Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  January 25, 2021

 

 The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

Specifically, applicant must address the following issues:

 

·       Section 2(d) refusal based on the likelihood of confusion with cited registrations; and

·       Section 2(e)(4) refusal based on the mark being primarily merely a surname. 

 

 

Refusal – Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4874861, 4078632, 4553770, and 1012277.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

            Comparing the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Here, applicant’s mark is “RHODES” in standard characters.  Registrant’s marks all contain “RHODES”.  Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Specifically, the cited marks are:

 

·       4874861 – “TRUMBULL RHODES” in standard characters;

·       4078632 – “ELLIOT RHODES” in standard characters;

·       4553770 – “RHODES & BECKETT” in standard characters; and

·       1012277 – “ZANDRA RHODES” in stylized characters.

 

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding “COMMCASH” and “COMMUNICASH” confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding “CONFIRM” and “CONFIRMCELLS” confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding “MILTRON” and “MILLTRONICS” confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered marks, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrants’ marks.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered marks because it contains some of the wording in the registered marks and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from any of the marks.

 

Thus, when comparing the marks as a whole, the overall impression is that of highly similar marks.

 

            Comparing the Goods

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Here, applicant’s goods are listed as “Bottoms as clothing; Hats; Hoodies; Jackets; Tops as clothing; Wearable garments and clothing, namely, shirts.”

 

Registrant’s relevant goods are listed as:

 

• 4874861 – “Clothing, namely, polo shirts, t-shirts, sweatshirts, shirts, shorts, sweaters, jerseys; neckties; bow ties, boxer shorts; swimwear”;
• 4078632 – “Complete articles of clothing, namely, belts, belts straps, gloves”;
• 4553770 – “Clothing, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, suits, ties, socks, underwear, leather belts, imitation leather belts; footwear; headgear, namely, hats, caps”; and
• 1012277 – “outer wear for women-namely, ladies' dresses, suits, coats and separates”.

 

Many of the items overlap.  For instance, applicant’s tops and bottoms would include any items worn on the top or bottom of the body, and applicant’s shirts would include any of the shirts listed by the registrants.  When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).  Thus, many of the clothing items are legally identical.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 

 

Moreover, decisions regarding likelihood of confusion in the clothing field have found many different types of apparel to be related goods.  Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 286 F.2d 623, 624, 128 USPQ 549, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (women’s boots related to men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233, 1236 (TTAB 1992) (underwear related to neckties); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) (women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets related to women’s shoes); In re Pix of Am., Inc., 225 USPQ 691, 691-92 (TTAB 1985) (women’s shoes related to outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397, 398-99 (TTAB 1982) (hosiery related to trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444, 445 (TTAB 1975) (men’s suits, coats, and trousers related to ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400, 404 (TTAB 1964) (brassieres and girdles related to slacks for men and young men).

 

Thus, a comparison of the goods shows that the goods are highly related.

 

            Conclusion

 

In sum, for the reasons outlined above, applicant’s mark is refused registration based on a likelihood of confusion with the cited mark(s).  Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

 

Refusal – Section 2(e)(4) – Surname

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); see TMEP §1211. 

 

An applicant’s mark is primarily merely a surname if the surname, when viewed in connection with the applicant’s recited goods and/or services, “‘is the primary significance of the mark as a whole to the purchasing public.’”  Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 864 F.3d 1374, 1377, 123 USPQ2d 1411, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); TMEP §1211.01.

 

The following five inquiries are often used to determine the public’s perception of a term’s primary significance:

 

(1)       Whether the surname is rare;

 

(2)       Whether anyone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname;

 

(3)       Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;

 

(4)       Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and

 

(5)       Whether the term is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.

 

In re Colors in Optics, Ltd., 2020 USPQ2d 48321, at *1-2 (TTAB 2020) (citing In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995) for the Benthin inquiries/factors)); TMEP §1211.01; see also In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 

 

These inquiries or factors are not exclusive, and any of these circumstances – singly or in combination – and any other relevant circumstances may be considered when making this determination.  In re Colors in Optics, Ltd., 2020 USPQ2d 48321, at *2 (citing Azeka Bldg. Corp. v. Azeka, 122 USPQ2d 1477, 1480 (TTAB 2017)); TMEP §1211.01.  For example, when the applied-for mark is not stylized, it is unnecessary to consider the fifth inquiry.  In re Yeley, 85 USPQ2d 1150, 1151 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1211.01.

