To: | Drummond, McKynlie (kynoeco@gmail.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90079330 - RAMMIES - N/A |
Sent: | November 13, 2020 06:19:14 PM |
Sent As: | ecom101@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90079330
Mark: RAMMIES
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Drummond, McKynlie
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
· Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
· Entity Indefinite
Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant’s applied-for mark is RAMMIES in standard characters for “Ramekins” in International Class 21.
Registrant’s mark is RAMMIE in standard characters for “Bakeware; Servingware for serving food” in International Class 21.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant’s RAMMIES mark is virtually identical to registrant’s RAMMIE mark because it is merely the plural form of the registered mark. An applied-for mark that is the plural form of a registered mark is essentially identical in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression, and thus the marks are confusingly similar. Swiss Grill Ltd., v. Wolf Steel Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 2001, 2011 n.17 (TTAB 2015) (holding “it is obvious that the virtually identical marks [the singular and plural of SWISS GRILL] are confusingly similar”); Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1355 (TTAB 2014) (finding the singular and plural forms of SHAPE to be essentially the same mark) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877, 878, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (finding no material difference between the singular and plural forms of ZOMBIE such that the marks were considered the same mark).
Based on the foregoing, the applicant’s applied-for and registrant’s marks are sufficiently similar to find a likelihood of confusion.
Relatedness of the Goods
In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe “[b]akeware,” which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “[r]amekins.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Based on the analysis above, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Because applicant’s and registrant’s marks are similar and the goods are related, there is a likelihood of confusion and applicant’s applied-for mark must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.
Entity Indefinite
If applicant is an individual, applicant should simply request that the legal entity be amended to “individual” and must indicate his/her country of citizenship for the record. 37 C.F.R. §2.32(b)(3)(i); TMEP §803.03(a). Alternatively, if applicant is a limited liability company, applicant must provide the correct name of the limited liability company and the U.S. state or foreign country of incorporation or organization. 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §803.03(h).
If, in response to the above request, applicant provides information indicating that it is not the owner of the mark, registration may be refused because the application was void as filed. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(d); TMEP §§803.06, 1201.02(b). An application must be filed by the party who owns or is entitled to use the mark as of the application filing date. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(d); TMEP §1201.02(b).
Advisory: Applicant May Wish to Seek Trademark Counsel
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant is encouraged to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in this process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
Response Guidelines
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
Assistance
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
Anicka Purath
/Anicka S. Purath/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 101
(571) 270-0622
anicka.purath@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE