United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90118062
Mark: BOREAL
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Movavi Software Inc
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Reference/Docket No. 518029.16
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: December 20, 2020
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62, 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.” In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
COMPARISON OF MARKS
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is BOREAL and registrant’s mark is BOREAL BLADE. The first part of both the applicant and registrant’s mark is the same, in that they both include BOREAL.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Also, incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the applicant’s mark BOREAL is entirely incorporated within the registrant’s mark BOREAL BLADE.
In light of the above discussion, the examiner finds that consumers are likely to confuse applicant’s mark with the above registered marks.
COMPARISON OF SERVICES
The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
In the instant case, both applicant and registrant provide Computer related goods and services. Applicant provides temporary use of web-based software and providing on-line non-downloadable software for recording, capturing, and editing multimedia content, namely, video, images, audio and audiovisual content; software as a service (saas) services featuring hosted web-based software for recording, capturing, and editing multimedia content, namely, video, images, audio and audiovisual content in International Class 042, and Registrant provides “Game software; Games that accept virtual or monetary wagers sold as a feature of game software; Augmented reality software for use in mobile devices; Computer game cartridges; Computer game cartridges and discs; Computer game cassettes; Computer game discs; Computer game equipment, namely, discs; Computer game programmes; Computer game programmes downloadable via the Internet; Computer game programs; Computer game programs, cartridges, and cassettes; Computer game software; Computer game software downloadable from a global computer network; Computer game software for personal computers and home video game consoles; Computer game software for use on mobile and cellular phones; Computer game software for use with personal computers, home video game consoles used with televisions and arcade-based video game consoles; Computer game tapes; Computer gaming software for recreational game playing purposes; Computer programs for pre-recorded games; Computer programs for video and computer games; Computer software, namely, game engine software for video game development and operation; Downloadable computer game programs; Downloadable computer game software via a global computer network and wireless devices; Downloadable electronic game programs; Downloadable electronic game software for use on computers, video game machines, and mobile phones; Downloadable video game and computer game software via the internet and wireless devices; Electronic game programs; Electronic game software; Electronic game software for cellular telephones; Electronic game software for handheld electronic devices; Electronic game software for wireless devices; Interactive game programs; Interactive game software; Interactive multimedia computer game programs; Interactive video game programs; Memory cards featuring game software for video game machines; Recorded computer game programs; Video game cartridges; Video game cartridges and cassettes; Video game cartridges and discs; Video game discs; Video game software; Video game tape cassettes; Video and computer game programs; Virtual reality game software; Virtual reality software for playing computer games and video games for computers and video game machines” in International Class 009; and “Computer programming of computer games; Computer programming of video games; Computer programming services for creating augmented reality videos and games; Design and development of computer game software and virtual reality software; Design and development of computer-modeled versions of human beings using computer animation for use in games and other applications, namely, virtual reality software; Designing and developing computer game software and video game software for use with computers, video game program systems and computer networks; Designing and modifying computer programs and video games for others; Development of computer hardware for computer games to be sold as a unit; Video game development services; Video game programming development services” in International Class 42.
When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
After the comparison of the applicant and registrant’s marks and services, the examining attorney has determined that consumers are likely to be confused between the marks because they create an overall similar commercial impression.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/C. Dionne Clyburn/
C. Dionne Clyburn
Trademark Examining Attorney
LO 110
571-272-9358
dionne.clyburn@uspto.gov
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