 

Please see the attached evidence from the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, which is a weekly updated directory of cell phone and other phone numbers (such as voice over IP) from various data providers, establishing the surname significance of “RHODES”.  This evidence shows the applied-for mark appearing 192,174 times as a surname in the LEXISNEXIS® surname database.  The attached evidence lists the first 200 names. 

 

Additional attached evidence shows that “RHODES” is a common surname, appearing often in the media, as it is the surname of lawyers, professors, distinguished speakers, inventors, NASCAR drivers, extremist leaders, and other prominent members of society.  The evidence shows that consumers would have frequently encountered this word as a surname. 

 

Further attached evidence shows that other registrations, including three owned by the applicant, have treated “RHODES” as a surname in the past.  This evidence also shows that applicant has acquired at least one of the “RHODES” registrations from someone with the surname “RHODES”.  A term that is the surname of an individual applicant or that of an officer, founder, owner, or principal of applicant’s business is probative evidence of the term’s surname significance.  TMEP §1211.02(b)(iv); see, e.g., In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding DARTY primarily merely a surname where “Darty” was the surname of applicant’s corporate president); In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278-80 (TTAB 2016) (holding ALDECOA primarily merely a surname where ALDECOA was the surname of the founder and individuals continuously involved in the business); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1507 (TTAB 2016) (holding BARR GROUP primarily merely a surname where BARR was the surname of the co-founder and applicant’s corporate officer and GROUP was found “incapable of lending source-identifying significance to the mark”); Miller v. Miller, 105 USPQ2d 1615, 1620, 1622-23 (TTAB 2013) (holding MILLER LAW GROUP primarily merely a surname where “Miller” was the surname of the applicant and the term “law group” was found generic).

 

Thus, the evidence clearly shows that the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname. 

 

A mark deemed primarily merely a surname may be registered on the Principal Register under Trademark Act Section 2(f) based on a claim of acquired distinctiveness.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(f); 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a); TMEP §§1211, 1212.  Applicant may respond by asserting a claim of acquired distinctiveness based on one or more of the following:

 

(1)       Prior Registrations:  Applicant may claim ownership of one or more active prior registrations on the Principal Register of the same mark for goods and/or services that are sufficiently similar to those named in the pending application.  37 C.F.R. §2.41; TMEP §§1212, 1212.04.  Applicant may do so by submitting the following statement, if accurate:  “The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services as evidenced by the ownership of active U.S. Registration No(s). _____ on the Principal Register for the same mark for sufficiently similar goods and/or services.”  TMEP §1212.04(e).

 

(2)       Five Years’ Use:  Applicant may submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services through the applicant’s substantially exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce that the U.S. Congress may lawfully regulate for at least the five years immediately before the date of this statement.”  37 C.F.R. §2.41; TMEP §1212.05(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).

 

(3)       Other Evidence:  Applicant may submit other evidence of acquired distinctiveness (such as verified statements of long term use, advertising and sales expenditures, examples of advertising, affidavits and declarations of consumers, customer surveys), with the following statement, if accurate:  “The evidence shows that the mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services.”  See 37 C.F.R. §2.41; TMEP §§1212.06 et seq.  When determining whether the evidence shows the mark has acquired distinctiveness, the trademark examining attorney will consider the following six factors:  (1) association of the mark with a particular source by actual purchasers (typically measured by customer surveys linking the name to the source); (2) length, degree, and exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of advertising; (4) amount of sales and number of customers; (5) intentional copying; and (6) unsolicited media coverage.  See Converse, Inc. v. ITC, 909 F.3d 1110, 1120, 128 USPQ2d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“the Converse factors”).  “[N]o single factor is determinative.”  In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424; see TMEP §§1212.06 et seq.  Rather, all factors are weighed together in light of all the circumstances to determine whether the mark has acquired distinctiveness.  In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424. 

 

If applicant cannot satisfy one of the above, applicant may respond by amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1091; 37 C.F.R. §§2.47, 2.75(a).  Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

 

 

 

Advisory – Potential Refusals

 

The filing dates of pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 90081191 and 88869446 precede applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced applications.  If one or more of the marks in the referenced applications register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

 

Response Guidelines

 

For this application to proceed toward registration, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the issues in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Andrea R. Hack/

Andrea Hack

Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

571-272-5413

andrea.hack@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on January 25, 2021 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90171975

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Andrea R. Hack/

Andrea Hack

Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

571-272-5413

andrea.hack@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from January 25, 2021, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”