To: | Eric Elliott (KWB-TMCorrespondence@mvalaw.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90034815 - VIP - 046889.03 |
Sent: | October 13, 2020 10:21:22 PM |
Sent As: | ecom117@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90034815
Mark: VIP
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Correspondence Address: 100 NORTH TRYON STREET, SUITE 4700
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Applicant: Eric Elliott
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Reference/Docket No. 046889.03
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: October 13, 2020
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
Registration of the applied-for mark, VIP, is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 0824208, VIP. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of the Marks
Here, the dominant features of applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark, “VIP”, are identical. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). The word portions of the marks are nearly identical in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; therefore, the addition of a design element does not obviate the similarity of the marks in this case. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, the wording “VIP” in the proposed mark is more significant than the design element and the font stylization.
A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element like the proposed mark here generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters like the cited mark here, because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Relatedness of the Goods and/or Services
The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The goods and/or services in this case are highly related, as applicant’s “advertising and marketing services” overlaps with and can be offered along with registrant’s “MARKETING RESEARCH WITH REFERENCE TO CHARACTERISTICS OF TELEVISION VIEWING AUDIENCES”. In fact, applicant offers marketing research too. Please see attached evidence from applicant’s website at http://www.veryimportantplacement.com/media-buying/ and Internet evidence from http://www.capmediagroup.com and http://www.jplcreative.com supporting the relatedness of the goods and/or services as those of the parties here. Material obtained from the Internet is generally accepted as competent evidence. See In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-03 (TTAB 2009) (accepting Internet evidence to show relatedness of goods in a likelihood of confusion determination); TBMP §1208.03; TMEP §710.01(b). The Internet has become integral to daily life in the United States, with Census Bureau data showing approximately three-quarters of American households used the Internet in 2013 to engage in personal communications, to obtain news, information, and entertainment, and to do banking and shopping. See In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, 113 USPQ2d at 1642 (taking judicial notice of the following two official government publications: (1) Thom File & Camille Ryan, U.S. Census Bureau, Am. Cmty. Survey Reports ACS-28, Computer & Internet Use in the United States: 2013 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf, and (2) The Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. & Econ. & Statistics Admin., Exploring the Digital Nation: America’s Emerging Online Experience (2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/exploring_the_digital_nation_-_americas_emerging_online_experience.pdf). Thus, the widespread use of the Internet in the United States suggests that Internet evidence may be probative of public perception in trademark examination. Thus, they presumably travel to the same consumers through the same channels of trade.
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.
Finally, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, applicant’s mark is refused on grounds of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
Applicant Email Address Requirement
Applicant must provide applicant’s own email address, which is a requirement for a complete application. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(2); Mandatory Electronic Filing & Specimen Requirements, Examination Guide 1-20, at III.A. (Rev. Feb. 2020). Applicant’s email address cannot be identical to the listed primary correspondence email address of any attorney retained to represent applicant in this application. See Examination Guide 1-20, at III.A.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Tina H. Mai/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 117
571-272-4110
tina.mai@uspto.gov (for informal communications)
RESPONSE GUIDANCE