Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  December 10, 2020

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on November 11, 2020.

 

In a previous Office action dated October 22, 2020, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion with a registered mark, specimen appeared to be digitally altered image or mockup, and specimen did not show use of the mark in the specified class.

 

Applicant has also amended the identification of goods. The amended identification is accepted and entered into the record

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in the summary of issues below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

 

·         Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

·         Specimen Refusal – Digitally Altered

·         Specimen Refusal –  Specimen Does Not Show Use in Specified Class

·          

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 2753702 and 4503606.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registrations.

 

Applicant has applied for the mark VIKING in standard characters for frames for “frame components of windshield wiper blade assemblies, namely reusable frames for supporting replaceable windshield wiping inserts” in Class 12.

 

A common registrant owns the marks VIKING in standard characters for tires in Class 12, and VIKING in stylized font with a design of a Viking man for vehicle tires in Class 12.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, the applied-for mark VIKING is similar in terms of appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression to the registered marks for VIKING. Accordingly, the marks are confusingly similar for likelihood of confusion purposes.

 

Applicant’s mark is VIKING and both of registrant’s marks are for VIKING. The entirety of one registered mark and the literal element of the other are identical to the applied-for mark in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods. Id.

 

U.S. Reg. No. 4503606 also includes a design element of a Viking man. However, the addition of the design element does not obviate the confusing similarity between the marks because when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

Furthermore, the applied-for mark appears in standard characters and thus could be presented in the exact same stylization and with the same design as the registered mark. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Therefore, the applied-for mark VIKING is confusingly similar to the registered marks for VIKING

Applicant has not presented any arguments addressing the confusing similarity of the marks.

Relatedness of the Goods

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods and/or services needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines.  See In re Country Oven, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 443903, at *5 (TTAB 2019) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); TMEP §1207.01(a); see also In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

 

In the present case, applicant’s frame components of windshield wiper blade assemblies, namely reusable frames for supporting replaceable windshield wiping inserts, are related to registrant’s tires. The attached evidence from Continental, and the previously attached Internet evidence from Michelin and Goodyear establishes that the same entity commonly produces frames for windshield wiper blades and tires, and markets the goods under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

The attached Internet evidence from Pep Boys, Firestone, and Tire Rack establishes that frame components of windshield wiper blades and tires are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

In addition, the trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods and as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely frames for windshield wiper blade assemblies and tires, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

Applicant’s Arguments Are Unpersuasive

 

Applicant makes the argument that the amended identification of goods differentiates its goods from the goods of the registrant. However, applicant’s specimen and substitute specimen both show goods that appear to be windshield wiper blades. Thus, the fact that applicant has further specified its goods does not obviate the refusal in this case.

 

Applicant argues that its goods and the goods of the registrant are dissimilar because the likely-to-continue trade channels and conditions under which sales are made are different. However, as shown by the above referenced evidence, frame components of windshield wiper blade assemblies and tires may emanate from a common source. The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion.  The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Further, applicant argues that the goods of the parties are dissimilar because applicant’s mark is used in connection with online sales of a subscription based wiper blade product. However, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods as stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).

 

Additionally, applicant also contends that the marks are not confusingly similar because there are no known instances of confusion. “‘[A] showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.’”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii).  “[T]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.”  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original).  “Uncorroborated statements of no known instances of actual confusion . . . are of little evidentiary value,” especially in ex parte examination.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1317, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

 

Conclusion

 

Purchasers familiar with the registrant’s marks for VIKING used on tires upon encountering applicant’s mark VIKING used on frame components of windshield wiper blade assemblies, namely reusable frames for supporting replaceable windshield wiping inserts would likely mistakenly believe that these goods emanate from the same source.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, registration of the applied-for mark is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

SPECIMEN REFUSAL – DIGITALLY ALTERED

 

Applicant was previously refused registration in International Class 12 because the specimen appeared to consist of a digitally created or altered image or a mockup and did not show the applied-for mark as actually used in commerce.  In addition, applicant was required to furnish information/documentation about the specimen to establish that it was actually used in commerce.  Response options for overcoming that refusal were set forth in the prior Office action.  Applicant, however, responded to such refusal by submitting a substitute specimen for each refused international class that does not show proper use of the applied-for mark in commerce for the reasons immediately stated below.  In addition, applicant did not respond to the requirement for information about the original specimen and any substitute specimen.

