To: | Feather Home, Inc. (trademarks@cobaltlaw.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88977860 - FEATHER - FEATHER 43 |
Sent: | June 10, 2020 03:43:47 PM |
Sent As: | ecom127@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88977860
Mark: FEATHER
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Feather Home, Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. FEATHER 43
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: June 10, 2020
This Office action is supplemental to the previous Office action issued on June 8, 2020, in connection with this application. The assigned trademark examining attorney inadvertently omitted a necessary issues, namely requirement for a declaration signature and verified statement attached to the amendment to the 1(b) basis. See TMEP §§706, 711.02.
The trademark examining attorney apologizes for any inconvenience caused by the delay in raising this issue.
In a previous Office action dated August 19, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: specimen refusal. The examining attorney also included requirements for an amended identification of goods and services and a multiple class application. Based on applicant’s response, the specimen refusal is withdrawn, and the requirements for an amended identification of goods and services and a multiple class application are satisfied.
However, a new section 2(d) refusal based on Registration No. 5351508 is issued. This constituted a new issue, necessitating this new non-final action. See TMEP §§706, 711.02.
The following is a SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:
• Specimen Refusal
• Declaration and Verified Statement Required
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5351508. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously attached registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “ du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.” In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Standard of Analysis:
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
That is, marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b). Additionally, the goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
The applicant has applied to register the mark FEATHER in standard characters for the following goods:
The cited mark is as follows:
Comparison of the Marks:
In the present case, applicant’s mark is FEATHER and registrant’s mark is FEATHER. These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and services. Id. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Comparison of the Goods:
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi). However, the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Here, applicant has applied for “Downloadable mobile applications for buying and renting of décor and furnishings” and Registration No. 5351508 covers “furniture”.
The attached Internet evidence establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures and provides both downloadable apps for the sale of furniture as well as furniture itself and markets the goods under the same mark. See previously attached evidence from Birch Lane, Joss & Main, Ashely Homestore, Rooms to Go, and Crate and Barrel. The attached evidence also shows that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Conclusion:
The similarity between the applicant's mark and the registered mark, and the relatedness of the applicant's goods to the registrant’s goods, is so great as to create a likelihood of confusion. Thus, registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5351508. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. Applicant should also note the following requirement.
DECLARATION AND VERIFIED STATEMENT REQUIRED
Although there is a presumption of a continuing valid basis, when amending from §1(a) to §1(b) in a trademark or service mark application, the applicant must confirm the presumption by including a
declaration signature and submitting a verified statement that the applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, and that the applicant had a bona fide intention to use the mark in
commerce as of the application filing date. 15 U.S.C. §1051(b)(3)(B); 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(2). See TMEP §§1303.01(b)(i), 1304.02(b)(i), and 1306.02(b)(i) for the verified statement for a §1(b) application for
collective and certification marks.
RESPONDING TO THIS OFFICE ACTION
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. .
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Carolyn R. Detmer/
Carolyn R. Detmer
Examining Attorney
Law Office 127
571-272-2722
carolyn.detmer1@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE