To: | Ripple Labs Inc. (tmadmin@kilpatricktownsend.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88884553 - RIPPLE ON-DEMAND LIQUIDITY - 1179638 |
Sent: | July 20, 2020 09:10:46 AM |
Sent As: | ecom121@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88884553
Mark: RIPPLE ON-DEMAND LIQUIDITY
|
|
Correspondence Address: KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP |
|
Applicant: Ripple Labs Inc.
|
|
Reference/Docket No. 1179638
Correspondence Email Address: |
|
NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 20, 2020
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
(This refusal applies to the services identified in International 36 only)
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4528771 and 4453376. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Applicant’s mark is “RIPPLE ON-DEMAND LIQUIDITY” for use with, pertinently:
Class 36: Electronic financial services, namely, monetary services for receiving and disbursing payments and gifts in fiat currencies and virtual currencies over a computer network and exchanging fiat currencies and virtual currencies over a computer network; electronic financial services, namely, receiving and disbursing payments and gifts in fiat currencies and virtual currencies over a computer network; financial services, namely, providing a virtual currency for exchange over a computer network; currency exchange services, namely, exchanging fiat currencies and virtual currencies over a computer network; payment verification services, namely, delivering payments and gifts from a source to a destination; financial management and administration services, namely, facilitating transfers of digital currency, transmission of digital currency via electronic communication networks, and electronic transmission of digital currency
Registrant’s marks are:
“RIPPLE” (Registration No. 4528771) for use with:
Class 36: Currency exchange services; on-line real-time currency trading; cash management, namely, facilitating transfers of electronic cash equivalents; virtual currency exchange transaction services for transferrable electronic cash equivalent units having a specified cash value; electronic funds transfer, namely, transmission of currency via computer terminals and electronic devices; electronic funds transfer, namely, transmission of virtual currency and digital currency via electronic communication networks
“RIPPLE COMMUNICATIONS” (Registration No. 4453376)
Class 36: Financial services and financial transaction services, namely, providing secure commercial transactions and payment options
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, while the applied-for mark is “RIPPLE ON-DEMAND LIQUIDITY”, the registered marks are “RIPPLE” and “RIPPLE COMMUNICATIONS”. Pertinently, then, the marks all include the wording “RIPPLE”. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
Importantly, this wording common to the marks also represents the dominant element of each of the marks. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).
Pertinent to the applied-for mark, “RIPPLE” is the dominant element, as the remaining wording is merely descriptive of applicant’s identified services. Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark. See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
Likewise, “RIPPLE” is the dominant element of the mark in Registration No. 4453376, as the remaining wording, namely, “COMMUNICATIONS”, has been disclaimed. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
Finally, “RIPPLE” represents the only wording in Registration No. 4528771. This wording remains the dominant element of this registered mark, despite registrant’s inclusion of a design element. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
As a result, because the dominant element of the applied-for mark is identical to the dominant element of each of the registered marks, these marks are confusingly similar for purposes of Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Comparison of Services
The services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The respective services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
In this case, the registrations use broad wording to describe “currency exchange services” (Registration No. 4528771) and “financial services and financial transaction services, namely, providing secure commercial transactions and payment options” (Registration No. 4453376), which presumably encompass all services of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “electronic financial services, namely, monetary services for receiving and disbursing payments and gifts in fiat currencies and virtual currencies over a computer network and exchanging fiat currencies and virtual currencies over a computer network;” “electronic financial services, namely, receiving and disbursing payments and gifts in fiat currencies and virtual currencies over a computer network;” “financial services, namely, providing a virtual currency for exchange over a computer network;” “currency exchange services, namely, exchanging fiat currencies and virtual currencies over a computer network;” “payment verification services, namely, delivering payments and gifts from a source to a destination;” and “financial management and administration services, namely, facilitating transfers of digital currency, transmission of digital currency via electronic communication networks, and electronic transmission of digital currency.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, these services of applicant and registrant are related.
Therefore, because of the confusingly similar nature of applicant’s and registrant’s marks and the effectively identical nature of applicant’s and registrant’s identified services, the applied-for mark must be refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, as it would create a likelihood of confusion with the registered marks.
(1) Record the assignment with the USPTO’s Assignment Recordation Branch (ownership transfer documents such as assignments can be filed online at http://etas.uspto.gov) and promptly notify the trademark examining attorney that the assignment has been duly recorded;
(2) Submit copies of documents evidencing the chain of title; or
(3) Submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “Applicant is the owner of U.S. Registration No(s). <applicant must indicate relevant registration number(s)>.” To provide this statement using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), use the “Response to Office Action” form; answer “yes” to wizard questions #3 and #9; then, continuing on to the next portion of the form, in the “Additional Statement(s)” section, find “Active Prior Registration(s)” and insert the U.S. registration numbers in the data fields; and follow the instructions within the form for signing. The form must be signed twice; a signature is required both in the “Declaration Signature” section and in the “Response Signature” section.
TMEP §812.01; see 15 U.S.C. §1060; 37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(1), 3.25, 3.73(a)-(b); TMEP §502.02(a).
Recording a document with the Assignment Recordation Branch does not constitute a response to an Office action. TMEP §503.01(d).
Applicant should note the following additional ground for potential refusal.
PRIOR-FILED APPLICATIONS – ADVISORY
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal and potential refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. However, if applicant responds to the refusal and potential refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.
DISCLAIMER REQUIRED
The attached evidence from the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language shows that the wording “on-demand” means “when needed or asked for” while the wording “liquidity” means “available cash or the capacity to obtain it on demand.” Thus, the wording merely describes applicant’s services, which have all been identified as relating to currency exchange, payment receiving, disbursing, transfer, and verification, and financial data exchange because these services are broad enough to encompass such services focused on allowing applicant’s consumers to obtain, send, or transfer their “available cash” at the moment it is “needed or asked for.” These services allow consumers to access their “available cash” or “liquidity” “on-demand” or at the time it is “needed or asked for.”
Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format:
No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “ON-DEMAND LIQUIDITY” apart from the mark as shown.
For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to provide one using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Timothy J. Callery/
Timothy J. Callery
Examining Attorney
Law Office 121
(571) 270-1987
tim.callery@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE