To: | Jain, Sujan (sujanj@gmail.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88881874 - GLIDE - N/A |
Sent: | July 15, 2020 08:12:18 PM |
Sent As: | ecom124@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88881874
Mark: GLIDE
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Jain, Sujan
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 15, 2020
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3799939, 5695879, and 5697307. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.” In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Applicant has applied to register:
The registered marks are:
The marks in U.S. Reg. Nos. 5695879 and 5697307 are both owned by Glide Capital, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company.
SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
GLIDE and GLYDE
With respect to the applied for mark GLIDE and the mark in the ‘939 registration, GLYDE, the marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan
Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
In addition, the attached evidence from Lexico establishes that the term GLYDE has no meaning in North American English. Accordingly, the minor difference in spelling would fail to distinguish the commercial impression of the marks based on denoted meaning.
Thus, because of the highly similar appearance between the marks, and the phonetic equivalence of the marks which is highly likely to result in consumers associating an identical meaning and commercial impression to both marks, the marks are confusingly similar.
GLIDE, GLIDE CAPITAL, and GLIDE PLATFORM
Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
In this case, the wording CAPITAL and PLATFORM has been disclaimed in registrant’s ‘879 and ‘307 registrations as being merely descriptive of, or generic for, the associated services. Accordingly, the identical wording GLIDE is the more dominant, source indicating wording in each registered mark.
The mere removal of the descriptive language from the registered marks would fail to obviate confusion in this case, as consumers are likely to view highly related financial services marketed under the relevant marks - GLIDE, GLIDE CAPITAL, and GLIDE PLATFORM – as originating from a single source. See, e.g., Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). The presence of the descriptive language fails to change the overall commercial impression of the identical wording, and thus would fail to distinguish the source of the services.
Thus, the marks are confusingly similar.
RELATEDNESS OF THE SERVICES
In this case, the applied for services comprise a variety of financial services specifically including banking and financing services, financial management, financial planning, online banking, electronic banking via a global computer network, processing of credit card payments, providing personal loan and lines of credit, providing electronic processing of electronic funds transfer, ACH, credit card, debit card, electronic check and electronic payment, providing and internet website portal in the field of financial transaction and payment processing services, debit card transaction processing, credit and loan services, and information services in the field of banking and financial advice.
With respect to the services in the ‘939 registration for “Electronic commerce payment services, namely, establishing personal accounts and processing payments for buyers and sellers of goods and services via electronic communication networks,” the services are encompassed by the broadly identified services in the application with respect to providing electronic processing of electronic funds transfer, ACH, credit card, debit card, electronic check and electronic payment, providing and internet website portal in the field of financial transaction and payment processing services, debit card transaction processing. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Similarly, the services of “financial services rendered in connection with the issuance, receipt and transfer of lines of credit, namely, credit processing services” in the ‘879 registration would be encompassed by these same electronic credit processing services. Id. Likewise,
Thus, with respect to the overlapping services, applicant’s and registrants services are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
For the additional services identified in the application and registrations, the attached Internet evidence, consisting of website screenshots from third party financial services providers Bank of America, Chase, Northern Trust and Fifth Third Bank, establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark, and that the relevant services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Specifically, providers of banking services of the type identified in the application commonly offer wealth management, financial consulting, financial information services, investment advisory services, and merchant payments services of the type identified in the cited registrations.
Thus, based on both the presence of legally identical services as well as the evidence establishing the commercial relatedness of the services in the application and each registration, the relevant services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
In this case, applicant's and registrants’ marks are confusingly similar marks in terms of overall sound, appearance and commercial impression. The use of the confusingly similar marks in conjunction with the legally identical or highly related financial services combines to create a substantial likelihood that consumers will be confused as to the source of the services. Therefore, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant is encouraged to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in this process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Christina M. Riepel/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 124
(571) 272-6358
christina.riepel@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE