To: | United States Distilled Products Company (paul.thomas@pillsburylaw.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88902381 - SKATTER BRAIN PEANUT BUTTER WHISKEY - N/A |
Sent: | August 10, 2020 03:46:06 PM |
Sent As: | ecom125@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88902381
Mark: SKATTER BRAIN PEANUT BUTTER WHISKEY
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Correspondence Address: PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP
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Applicant: United States Distilled Products Company
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: August 10, 2020
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Applicant’s mark SKATTER BRAIN PEANUT BUTTER WHISKEY FOR YOUR NUTTY SIDE is for “Alcoholic beverages except beers and wines” in International Class 33.
Registrant’s mark DOUBLE SCATTERBRAIN is for “Beer” in International Class 32.
Standard of Analysis for 2(d) Refusal
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, the marks at issue feature highly similar and identical terms, rendering the marks similar in appearance and overall commercial impression. Namely, the applied-for and registered marks feature the nearly identical terms SKATTER and SCATTER, respectively, paired with the identical term BRAIN. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
The distinctions in appearance and sound between the marks at issue do not obviate the comparison between the marks. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). In this case, the descriptive wording DOUBLE has been disclaimed from the registered mark. See disclaimer statement of record. Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording SCATTERBRAIN the more dominant element of the mark.
Given that the dominant element of the registered mark is nearly identical in part to that of the applied-for wording, the marks create highly similar overall commercial impressions. As such, the applied-for and registered marks bear a likelihood of consumer confusion as to whether the goods of the parties emanate from a common source.
In addition, applicant’s inclusion of design elements does not overcome the similarity to the registered, standard character mark. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Further, when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, such as the applied-for mark, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
For these reasons, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Goods
For the reasons stated above, registration of the applied-for mark is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
COLOR CLAIM AND DESCRIPTION OF THE MARK
Where the color claim and/or description of the mark and drawing are inconsistent with one another, generally the USPTO looks to the drawing to determine what the mark is. TMEP §807.07(a)(i)-(a)(ii), (c). Additionally, the colors in the drawing, color claim, and description must match. See 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(1); TMEP §§807.07 et seq.
In addition, applicant must submit an amended description of the mark because the current one is incomplete and does not describe all the significant aspects of the mark. 37 C.F.R. §2.37; see TMEP §§808.01, 808.02. Descriptions must be accurate and identify all the literal and design elements in the mark. See 37 C.F.R. §2.37; TMEP §§808 et seq.
To clarify the colors in the mark and the mark description, applicant may satisfy one of the following:
(1) Submit a new color drawing that shows the mark in the colors specified in the color claim. TMEP §807.07(c). However, any other amendments to the drawing will not be accepted if they would materially alter the mark. 37 C.F.R. §2.72; see TMEP §§807.07(c), 807.14 et seq.
(2) Submit an amended color claim and description featuring greater detail that matches the colors in the drawing. Generic color names must be used to describe the colors in the mark, e.g., red, yellow, blue. TMEP §807.07(a)(i)-(ii). If black, white, and/or gray represent background, outlining, shading, and/or transparent areas and are not part of the mark, applicant must so specify in the description. See TMEP §807.07(d).
The following color claim and description are suggested:
Color claim: “The colors black, white, gray, tan, blue, green, red, and yellow are claimed as a feature of the mark.”
Description: “The mark consists of the stylized wording “SKATTER” featuring gray and black swirling patterns within the letters with tan borders around the lettering. The letter “A” in “SKATTER” is upside down. Below the wording “SKATTER” is the stylized wording “BRAIN,” also featuring gray and black swirling patterns within the letters with tan borders around the lettering. Below the wording “BRAIN” is the stylized wording “PEANUT BUTTER” in tan above the stylized wording “WHISKEY” in tan. Below the wording “WHIKSEY” is a design of the head of an elephant in gray, dark gray, black, and white. The elephant is wearing black sunglasses with mirrored lenses that feature white, light gray, dark gray, blue, green, yellow, and red shading. To the left of the elephant’s tusks is the stylized wording “FOR YOUR” in light gray. To the right of the elephant’s tusks is the stylized wording “NUTTY SIDE” also in light gray. All wording and design elements are imposed on a white background.”
For more information about drawings and instructions on how to submit a new color drawing, amended color claim and/or description online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Drawing webpage.
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Amanda Galbo/
Amanda Galbo
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 125
(571) 272-5391
amanda.galbo@uspto.gov
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