To: | J.R. Simplot Company (trademarks@parsonsbehle.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90028257 - INNVICTIS BIOSCIENCE - N/A |
Sent: | October 08, 2020 11:48:58 AM |
Sent As: | ecom126@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90028257
Mark: INNVICTIS BIOSCIENCE
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Correspondence Address: 800 WEST MAIN STREET, SUITE 1300
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Applicant: J.R. Simplot Company
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: October 08, 2020
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Applicant’s mark is INNVICTIS for “Agricultural chemicals, except fungicides, herbicides, insecticides and parasiticides; Adjuvant for use with agricultural chemicals; Fertilizers for agricultural use; Plant growth nutrients for agricultural use; Plant growth regulators for agricultural use; Silicone surfactants for use in agricultural sprays and adjuvants; Surfactants for use in connection with agricultural pesticides” in Class 1.
The cited registration(s) is INNVICTIS CROP CARE, LLC (Reg. No. 5195067) for, in part, “Agricultural chemicals, except fungicides, herbicides, insecticides and parasiticides; Adjuvant for use with agricultural chemicals; Fertilizers for agricultural use; Plant growth nutrients for agricultural use; Plant growth regulators for agricultural use; Silicone surfactants for use in agricultural sprays and adjuvants; Surfactants for use in connection with agricultural pesticides” in Class 1
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).
In this case, both the applied-for mark and the registered mark share the identically spelled term INNVICTIS. The identical term would sound alike in both marks and have the same meaning.
The shared term is also the initial term in both marks. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).
Further, the other wording in the registered mark has been disclaimed and is thus less significant in terms of trademark use. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
The additional wording in the applied-for mark is descriptive and also would have less trademark significance. Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark. See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
In the present case, the attached evidence shows that the wording “BIOSCIENCE” in the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of or generic for applicant’s goods and/or services. Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording “INNVICTIS” the more dominant element of the mark.
Therefore, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark share the same commercial impression and are confusingly similar.
Comparison of Goods/Services
In this case, the goods and/or services in the application and registration are identical for the Class 1 goods. Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class of purchasers are the same for these goods and/or services. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Because the marks are confusingly similar and the goods are related, there is a likelihood of confusion between the marks. Consequently, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act for applicant’s goods in International Class 1.
The attached evidence from www.merriam-webster.com and www.ahdictionary.com shows this wording means “life science”. Thus, the wording merely describes applicant’s goods and/or services because the goods are used in the field of life science.
Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format:
No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “BIOSCIENCE” apart from the mark as shown.
For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to provide one using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Katherine Ferrell/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 126
(571)-270-3576
Katherine.Ferrell@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE