To: | Moran, Edward (Icepole123@yahoo.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90150035 - SADBOY - N/A |
Sent: | January 06, 2021 06:09:38 PM |
Sent As: | ecom114@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90150035
Mark: SADBOY
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Moran, Edward
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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COMBINED EXAMINER’S AMENDMENT/PRIORITY ACTION NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: January 06, 2021
Applicant must address issues shown below. On January 6, 2021, the examining attorney and Mr. Edward Moran discussed the issues below. Applicant must timely respond to these issues. See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); TMEP §708.05.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
1. Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
2. Advisory: Applicant May Wish To Seek Trademark Counsel
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5737527. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant’s mark is SADBOY (standard characters) for “[c]lothing, namely, shirts, pants, shorts” in International Class 025.
Registrant’s mark is SAD BOY PREMIUM GOODS (standard characters) for “[c]oats, short sleeve shirts, long sleeve shirts, windbreaker jackets, caps being headwear, jerseys, hats, pants, sweaters and swimming trunks” in International Class 025.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In the present case, applicant’s mark, SADBOY, is highly similar to registrant’s mark, SAD BOY PREMIUM GOODS, where both marks share similar wording as the dominant and first feature of registrant’s mark, and the wording wholly comprises applicant’s mark.
Here, the similar wording in the marks is identical except for a slight difference in appearance, where SADBOY appears in applicant’s mark as a compound word with no space separating the words; and SAD BOY appears in registrant’s mark as multiple words with space separating the words. As such, the wordings in the marks are identical in sound and virtually identical in appearance, and are thus confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar. The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”).
Further, the additional descriptive and disclaimed wording in registrant’s mark, namely, PREMIUM GOODS, is not enough to overcome a likelihood of confusion. This is because although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
As such, the marks are confusingly similar in nature.
Comparison of the Goods
The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
In the present case, applicant’s goods are highly related to registrant’s goods, where both parties provide various clothing goods, including shirts and pants.
Because the marks are similar and the goods are related, it is likely that consumers would believe that the goods emanate from a common source.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
As such, applicant’s mark is refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion.
ADVISORY: APPLICANT MAY WISH TO SEEK TRADEMARK COUNSEL
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant is encouraged to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in this process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
Application has been amended as shown below. As agreed to by the individual identified in the Priority Action section, the examining attorney has amended the application as shown below. Please notify the examining attorney immediately of any objections. TMEP §707. In addition, applicant is advised that amendments to the goods and/or services are permitted only if they clarify or limit them; amendments that add to or broaden the scope of the goods and/or services are not permitted. 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a).
AMENDED IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS
The identification of goods is amended to read as follows:
See TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.01(e).
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Adetayo J. Adeyiga/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 114
(571) 272-7089
adetayo.adeyiga@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE