem. Corp. v. Osmose Wood Pres. Co. of Am., 102 USPQ at 322.

For assistance with identifying and classifying services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

Applicant may adopt the following identification of services, if accurate (changes in bold): 

International Class 41: Entertainment in the nature of live performances by a DJ; entertainment services, namely, providing non-downloadable musical entertainment in the nature of providing non-downloadable prerecorded music via a website {this identification is indefinite as it does not identify with particularity any specific service within Class 41.  However, it appears that applicant intended to identify “entertainment services, namely, providing non-downloadable prerecorded music via a website.”  Accordingly, if accurate, it is recommended that applicant adopt the proposed amended identification to clarify the nature of the services.  Otherwise, applicant must amend the identification of services by indicating a specifically identifiable service within Class 41.}

Applicant’s goods and/or services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods and/or services or add goods and/or services not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b).  The scope of the goods and/or services sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification.  TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b).  Any acceptable changes to the goods and/or services will further limit scope, and once goods and/or services are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).

Assistance:

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

/David I. Dubin/

David I. Dubin

Examining Attorney

Law Office 107

571-270-0958

David.Dubin@uspto.gov

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on April 01, 2021 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90267900

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

(1)  Read the official letter.

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

/David I. Dubin/

David I. Dubin

Examining Attorney

Law Office 107

571-270-0958

David.Dubin@uspto.gov

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from April 01, 2021, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”