Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

Issue date:  March 01, 2021

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on February 10, 2021.

 

In a previous Office action dated November 20, 2020, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.  In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirements:  amend the identification of goods and services and disclaim descriptive wording in the mark.

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirements have been satisfied: definite amended identification provided and disclaimer statement provided.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

 

• Likelihood of confusion refusal made under Trademark Act Section 2(d)

 

Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 2276703 4732922, and 5404592.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Applicant’s mark is KIDS FUN TV in standard characters for, in relevant part, “Shirts; t-shirts; sweatshirts; hats; beanies; bandanas; caps being headwear; aprons” in class 025 and “Toys, namely, action figure toys, action figures, action figures and accessories therefor, collectable toy figures, dolls, doll accessories, doll clothing, dolls and accessories therefor, furniture for dolls' houses, plastic dolls, play figures, play houses, play houses and toy accessories therefor, pet toys, plastic character toys, play sets for action figures, playset buildings, playsets for dolls, plush dolls, plush toys, positionable toy figures, stuffed and plush toys, stuffed dolls and stuffed toy animals, stuffed toys, stuff toy animals, toy action figures, toy action figures and accessories therefor, toy figures, toy cars, toy houses, and vinyl dolls; balls for games” in Class 028.

 

Registrant’s mark for Registration No. 2276703 is KID FUN in typed drawing for “small toys in the nature of carnival, gift or party favor items”.

 

Registrant’s mark for Registration No. 4732922 is FUN TV in standard characters for, in relevant part, “Clothing, namely, shoes; t-shirts, shorts, sweat shirts, sweat pants, sweat shorts; and headwear, namely, hats and caps” in Class 025. 

 

Registrant’s mark for Registration No. 5405592 is KIDSFUN in stylized form “Batting gloves; Toy pistols; Electronic action toys; Toy building blocks; Jigsaw puzzles; Magic tricks; Apparatus for electronic games other than those adapted for use with an external display screen or monitor; Dolls; Electric action toys; Inflatable swimming pools; Radio-controlled toy vehicles; Balls for sports; Body-building apparatus; Archery implements; Board games”. 

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Comparison of Goods/Services

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

Applicant’s goods are, in relevant part, “Shirts; t-shirts; sweatshirts; hats; beanies; bandanas; caps being headwear; aprons” in class 025 and “Toys, namely, action figure toys, action figures, action figures and accessories therefor, collectable toy figures, dolls, doll accessories, doll clothing, dolls and accessories therefor, furniture for dolls' houses, plastic dolls, play figures, play houses, play houses and toy accessories therefor, pet toys, plastic character toys, play sets for action figures, playset buildings, playsets for dolls, plush dolls, plush toys, positionable toy figures, stuffed and plush toys, stuffed dolls and stuffed toy animals, stuffed toys, stuff toy animals, toy action figures, toy action figures and accessories therefor, toy figures, toy cars, toy houses, and vinyl dolls; balls for games” in Class 028.

 

Registrant’s goods for Registration No. 2276703 are “small toys in the nature of carnival, gift or party favor items”.  In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe small toys, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “Toys, namely, action figure toys, action figures, action figures and accessories therefor, collectable toy figures, dolls, doll accessories, doll clothing, dolls and accessories therefor, furniture for dolls’ houses, plastic dolls, play figures, play houses, play houses and toy accessories therefor, pet toys, plastic character toys, play sets for action figures, playset buildings, playsets for dolls, plush dolls, plush toys, positionable toy figures, stuffed and plush toys, stuffed dolls and animals, stuffed toys, stuff toy animals, toy action figures, toy action figures and accessories therefor, toy figures, toy cars, toy houses, and vinyl dolls; balls for games”.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

Registrant’s goods for Registration No. 4732922 are, in relevant part, “Clothing, namely, shoes; t-shirts, shorts, sweat shirts, sweat pants, sweat shorts; and headwear, namely, hats and caps” in Class 025.  Both applicant’s list of goods and registrant’s list of goods include shirts, sweatshirts, hats and caps.  Further, neither the application nor the registration contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).  Therefore, the goods are closely related.