 

Digitally created or altered image or mockup is not an acceptable specimen.  Registration is refused because the specimen appears to consist of a digitally created or altered image or a mockup of a depiction of the mark on the goods or their packaging and does not show the applied-for mark as actually used in commerce in International Class 12.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a), (c); TMEP §§904.04(a), 904.07(a). 

 

An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark as actually used in commerce for each international class of goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a).  “Use in commerce” means (1) a bona fide use of the applied-for mark in the ordinary course of trade (and not merely to reserve a right in the mark), (2) the mark is placed in any manner on the goods, packaging, tags or labels affixed to the goods, or displays that directly associate the mark with the goods and have a point-of-sale nature, and (3) the goods are actually sold or transported in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. §1127.

 

An image of a product or packaging that has been digitally created or altered to include the mark or a mockup of how the mark may be displayed on the product or packaging is not a proper specimen for goods because it does not show actual use of the mark in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. §1127; 37 C.F.R. §2.56(c); TMEP §904.04(a).

 

In this case, applicant’s specimens appears to be digitally created or altered. Applicant’s substitute specimen is merely a different version of the same webpage submitted as a specimen on July 8, 2020.  The use of the mark VIKING on the pictured goods appears to be digitally altered becaue the mark appears to be floating over the goods and does not appear to follow the natural shape of the goods, which suggest that the mark has been superimposed on to a pre-existing image of similar goods. In addition, an identical image of the goods can be found on the Internet being sold under the mark PIAA and without the wording “SCHEDGE VIKING.” See previously attached screen capture from Tire Rack. Therefore, the specimen appears to be digitally created or altered and does not show actual use of the mark in commerce.

 

Response options.  Applicant may respond to the specimen refusal by satisfying one of the following options for each applicable international class: 

 

(1)        Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.”  The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.  For instructions on how to submit a different specimen using the online Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Specimen webpage.

 

(2)        Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b) (which includes withdrawing an amendment to allege use, if one was filed), as no specimen is required before publication.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements, including a specimen.

 

If applicant submits an acceptable verified substitute specimen or amends to Section 1(b), the requirement below for additional information/documentation about the original specimen will be withdrawn.  The requirement below as to the original specimen will be made final if applicant submits a substitute specimen that is not acceptable or does not amend to Section 1(b), and does not also respond completely to the requirement below.

 

Additional information/documentation about original specimen(s) required.  To permit proper examination of the application record for compliance with use in commerce requirements, applicant must respond to the following requests for information and documentation about the specimen(s).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.  A specimen must show the mark as actually used in commerce, which means use in the ordinary course of trade, and not merely to reserve a right in the trademark.  15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1052, 1127.  Because the specimen of record appears to be digitally created or altered, or is a mockup, further information is necessary to determine whether the specimen is in actual use in commerce. 

 

Answer for each specimen/photograph/image previously provided.  For any website source, provide a digital copy of the entire webpage from top to bottom, as rendered in an Internet browser, that includes the URL and access or print date.  TMEP §710.01(b) (citing In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1733 (TTAB 2018)). 

 

(1)        Identify the particular good(s) listed in the application for which the specimen(s) was submitted to show use of the mark.

 

(2)        Explain whether the specimen was created for submission with this application.  If so, specify the date each specimen was created.  If applicant used the image(s) of the goods shown in the specimen(s) from a third-party website, provide the URL of the website and a digital copy of relevant webpage(s) for each image.

 

(3)        Provide information about and examples of how applicant’s goods appear in the actual sales environment.

(a)        If sold in stores, provide a representative sample of the name(s) of the stores and of photographs showing the goods for sale in the named stores, such as photographs of the sales displays or goods on shelves with the mark. 

