Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

Issue date:  November 30, 2020

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the following mark(s), owned by the same registrant:

·       ICON, in standard characters, for “property tax appeal representation services for others before local taxing and appraisal authorities” in Class 45 (U.S. Registration No. 5866261)

·       ICON PROPERTY TAX APPEAL, with design, for “property tax appeal representation services for others before local taxing and appraisal authorities” in Class 45 (U.S. Registration No. 5866262)

Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration(s).

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

1.     Similarity of the Marks

Applicant’s Mark: ICON, in standard characters

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

a.     ICON, in standard characters (U.S. Registration No. 5866261)

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is ICON and registrant’s mark is ICON.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.  Id.

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

Where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods and/or services needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines.  See In re Country Oven, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 443903, at *5 (TTAB 2019) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); TMEP §1207.01(a); see also In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

b.     ICON PROPERTY TAX APPEAL, with design (U.S. Registration No. 5866262)

In this case, the marks are highly similar because the marks share the wording, ICON. The only difference between the marks is applicant’s exclusion of the design elements and the deletion of the disclaimed wording PROPERTY TAX APPEAL, in its mark.

When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

Here, even though the applicant excludes the house designs in registrant’s mark, the exclusion of the designs do not alter the overall commercial impression between the marks because purchasers are more likely to be impressed by the wording of the mark. Thus, the more dominant feature is the wording, which is afforded greater weight in determining whether the marks are confusingly similar.

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

Here, the registrant disclaimed PROPERTY TAX APPEAL. Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording, ICON, the more dominant element of the mark.

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

In this case, both marks share the similar wording, ICON. This similarity creates a confusingly similar commercial impression because consumers are likely to believe that applicant’s mark is a condensed form of registrant’s mark or that registrant has begun offering similar goods and services under another iteration of its registered mark. Thus, the removal of the wording PROPERTY TAX APPEAL does not create a distinct commercial impression that distinguishes applicant’s mark from registrant’s mark.

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

2.     Relatedness of the Services

Applicant’s Services:

·       Class 45: Legal services

Registrant’s Services:

·       Class 45: Providing property tax appeal representation services for others before local taxing and appraisal authorities (U.S. Registration Nos. 5866261 and 5866262)

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

The attached Internet evidence establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

Please see the following attached Internet evidence establishing that applicant’s services and registrant(s)’ services are highly related and commonly emanates from a single source and markets the services under the same mark:

·       http://wilkesartis.com/about-us/ (offering legal services and property tax appeal representation services)

·       http://www.honigman.com/practices-tax-appeals.html (offering legal services and property tax appeal representation services)

·       http://www.antonlegal.com/practice-areas/dc-real-estate-lawyers/real-estate-tax-appeals/ (offering legal services and property tax appeal representation services)

Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See id.

The marks create the same commercial impression and the attached evidence illustrates that the services are commercially related and are likely to be encountered together in the marketplace by consumers. Accordingly, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the services originate from a common source. Therefore, registration must be refused. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

/Philip Liu/

Trademark Examining Attorney

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

Law Office 109

(571) 272 - 6792

Philip.Liu@uspto.gov

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on November 30, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90090434

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

(1)  Read the official letter.

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

/Philip Liu/

Trademark Examining Attorney

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

Law Office 109

(571) 272 - 6792

Philip.Liu@uspto.gov

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from November 30, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”