United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

COMBINED EXAMINER’S AMENDMENT/PRIORITY ACTION NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.

 

 

Issue date:  November 22, 2020

 

 

PRIORITY ACTION

 

USPTO database searched; no conflicting marks found.  The trademark examining attorney searched the USPTO database of registered and pending marks and found no conflicting marks that would bar registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d).  15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §704.02.

 

Applicant must address issues shown below.  On 11/17/20, the examining attorney and Natalya Vasyuk discussed the issues below.  Applicant must timely respond to these issues.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); TMEP §708.05.

 

PARTIAL SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

The stated refusal refers to the Class 25 goods and does not bar registration of the Class 4 and Class 21 goods.

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4704075.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

 

Applicant’s mark is CHATEAU HOUGHTON (standard characters) for “Robes” in International Class 25.

 

Registrant’s mark is HOUGHTON (standard characters) for “Clothing, namely, shirts, blouses, dresses, skirts, coats, pants, jackets, sweaters, headwear, footwear, belts for clothing, and gowns” in International Class 25.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Comparison of the Marks

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  Here, both the applied-for mark and registered marks contain the word “HOUGHTON”.

 

Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part, and are therefore similar in sound, appearance, and commercial impression.

 

Because the marks are similar in sound, appearance, and commercial impression, a consumer who is familiar with registrant’s mark used on registrant’s goods is likely to mistakenly believe that applicant’s mark, used on applicant’s goods, indicates the same source. Therefore the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The attached Internet evidence consists of webpages from entities which manufacture, under the same mark, both the applicant’s identified goods and the registrant’s identified goods. See attached evidence from GAP, OLD NAVY, and BANANA REPUBLIC. This establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark and that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

In sum, the marks are highly similar and the goods of the parties are closely related.  As such, consumers encountering the marks of the parties in connection with the identified goods are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods.  Accordingly, registration of the mark is refused pursuant to Trademark Act Section 2(d). 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. 

 

Applicant may respond to the stated refusal by submitting evidence and arguments against the refusal.  In addition, applicant may respond by doing one of the following:

 

(1)  Deleting the goods to which the refusal pertains; or

 

(2)  Filing a Request to Divide Application form (form #3) to divide out the goods that have not been refused registration, so that the mark may proceed toward publication for oppositionfor those goods or services to which the refusal does not pertain.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.87.  See generally TMEP §§1110 et seq. (regarding the requirements for filing a request to divide).  If applicant files a request to divide, then to avoid abandonment, applicant must also file a timely response to all outstanding issues in this Office action, including the refusal.  37 C.F.R. §2.87(e).

 

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

 

 

 

EXAMINER’S AMENDMENT

 

Application has been amended as shown below.  As agreed to by the individual identified in the Priority Action section, the examining attorney has amended the application as shown below.  Please notify the examining attorney immediately of any objections.  TMEP §707.  In addition, applicant is advised that amendments to the goods and/or services are permitted only if they clarify or limit them; amendments that add to or broaden the scope of the goods and/or services are not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a).

 

 

VOLUNTARY DISCLAIMER WITHDRAWAL

Applicant has authorized the withdrawal of applicant’s voluntary disclaimer of “CHATEAU”.  The disclaimer is hereby deleted from the application.  See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); TMEP §1213.01(c). 

 

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.

 

 

/Kyle Ingram/

Kyle Ingram

Attorney Advisor

Law Office 125

(571)272-5276

Kyle.ingram@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond. 

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

 

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on November 22, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90078775

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Ingram, Kyle

/Kyle Ingram/

Kyle Ingram

Attorney Advisor

Law Office 125

(571)272-5276

Kyle.ingram@uspto.gov

 

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from November 22, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”