 

Registrant’s goods for Registration No. 5405592 are “Batting gloves; Toy pistols; Electronic action toys; Toy building blocks; Jigsaw puzzles; Magic tricks; Apparatus for electronic games other than those adapted for use with an external display screen or monitor; Dolls; Electric action toys; Inflatable swimming pools; Radio-controlled toy vehicles; Balls for sports; Body-building apparatus; Archery implements; Board games”.  Both list of goods include action toys, dolls, and balls for sports.  Thus, the goods are closely related.

 

Comparison of Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). 

 

Applicant’s mark is KIDS FUN TV in standard characters.

 

Registrant’s mark for Registration No. 2276703 is KID FUN in standard characters.

 

Registrant’s mark for Registration No. 4732922 is FUN TV in standard characters.

 

Registrant’s mark for Registration No. 5404592 KIDSFUN in stylized wording.

 

In the present case, the marks are identical in part and applicant’s mark encompasses elements of all of the registrant’s mark.  Therefore, the marks create similar commercial impressions.

 

In its response, applicant has submitted printed or electronic copies of third-party registrations for marks containing the wording KID§, FUN, and TV to support the argument that this wording is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection.  These registrations appear to be for goods similar to those identified in applicant’s application. 

 

The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services.  See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods and/or services “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field.  Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1324, 128 USPQ2d 1686, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

 

However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with similar goods and/or services, as in the present case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1328-29, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 2017); AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  These few registrations are “not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them.”  AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1735 (TTAB 2018).  Thus, the few similar third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that various combination of the wording KID(S), FUN, or TV is weak or diluted. 

 

Further, the third party registrations that applicant submitted for the goods in Class 025 are irrelevant because the shared term between applicant’s mark and the cited registration are FUN TV, however, the third party registrations include the words KIDS and TV.

 

With regards to the third party registrations applicant submitted for the goods in Class 028, the two other registrations are transposition of the words at issue, and create a different meaning, thus, are irrelevant.

 

Finally, applicant argues that the marks have different connotation.  An applied-for mark that is the singular or plural form of a registered mark is essentially identical in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression, and thus the marks are confusingly similar.  Swiss Grill Ltd., v. Wolf Steel Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 2001, 2011 n.17 (TTAB 2015) (holding “it is obvious that the virtually identical marks [the singular and plural of SWISS GRILL] are confusingly similar”); Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1355 (TTAB 2014) (finding the singular and plural forms of SHAPE to be essentially the same mark) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877, 878, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (finding no material difference between the singular and plural forms of ZOMBIE such that the marks were considered the same mark).  Thus, the difference between KID and KIDS is not enough to obviate the similarities between the marks.

 

The mark FUN TV, as it relates to the goods in Class 025, is arbitrary.  Applicant has disclaimed the wording KID because it is descriptive of the intended user of applicant’s goods and services.  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Thus, the wording FUN TV is the dominant portion of applicant’s mark, as it relates to applicant’s goods in Class 025.  The dominant portion of applicant’s mark is identical to registrant’s mark for Registration No. 4732922.

 

Finally, where the goods and/or services of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods and/or services.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Therefore, consumers will be confused as to the source of the goods.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Proper Response to Final Action

 

If applicant does not timely respond within six months of the issue date of this final Office action, the following classes to which the final refusal apply will be deleted from the application by Examiner’s Amendment:  Classes 025 and 028.  37 C.F.R. §2.65(a); see 15 U.S.C. §1062(b).

 

In such case, the application will proceed for the following classes only:  Classes 016 and 041. 

 

Applicant may respond to this final Office action by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)       A request for reconsideration that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals; and/or

 

(2)       An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with the required filing fees.

 

TMEP §715.01; see 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2).

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

Janet Lee

/Janet H. Lee/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 124

Phone:  (571) 272-1053

Email:  janet.lee6@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on March 01, 2021 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90085751

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Janet Lee

/Janet H. Lee/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 124

Phone:  (571) 272-1053

Email:  janet.lee6@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from March 01, 2021, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”