To: | PEI Licensing, LLC (tricia.thompkins@pery.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88879316 - PE - N/A |
Sent: | February 01, 2021 02:35:18 PM |
Sent As: | ecom101@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88879316
Mark: PE
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: PEI Licensing, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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FINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: February 01, 2021
Status
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on December 30, 2020.
The refusal to register the mark based on Registration Nos. 5102547 and 5294642 has been withdrawn.
Refusal To Register Under Section 2(d)—Likelihood of Confusion
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
I. Comparison of the Marks
Applicant’s mark PE is confusingly similar to registrant’s mark PE and design. Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In the present case, the compared marks could clearly be pronounced the same, e.g. “P E.” Such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the compared marks are confusingly similar. In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007) (citing Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (C.C.P.A. 1968)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). The marks are also presumably identical in meaning because the letters P and E are displayed in the same order and, therefore, appear as initials or acronyms. Although the registrant’s mark includes a design element, the literal element in the cited registration is “PE,” which is identical to the literal element in applicant’s mark.
Applicant argues that registrant’s highly stylized mark creates a distinct commercial impression and, therefore, the marks can coexist without confusion. The examining attorney respectfully disagrees. The applicant has applied for a standard character mark which consists solely of the letters PE. The case law is well-established in this area. A standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Applicant is requesting exclusive trademark rights to use the letters PE in connection with clothing items. The owner of the cited mark has also claimed exclusive use to the letters PE with its clothing items. Since the literal element is identical, the only means to distinguish the marks would be font or stylization. However, the applicant has not limited its mark to any particular style, font or design. Therefore, the applicant’s standard character mark may appear in a manner that is very similar in appearance to the mark in the cited registration.
Moreover, when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
As a result of applicant’s standard claim to the literal term PE, applicant’s mark may be displayed using stylization that is similar to that which appears in the cited mark. The marks in the present case are essentially identical, with the sole exception being the use of stylization by the registrant in its mark. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Therefore the marks are confusingly similar.
II. Comparison of the Goods and/or Services
When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). In this case, the goods and/or services in the application and registration(s) are identical. Neither the application nor the registration(s) contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores. Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks. See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii). Therefore, the use of similar marks in connection with the goods in the application and the registration is likely to result in confusion.
Applicant argues that PE marks are relatively common and, therefore, the cited registration should be entitled to a narrow scope of protection. However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that marks deemed “weak” are still entitled to protection under Section 2(d) against the registration by a subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related goods and/or services. TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1401, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1246 (TTAB 2010).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
In conclusion, applicant is attempting to register exclusive rights to use the term PE for clothing without placing any restrictions or limitations on the manner in which the mark will be depicted on the goods. Potential purchasers who hear the name PE used as a source indicator for clothing items will not be able to distinguish the source or provider of the goods by relying on design elements including font, stylization or other additional logos and tag lines. Potential purchasers who come across applicant’s PE mark and registrant’s PE mark in the marketplace for clothing are likely to confuse the source or provider of clothing items sold under various renderings of the PE logo.
In light of the similarities between the marks and the closely related nature of the goods and/or services, the examining attorney has determined that the mark cannot proceed to registration.
This refusal is now made final.
How to respond. Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
/Saima Makhdoom/
Trademark Attorney
USPTO, Law Office 101
(571) 272-8802 (Tel)
Saima.Makhdoom@uspto.gov
www.uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE