To: | Strong Current Enterprises Limited (wsp@njpls.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88279912 - JANSSEN - N/A |
Sent: | April 23, 2020 05:48:02 PM |
Sent As: | ecom108@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88279912
Mark: JANSSEN
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Strong Current Enterprises Limited
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: April 23, 2020
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on April 19, 2020. In the response, applicant advised the office that Cancellation No(s). 92072396 has been terminated and requested that the Class 14 goods be moved to the Supplemental Register. Applicant also expressed the desire to divide the application.
Based upon the cancellation, the 2(d) refusal issued in the initial office action is withdrawn. The fact that an application with a Section 1(b) basis cannot be placed on the Supplemental Register, the 2(e)(4) refusal is maintained at this time.
Based upon further review of the action herein, a 2(d) refusal for Class 25 only issues. The trademark examining attorney apologizes for any inconvenience this may cause applicant.
REFUSAL –LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION UNDER SECTION 2(D)
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2460525. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
In the instant matter, applicant seeks registration of the mark JANSSEN for Bottoms as clothing for adults, women, men, children, babies; Coats for adults, women, men, children, babies; Jackets for adults, women, men, children, babies; Pants for adults, women, men, children, babies; Shirts for adults, women, men, children, babies; Shoes for adults, women, men, children, babies; Shorts for adults, women, men, children, babies; Sweaters for adults, women, men, children, babies; T-shirts for adults, women, men, children, babies; Tops as clothing for adults, women, men, children, babies; Trousers for adults, women, men, children, babies , in Class 25. Registrant’s mark is STEPHAN JANSON for singlets, dressing gowns, pullovers, bathing suits, cardigans, jerseys, neckerchiefs, scarves, sweaters, trousers, skirts, jackets, shirts, vests, waistcoats, jumpers, blouses, pants, Bermuda shorts, T-shirts, sweatshirts, suits and dresses, overcoats, coats, raincoats, belts, suspenders, shoes, hats, in Class 25.
Similarities between the Marks
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
For comparison purposes, the wording associated with the marks is set forth below:
JANSSEN Applicant’s mark
STEPHAN JANSON Registrant’s mark
It is noted that marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). In the instant matter, the terms JANSSEN and JANSON are very similar. In fact, the marks are phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).[1]
Moreover, there are strong similarities between the marks because they share similar surnames, and that consumers viewing the mark JANSSEN may perceive it as an abbreviated form of STEPHAN JANSON because it is the practice in the fashion industry to refer to surnames alone. See In re SL&E Training Stable, Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1216, 1219 (TTAB 2008).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Comparison of Goods
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In the instant matter, applicant’s identified goods are Bottoms as clothing for adults, women, men, children, babies; Coats for adults, women, men, children, babies; Jackets for adults, women, men, children, babies; Pants for adults, women, men, children, babies; Shirts for adults, women, men, children, babies; Shoes for adults, women, men, children, babies; Shorts for adults, women, men, children, babies; Sweaters for adults, women, men, children, babies; T-shirts for adults, women, men, children, babies; Tops as clothing for adults, women, men, children, babies; Trousers for adults, women, men, children, babies , in Class 25. Registrant’s identified goods are singlets, dressing gowns, pullovers, bathing suits, cardigans, jerseys, neckerchiefs, scarves, sweaters, trousers, skirts, jackets, shirts, vests, waistcoats, jumpers, blouses, pants, Bermuda shorts, T-shirts, sweatshirts, suits and dresses, overcoats, coats, raincoats, belts, suspenders, shoes, hats, in Class 25.
It is noted that the goods of the parties are similar types of casual clothing. Decisions regarding likelihood of confusion in the clothing field have found many different types of apparel to be related goods. Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 286 F.2d 623, 624, 128 USPQ 549, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (women’s boots related to men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233, 1236 (TTAB 1992) (underwear related to neckties); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) (women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets related to women’s shoes); In re Pix of Am., Inc., 225 USPQ 691, 691-92 (TTAB 1985) (women’s shoes related to outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397, 398-99 (TTAB 1982) (hosiery related to trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444, 445 (TTAB 1975) (men’s suits, coats, and trousers related to ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400, 404 (TTAB 1964) (brassieres and girdles related to slacks for men and young men).
Further, neither the application nor the registration(s) contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores. Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks. See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).
Conclusion
Since the marks of the parties create the same general overall commercial impression and the goods of the parties are related and share the same trade channels, there is a likelihood of confusion between the marks and the registration must be refused.
RIGHT TO RESPOND
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
REFUSAL APPLIES TO CLASS 25 ONLY
Applicant may respond to the stated refusal by submitting evidence and arguments against the refusal. In addition, applicant may respond by doing one of the following:
(1) Deleting the class to which the refusal pertains;
(2) Filing a Request to Divide Application form (form #3) to divide out the goods and/or services that have not been refused registration, so that the mark may proceed toward publication for opposition in the class to which the refusal does not pertain. See 37 C.F.R. §2.87. See generally TMEP §§1110 et seq. (regarding the requirements for filing a request to divide). If applicant files a request to divide, then to avoid abandonment, applicant must also file a timely response to all outstanding issues in this Office action, including the refusal. 37 C.F.R. §2.87(e).; or
(3) Amending the basis for that class, if appropriate. TMEP §806.03(h). (The basis cannot be changed for applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a). TMEP §1904.01(a).)
NOT ELLIGIBLE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER AT THIS TIME
CLOSING
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/William H. Dawe, III/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 108
(571) 272-9337 voice
(571) 273-9337 fax
Bill.Dawe@USPTO.GOV (not for fomal responses)
RESPONSE GUIDANCE