(b)        If sold online, provide a representative sample of the name(s) of the online retailers, the website URL(s) for each named retailer, and a digital copy of the webpages showing the goods for sale on the named website.

(c)        If sold in another type of sales environment (e.g., catalogs, trade shows), identify the environment and provide photographs and/or documentation showing the goods for sale in that environment. 

 

(4)        If the information in question (3) about how the goods appear in the actual sales environment is not available to applicant, please describe how applicant’s goods are sold or transported and provide photographs and other documentation showing how applicant’s mark appears on the goods and/or its packaging when the goods are sold or transported to or within the United States.

 

(5)        For each category of sales environment specified in response to questions (3) and (4), specify when the goods bearing the mark were first available for purchase within the United States, the date of the first sale of the goods to or within the United States, and whether the goods are still for sale to or within the United States in that environment.

 

(6)        For the goods identified in response to question (1), provide documentation that shows payment or other consideration made for the goods, redacting personal or private information of buyers as necessary.

 

Failure to comply with a requirement to furnish information is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.  Merely stating that information is available on applicant’s or a third party website or providing a hyperlink of such a website is an insufficient response and will not make the additional information or materials of record.  See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).

 

Thus, the refusal to register the applied-for mark in International Class 12 is now made final because applicant failed to provide evidence of use of the mark in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a), 2.63(b); TMEP §§904, 904.07, 1301.04(g)(i).  In addition, the requirement for information/documentation about the original specimen and any substitute specimen is made final.  37 C.F.R. §2.61(b).

 

SPECIMEN REFUSAL – SPECIMEN DOES NOT SHOW USE IN SPECIFIED CLASS

 

Specimen does not show use in specific class.  Registration is refused because the specimen does not show the applied-for mark as actually used in commerce in connection with any of the goods and/or services specified in International Class 12.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); In re Keep A Breast Found., 123 USPQ2d 1869, 1876-79 (TTAB 2017); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(d), (g)(i).  An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark as actually used in commerce for each international class of goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a); see In re Gulf Coast Nutritionals, Inc., 106 USPQ2d 1243, 1247 (TTAB 2013). 

 

Applicant has applied for the mark VIKING for frame components of windshield wiper blade assemblies, namely reusable frames for supporting replaceable windshield wiping inserts. See applicant’s identification of goods. However, the nature of the goods pictured in the specimen do not appear to match applicant’s identification. Specifically, the specimen appears to show the mark being used on a windshield wiper blade being sold in its entirety, not on a frame component for windshield wiper blades assemblies, because the specimen refers to the goods in the title as “Schedge Katana Wiper Blade.” Thus, the specimen does not show use of the mark VIKING in connection with applicant’s claimed goods, for frame components of windshield wiper blade assemblies, namely reusable frames for supporting replaceable windshield wiping inserts.

 

Examples of specimens.  Specimens for goods include a photograph of (1) the actual goods bearing the mark; (2) an actual container, packaging, tag or label for the goods bearing the mark; or (3) a point-of-sale display showing the mark directly associated with the goods.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.56(b)(1), (c); TMEP §904.03(a)-(m).  A webpage specimen submitted as a display associated with the goods must show the mark in association with a picture or textual description of the goods and include information necessary for ordering the goods.  TMEP §904.03(i); see 37 C.F.R. §2.56(b)(1), (c). 

 

Any webpage printout or screenshot submitted as a specimen must include the webpage’s URL and the date it was accessed or printed on the specimen itself, within the TEAS form that submits the specimen, or in a verified statement under 37 C.F.R. §2.20 or 28 U.S.C. §1746 in a later-filed response.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.56(c); TMEP §§904.03(i), 1301.04(a).

 

Response options.  Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:

 

(1)        Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods and/or services identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.”  The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.

 

(2)        Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b) (which includes withdrawing an amendment to allege use, if one was filed), as no specimen is required before publication.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements, including a specimen.

 

For an overview of the response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy these options using the online Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Specimen webpage. 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

Valenti, Sarah

/Sarah Valenti/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 112

(571) 270-5378

Sarah.Valenti@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.